Rules for the computer-aided synthesis of fault trees by J.S. Mullhi (7123478)
 
 
 
This item is held in Loughborough University’s Institutional Repository 
(https://dspace.lboro.ac.uk/) and was harvested from the British Library’s 
EThOS service (http://www.ethos.bl.uk/). It is made available under the 
following Creative Commons Licence conditions. 
 
 
 
 
 
For the full text of this licence, please go to: 
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/ 
 
RULES FOR THE COMPUTER-AIDED 
SYNTHESIS OF FAULT TREES 
by 
J. S. MULLHI 
A Doctoral Thesis 
Submitted in partial fulfilment of 
the requirements for the award of 
Ph. D. of the Loughborough University of Technology 
December 1989 
© by Jasbir Singh Mullhi 1989 
DECLARATION OF ORIGINAL WORK 
This is to certify that the work described in this thesis is my own work, that the original 
work is my own except as specified in acknowledgements, and that neither this thesis 
nor the original work contained within it has not been submitted to any other institution 
for a higher degree. 
PREFACE 
This thesis describes the development of a computer-aided fault tree synthesis package 
for application in the process industries. It builds on the previous research work carried 
out in the Plant Engineering Group at Loughborough University. The emphasis has been 
put on describing the underlying methodology as opposed to the actual computer 
programs. 
The methodology described was developed by modelling a number of "real" systems, 
which had already been analysed using manual fault tree construction techniques by 
British Gas plc. Additionally a number of standard examples from the literature were 
utilised, as well as a large number of contrived examples to fully evaluate the package. 
The problems encountered and their solution are described. 
The culmination of this project was the implementation of the computer package at the 
Midlands Research Station of British Gas plc. It is not intended that the package should 
replace the fault tree expert. It should rather be viewed as a tool to facilitate the work of 
the process engineer, particularly during the design phase. This should enable the 
evaluation of many more options, which would otherwise have been proved prohibitive 
by the effort required to manually synthesise the fault trees. 
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1.0 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 BACKGROUND 
A fault tree is a graphical representation showing the logical relationship between a 
system hazard or undesired event, the top event, and its primary causes. It can be used 
as a means of quantifying the top event in terms of failures in the system components. 
Fault trees can be generated for any top event and any system. However, in this thesis 
the discussion is confined to their application to the process industries. 
In order to illustrate the concept of a fault tree, consider the simple plant layout in 
Figure 1.1: 
Figure 1.1 
Simple Tank System 
The system consists of a tank of water with two hand valves on the outlet, which are 
both closed. Assume that the causes of the event SOME-FLOW at location X are to be 
investigated. 
By defining SOME-FLOW as the undesired event, a fault tree can be developed to find 
the primary causes of this top event. This fault tree is given in Figure 1.2. 
The different types of symbol in the fault tree should be noted. Essentially these fall into 
two categories: logic symbols and event symbols. For a full description of these refer to 
Table 1.1. 
It is seen that the fault tree given in Figure 1.2 is composed entirely of these symbols. 
Commonly no text is written inside the logic symbols; however text is required inside 
the event symbols to describe the state of the plant at the current level of development in 
the fault tree. The top event in Figure 1.2 is thus developed to four primary causes 
representing failures in the two hand valves, and one diamond event cause. 
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Figure 1.2 
Fault Tree for Tank System of Figure 1.1 
SYMBOLS MEANING 
AND Gate - output exists 
only if all the inputs exist 
OR Gate - output exists 
if any of the inputs exists 
Transmissive event requiring 
further development to find 
primary causes 
Basic event representing 
primary causes 
Transmissive event is not 
or cannot be further 
developed, usually because 
it crosses the system 
boundary 
Table 1.1 
Fault Tree Symbols 
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If the tank were normally empty, then the causes of some level in the tank would lie further upstream, in the inlet to the tank. Since the nature of the upstream plant is 
unknown, the event SOME LEVEL IN TANK must be flagged as a diamond event. Alternatively, if it can be assumed that some level in the tank is a normal state, then the fault tree in Figure 1.2 would reduce to that given in Figure 1.3 below: 
Fault tree synthesis is only a precursor to fault tree analysis. Fault trees can be analysed 
using two techniques: qualitative analysis and quantitative analysis. Qualitative analysis 
is the process by which the minimum cutsets of a fault tree are determined. 
A cutset is the set of primary failures which can give rise to the top event; a minimum 
outset would be one which does not contain another cutset within itself. By determining 
all the minimum cutsets for a fault tree, the complete set of failure modes for that top 
event are obtained. Returning to the fault tree in Figure 1.3, four cutsets are obtained: 
1) Hand valve A fails open 
Hand valve B fails open 
2) Hand valve A fails open 
Hand valve B leaks 
3) Hand valve A leaks 
Hand valve B fails open 
4) Hand valve A leaks 
Hand valve B leaks 
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Since this is a very simple tree the cutsets listed above are in fact minimal. The next step in the process would be to carry out quantitative analysis. By knowing the failure rate data for the events in the cutsets, the frequency or probability of the top event in the tree 
can be ascertained. The availability of failure rate data determines the degree of 
resolution required when synthesising the fault tree. An event for which failure rate data is available can be regarded as a primary cause and need not be developed any further. 
Failure rate data for hand valves should be available and so the probability of the top 
event in Figure 1.3 should be determinable. If the probability of the top event is found to 
be too high, then either the valve type can be changed or the plant re-designed. The fault 
tree can thus be used to assess the reliability and safety of a system and if necessary 
direct the attention of the design engineer to those features which are most critical. 
1.2 ESSENTIAL REQUIREMENTS OF A COMPUTER BASED 
METHODOLOGY FOR FAULT TREE SYNTHESIS FOR 
PROCESS PLANTS 
Even the simple example used above highlights some fundamental points which any 
computer-based methodology must address. These are summarised below: 
a) a system flow-sheet can contain much information about the plant and its operation, 
some of which is only apparent to an expert familiar with the system. All of this 
information must be explicitly defined in a form suitable for representation in the 
programming language being used. 
b) failure models must exist which can propagate deviations in process variables from 
one unit to another, as well as describe how primary failures in the models can give rise 
to these deviations. 
c) the methodology must be able to handle multi-valued deviations in the process 
variables, e. g. the flow could be high, low, none, some or reverse. 
d) there must be a facility for carrying out two-way fault propagation, since the causes 
of any given event can occur either upstream or downstream of the current location. 
e) the methodology must be able to cope with complex sub-systems within the plant, 
e. g. control loops and trip systems. 
f) the fault tree must be both correct and be presented in a structurally intelligible 
format. There is a tendency with automated methodologies to destroy the structure 
which an expert manually synthesising the fault tree would clearly impart. 
1.3 FAULTFINDER APPROACH TO FAULT TREE SYNTHESIS 
Essentially there are three basic steps in using the methodology described in this thesis 
to synthesise fault trees: 
- system decomposition, the information in the plant 
flow-sheet is extracted and input to 
the methodology. 
- modelling, failure models are created 
for the different plant items. 
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- synthesis, based on the information supplied in the first two stages, the fault tree is 
automatically generated, for the specified top event, by the methodology. 
FAULTFINDER is the suite of computer programs used to execute the above tasks. This thesis will concentrate on describing the underlying FAULTFINDER methodology 
and how it meets the requirements listed above, rather than describing the computer 
programs. However, Appendix A gives a brief overview of the different programs. 
1.4 STRUCTURE OF THIS THESIS 
The FAULTFINDER methodology and programs have evolved to their current status as 
the result of on-going research by various workers at Loughborough. The rest of this 
thesis is thus split into two basic sections as described below: 
1.4.1 PART A 
Chapter 2 presents a literature survey in the field of computer-aided fault tree synthesis, 
and indicates where FAULTFINDER fits into this overall picture. 
Chapter 3 presents an overview of the basic FAULTFINDER methodology as it existed 
prior to the commencement of this project. This stage of the development will be 
referred to as FAULTFINDER MK1. 
1.4.2 PART B 
This part will outline those developments which were made during the course of this 
project. This stage of the development will be referred to as FAULTFINDER MK2. 
Chapter 4 outlines the refinements made to the model generation program, to facilitate 
the task of creating failure models. 
Chapter 5 outlines the developments to the general methodology, which eliminated the 
need to identify one type of sub-system, divider-header combinations, during the 
decomposition stage. 
Chapter 6 presents rules for the decomposition of control loops, a sub-system requiring 
special treatment in the methodology. 
Chapter 7 presents rules for the decomposition of trip systems, a sub-system requiring 
special treatment in the methodology. 
Chapter 8 describes the enhancements implemented to overcome the problems presented 
by common mode failures, with respect to utility supplies. 
Chapter 9 outlines the interface of FAULTFINDER with two fault tree analysis 
packages PREP and FTAP. 
Chapter 10 describes some test cases which were used to develop the current 
methodology. 
The final chapter in this thesis presents the overall conclusions and the 
recommendations for further work. 
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1.5 CONVENTIONS USED FOR REPRESENTING FAULT 
TREES 
This section describes the conventions used to represent the events and symbols in the 
fault trees contained in this thesis. The event names used to represent the plant state 
refer to one of the following two types of event: 
- variable deviations in process parameters. The format and meaning of these is 
described in Chapter 3. 
- faults in process items. The format of these is described in Chapter 3. Since a fault 
name within the FAULTFINDER methodology can comprise a maximum of eight 
characters, the full meaning of each fault name is given in Appendix C. 
In general the fault tree symbolism used complies with that given in Table 1.1. 
However, for some of the larger fault trees, particularly those in Chapter 10, the 
symbols enclosing the events have been omitted and the logic gates have been replaced 
by text strings, e. g. AND/OR. This has been done for ease of presentation. 
Furthermore in some branches, where the intermediate steps in the propagation chain 
are not significant to explain a particular point, the intermediate events are omitted. 
Such an occurrence is identified by using a dotted line to link the particular events. 
PART A 
CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE SURVEY 
CHAPTER 3 OUTLINE OF METHODOLOGY 
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2.0 LITERATURE SURVEY 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents a review of the literature relating to fault tree synthesis. Due to the 
widespread application of the fault tree technique and the resulting volume of published 
papers, this review is of necessity restricted to those areas which have had the greatest 
bearing on this project. The focus of attention has therefore been the attempt to develop 
formal methodologies for handling the systems in the process industries. 
The following is an overview of the topics addressed: 
- basic fault tree concepts. 
- origins of fault tree synthesis and adoption of the technique by the process industries. 
- development of formal methodologies to handle systems from the process industries. 
- problems encountered in the application of the technique to the process industries and 
their solution. 
- automation of these methodologies in the form of computer codes. 
2.2 FAULT TREE CONCEPTS 
A fault tree consists of a series of events and system states linked together by logic 
gates. Initially an undesired or top event must be defined. The causes of the top event 
are then developed and linked by the appropriate gates. Each of these causes is 
subsequently traced down to its basic cause events, which are normally faults within 
items of the plant. 
The two basic logic gates are the AND gate and the OR gate. An AND gate is used 
when two or more events must occur together to cause the event under consideration. 
An OR gate is used when any one of a number of events is alone sufficient to cause the 
event under consideration. 
Tables 2.1a and 2.1b summarise the conventional fault tree logic and event symbolism. 
In practice the AND and OR gates account for the vast majority of cases encountered. 
This is probably due to the inability of most of the fault tree analysis programs to handle 
the other types of gate. There was in fact much criticism of an EX-OR gate used by 
Lapp and Powers [Ref 2-1], by Yellman [Ref 2-2], Locks [Ref 2-3], Lambert [Ref 2-4] 
and Henley and Kumamoto [Ref 2-5], amongst others. It is indeed possible to reduce 
someof the gates in Table 2.1 a, to their more basic equivalents comprising of AND and 
OR gates only. 
Henley and Kumamoto [Ref 2-6] give a good overview of the different types of fault 
tree symbol. 
2.3 PURPOSE OF FAULT TREE SYNTHESIS 
It should be noted that fault tree synthesis is only an intermediate step, albeit a very 
important one, in the assessment of the reliability of usually complex systems. 
The 
motivation for synthesising fault trees is to enable fault tree analysis. 
Before proceeding any further it is worthwhile clarifying some of the terminology as 
this is used somewhat interchangeably in the literature. 
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SYMBOLS 
2 
FOR 
MEANING 
AND Gate - output exists 
only if all the inputs exist 
NOT Gate - output exists 
only if some events exist 
whilst others do not. 
OR Gate - output exists 
if any of the inputs exists 
FOR Gate - output exists 
if only one of the inputs exists 
INHIBIT Gate - output exists 
only when the conditional 
input is satisfied 
DELAY Gate - output exists 
only after the specified time 
has elapsed 
A 
MATRIX Gate - output exists 
if one or more combinations 
of the inputs exists 
Table 2. la 
Fault Tree Logic Symbols 
Page 2/3 
SYMBOLS 
IN 
A 
OUT 
MEANING 
Transmissive event requiring 
further development to find 
primary causes 
Basic event representing 
primary causes 
Transmissive event is not 
or cannot be further 
developed, usually because 
it crosses the system 
boundary 
A significant undeveloped 
event requiring further 
development to complete 
the fault tree 
Connecting/Transfer Symbols 
A similarity transfer - the input 
is similar but not identical to the 
like identified input 
An event that is normally expected 
to occur 
Table 2.1 b 
Fault Tree Event Symbols 
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Essentially there are four main steps in the analysis of any system using the fault tree 
technique. These are: 
- system definition 
- fault tree construction 
- qualitative evaluation 
- quantitative evaluation 
In the current context fault tree synthesis addresses the first two steps. The last two steps 
are in the domain of fault tree analysis and have not been considered in any great depth 
in this review. 
A comprehensive list of the publications relating to the above four fields is given by Lee 
et al [Ref 2-7]. 
2.4 FAULT TREE ORIGINS 
Fault tree synthesis/analysis was first conceived by Watson [Ref 2-8] in connection with 
the study of the Minuteman Missile Launch Control System in 1961. At its inception the 
technique was largely utilised by the aerospace, nuclear and electronics industries. The 
main reasons being: 
- complexity of these systems defied any informal analysis techniques, and 
- potential failure paths needed to be identified a priori due to the loss potential 
associated with system failure. 
It was not until the early 1970s that the first published work started to appear on the use 
of this technique by the process industries. The following reasons were cited by Powers 
and Tompkins [Ref 2-9] in 1974, for the relatively late adoption of the technique by the 
process industries: 
- the systems were not complex enough to warrant these approaches. Informal 
techniques were able to discover most of the hazardous failure modes. 
- the systems are remarkably robust. Even when several unit failures 
have occurred the 
total process does not fail completely. 
- the consequences of failure often mean that the plant 
is shut down and may be 
restarted. 
- the inherent hazards in most of the chemical industries are 
due to the reactivity of the 
chemicals being processed. The prediction of the behaviour of these chemicals under a 
wide range of conditions is difficult. Hence, a great deal of uncertainty surrounds the 
definition of hazards. 
- the difficulty in generating chemical process models, which can 
be easily solved and 
applied under a wide range of normal/abnormal operating conditions. 
- the effort required to produce good quality 
fault trees. This could easily run into 
man-months or even man-years. 
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In [Ref 2-9] Powers and Tomkins also cite a number of reasons for the growing suitability of using a formal approach like fault tree synthesis for the process industries. These arose due to the increasing complexity of such systems and the potential hazards associated with them. The main reasons being: 
- larger processing units and trend towards single train installations. 
- more complete process integration to enable energy recovery and waste recycling. 
- reduction of intermediate storage capacity. 
- centralisation of control. 
- growth of computer-based systems. 
- multiplexing of equipment. 
- location of plants closer to population centers. 
2.5 SYSTEM DEFINITION 
The starting point for analysing any chemical process system will normally either be a flow diagram or aP&I diagram. In assessing the causes of any particular hazard, it is 
not possible to consider the whole system in its entirety except for the most trivial cases. A common approach adopted has therefore been to consider the system as being 
composed of a number of inter-connected components. The task of fault tree synthesis is 
thus broken down to manageable proportions. By synthesising a sub-tree for each 
component it is possible to build the overall fault tree for the whole system by simply linking together the various sub-trees. 
Many of the workers in this field have generally decomposed the systems at a level 
which usually gives a one-to-one correspondence between the units in the physical 
system and the components in the decomposed representation. The main divergence 
from this approach has been by Shafaghi et al [Ref 2-10], in which they describe a 
technique for decomposing the plant based on the control and protective loops contained 
within it. 
In order to be able to build a fault tree from the system components it is necessary to 
model the behaviour of the components both under normal operation and also under 
fault conditions. If the decomposition and modelling is done in a context-independent 
manner, i. e. regardless of what the component is connected to, then it is possible to 
build up a library of failure models which can be used again and again in a wide variety 
of applications. The problems inherent in trying to create models of this nature are 
discussed by Brown and De Kleer [Ref 2-11]. 
In general it can be taken that the finer the level of decomposition of the system, the 
greater will be the applicability of the resultant failure models. However the price paid 
for this is, that much greater effort is required in building the models for the increased 
number of components. 
It follows then that models created from a decomposition at the unit/component level 
will be fairly context-independent whereas those arising from structure modelling as 
used by Shafaghi et al, by decomposing the system around control/protective loops will 
almost certainly not be context-independent. 
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2.6 UNIT MODELLING 
The behaviour of process units is described in terms of mass, energy and momentum 
balances. This representation could be achieved by writing the full unsteady state 
differential equations. Powers and Tompkins [Ref 2-9], however highlight three main 
disadvantages with using this approach: 
- models are complex and contain very detailed information about the system. 
- models are normally difficult to solve. 
- models are usually constrained to a specific operating region and a specific mode of failure. 
They go on to suggest that the biggest disadvantage is probably the last one, since if a 
system has been modelled to the extent of a dynamic simulation then the associated 
hazards are well on the way to being understood. The whole point of fault tree synthesis 
and fault tree analysis is to identify unforeseen failure modes. 
The concept of information flow models is introduced where the coupling between 
variables is defined. This is illustrated in the following example of the heat exchanger 
model taken from [Ref 2-91: 
m4, P4, T4 
m3, P3, T3 
Figure 2.1 
Heat Exchanger Model of Powers and T 
Independent De endent Variables 
Variables ml m3 T2 T4 U 
TI 0 0 + + 0 
T3 0 0 + + 0 
U 
A 
0 
0 
0 
0 
- 
- 
+ 
+ 
X 
0 
P1 + 0 + + + 
P2 
P3 
- 
0 
0 
+ 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
+ 
P4 0 - + + - 
Table 2.2 
Variable Cou lin Matrix for Heat Exchanger Model of Figure 2.1 
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where: 
0 indicates no or negligible dependency 
+, - indicates direction of the dependency 
X indicates an invalid combination 
m 1, m3 are flow-rates of the two streams 
T(1-4) are the respective temperatures 
U is the overall heat transfer coefficient 
A is the overall area for heat transfer 
P(1-4) are the respective pressures 
Almost all the work published is based upon using this concept of qualitative modelling. 
Despite its apparent simplicity it has proved an adequate vehicle for generating and 
analysing fault trees. 
2.7 KNOWLEDGE REPRESENTATION FORMALISMS 
2.7.1 INTRODUCTION 
This section outlines the main formalisms used by various workers in developing the 
methodologies for the creation of the unit models. The following techniques are 
reviewed: 
- directed graphs (digraphs) 
- decision tables 
- mini-fault trees (minitrees) 
- reliability graph 
- failure transfer functions 
2.7.2 DIGRAPHS 
In 1977, Lapp and Powers [Ref 2-1] illustrated the use of a digraph representation to 
model the system. A digraph is composed of a set of nodes which are connected by 
directed edges. The nodes on the graph represent the process variables and certain types 
of failure events. If one variable affects another then a directed edge is drawn from the 
independent to the dependent variable. 
The significant aspects of digraphs will be illustrated by reference to the following 
model for a pneumatic control valve: 
3 
2 
Figure 2.2 
Pneumatic Control Valve Model 
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The parameters of prime interest are the application of pressure (P) at location 3 and its 
resultant effect on the flow rate (M) at location 2. The basic digraph for this would be: 
(P3 
M2 
Figure 2.3 
Simple Digraph for Control Valve Model of Figure 2.2 
In general it is necessary to indicate the gain on the edge. The gain would be -1 for a 
normal control valve, giving the following mapping between the two variables: 
P3 M2 
-10 +10 
-1 +1 
0 0 
+1 -1 
+10 -10 
Table 2.3 
_Mapping 
Between Control Valve Parameters 1 
The gain can thus be interpreted as a (partial) derivative: dM2/dP3 = -1. 
Had the valve been of the slam shut type then the gain between the two variables would 
have been -10. This would have given the following mapping between P3 and M2: 
P3 M2 
-10 0 
-1 0 
0 0 
+1 -10 
+10 -10 
Table 2.4 
Ma in Between Control Valve Parameters 2 
The following points are worthy of note: 
- five deviation states are used to model 
disturbances: -10, -1,0, +1, +10. 
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- the disturbance in the dependent variable is obtained by multiplying the deviation in 
the independent variable by the gain. 
- the maximum deviation is 10. 
In general a common interpretation imposed on these deviation states is: 
0 normal state for the variable. 
-1, +1 moderate disturbances (low or high) which would be 
correctable by control loops. 
-10, +10 large disturbances (very high and very low) which 
would overload control loops, but would be correctable 
by trip systems. 
Edge dependent relationships can also be included as shown below: 
+1: valve reversed 
P3 -1 M2 
-10 0: valve stuck 
valve closed 
Figure 2.4 
Digraph Showing Edge-Dependent Relationships 
Hence, both the usual relationships and the influence that failures would have, can be 
modelled within the same digraph. 
Using the principles outlined above a digraph for the entire system can be developed by 
building digraphs for the components and then linking them together. 
The application of the digraph technique has been illustrated by Lapp and Powers [Ref 
2-1 ], Andrews and Morgan [Ref 2-12], Cummings, Lapp and Powers [Ref 2-13] and 
Allen [Ref 2-14]. 
2.7.3 MINITREES 
The use of this technique has been demonstrated by a number of workers, most notably 
Kelly and Lees [Ref 2-15], Lees, Andow and Murphy [Ref 2-16] and Taylor [Ref 2-17]. 
The technique is based upon a modular decomposition of the plant into its constituent 
units. Minitrees are then used to represent the failure model for each unit. In general a 
minitree is required to describe the propagation of each deviation in each variable 
through the model. 
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Consider the following unit model for a non-return valve: 
0 
MMMMMMMMMMMMý 
Figure 2.5 
Schematic Representation of Non-Return Valve 
Using the concepts outlined in [Ref 2-15] and [Ref 2-16], the following two minitrees 
would describe the propagation of low and reverse flow through the unit: 
Low Flow Reverse Flow 
Reduced Increased Pressure 
Pressure Blockage Pressure Valve Reversal Fails Upstream in Valve Downstream 
Figure 2.6 
Minitrees for Non-Return Valve Model 
Similarly minitrees would be required for any other deviation in flow e. g. high, none 
etc., and for the complete set of deviations for the other variables in the methodology. 
In the above two minitrees, the output events are deviations in variables and the inputs 
either deviations in variables or basic event failures. Hence minitrees can describe both 
fault initiation and fault propagation. 
The minitrees are generated from three primary input sources: 
a) propagation equations, which describe the propagation of variable deviations through 
the model. 
b) event statements, which describe fault initiation in a model. 
c) decision tables, which allow the incorporation of AND logic into the model. 
Further details of these can be found in Chapter 3 of this thesis. 
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The minitrees used by Taylor [Ref 2-17] to build the failure models are somewhat different. They have the following general structure: 
Output Event 
or New State 
I- 
_7 
Input Event Condition 
Figure 2.7 
General Format of Minitrees Used by Taylor 
Hence considering the following system: 
Coolant 
Stream 
PUMP 
X 
High Temp 
at X 
Not Compensated 
Pump by Control Valve 
Fails Adjustment 
Schematic Re 
Hot 
Stream 
HEAT CONTROL 
EXCHANGER ý VALVE 
Figure 2.8 
tation of a Heat Exchanger System 
This would yield the following minitree for a high temperature at location X: 
Figure 2.9 
Minitree for Heat Exchanger System of Fi 2.8 
/ 
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It can be seen from the above minitree, that in general it is necessary not only to model the failures, but also to AND the causes with any compensatory events. 
The technique used for building the minitrees is based upon: 
a) drawing equation bigraphs for the component which connect the equations and 
variables. 
b) marking arrows on the equation bigraph to produce a cause-effect graph to describe 
the propagation of disturbances through the plant. 
c) extracting signal flow graphs from the cause-effect graphs which show the influence 
of each variable on other variables. 
The normal deviation states used are: 
- normal, zero and negative. 
- disturbed high/low (correctable by control loops). 
- high/low (corrected by trip systems). 
- very high/low (cannot be corrected). 
2.7.4 DECISION TABLES 
This technique has been described by Salem et al [Ref 2-18]. The decision table is used 
to describe each possible output state of a component in terms of its inputs and the 
internal operational or failed states. The following example is taken from the above 
paper to illustrate the application of this technique to a fuse component model: 
Row Number Input State Internal Mode Output State 
1 0 0 0 
2 0 1 0 
3 0 2 0 
4 1 0 1 
5 1 1 0 
6 1 2 1 
7 2 0 0 
8 2 1 0 
9 2 2 2 
Table 2.5 
Decision Table for Fuse Component Model 
where: 
a) For Input/Output States: 
b) For Internal Modes: 
0= no signal 
1= normal 
2= overload 
0= good 
I= failed open 
2= failed closed 
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It should be noted that any number of states can be modelled using this technique; in the 
above component model three states have been utilised. 
An important extension of this technique is the introduction of "Don't Care" logic into 
the model, in order to facilitate both the modelling and the fault tree construction 
phases. This is achieved on the following basis: 
a) the rows which have identical outputs are searched. Hence, in the above model if 
Output 0 is first investigated then Rows 1-3,5,7 and 8 would be flagged. 
b) each column in these rows is then analysed to see if they agree in all but one column. 
The following two sets would thus result: Set 1 (Rows: 1-3); and Set 2 (Rows: 2,5 and 
8). 
c) in the column which disagrees, if it contains every possible state, then it can be 
replaced by a "Don't Care" state. 
Hence, in the above model Rows 1-3 would be replaced by a single row thus: 
Row Number Input State Internal Mode Output State 
New Row 0 - 0 
where '-' represents "Don't Care" state. 
It should also be noted that in general this reduction step can only be applied to the input 
and internal columns. It cannot be used on the output state column. 
2.7.5 RELIABILITY GRAPH 
Camarda, Corsi and Trentadue [Ref 2-19] introduced the concept of using a reliability 
graph in which all the possible ways of correct system operation are shown. The 
advantage of this approach is that a reliability graph is much easier to construct than a 
failure model representation, since the number of ways in which a physical system can 
operate are much fewer than those in which it can fail. The main features of the 
reliability graph are: 
a) the branches represent the components/events necessary to the success of the system. 
Each branch can only have one of two states: good or failed. 
b) information flow can either be uni or bi-directional along the arrow. 
c) there is only one input and one output node from the system 
The success paths of the tree are represented by tie-sets. A tie-set is the combination of 
nodes between the terminal nodes which are traversed in the direction of the arrows 
along the branches. A tie-set is called minimal if each node is traversed once only. 
Hence, for a notional system having the following reliability graph: 
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2 
3 
Figure 2.10 
Illustrative Reliability GraDh 
would have the following tie-sets (minimal): ab, cd, ceb, aed. 
Having evaluated the minimal tie-sets, the next step is to evaluate the minimal cutsets from the minimal tie-sets. This is achieved by logic inversion. 
The use of this technique is not really suitable for the domain of the process industry 
problems. It is only really adequate for electrical circuit type systems, where simple 
success/failure state modelling is adequate. Chemical process systems require more 
detailed failure models than simple two-state logic. 
Another disadvantage is that it would be necessary to understand reliability theory 
before utilising this technique. 
2.7.6 FAILURE TRANSFER FUNCTIONS 
The use of this technique was illustrated by Fussell [Ref 2-20]. Failure transfer functions 
were used to describe the failure modes of the components making up the system; each 
failure mode being represented by a unique failure transfer function. 
A failure transfer function was defined as comprising up to six parts as illustrated in 
Figure 2.11. 
Discriminator 
+ 
Internal 
Input Events & 
Events Logic 
Gates 
Output Output 
Logic Gate Event 
Figure 2.11 
Schematic Representation of Failure Transfer Function 
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The six parts in the above figure have the following meaning: 
OUTPUT EVENT - mode of failure. 
OUTPUT LOGIC GATE - logic with which the transfer function for this output event is linked to other transfer functions having the same output event. 
INTERNAL EVENTS - events requiring development within the transfer function. 
INTERNAL LOGIC GATES - logic linking the development of the internal events. 
INPUT EVENTS - these are either primary events or undeveloped events. They 
represent the limit of resolution of the transfer function within this component. 
DISCRIMINATOR - determines which failure transfer functions may co-exist. 
The use of failure transfer functions is illustrated in Figure 2.12, which contains the two 
basic failure modes for a fuse. It should be noted that since the two failure modes are 
mutually exclusive, the two transfer functions have different discriminators. 
DISCRIMINATOR =1 DISCRIMINATOR =2 
F 
NO CURRENT OVERLOAD 
NO CURREN FUSE 
OVERLOAD 
FUSE 
TO FUSE FAILS 
CURRENT FAILS TO 
OPEN OPEN 
Figure 2.12 
Failure Transfer Functions for Fuse Model 
Failure transfer functions are thus analagous to minitrees and are generated by a 
conventional failure mode analysis. 
2.8 PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED AND THEIR SOLUTION 
2.8.1 INTRODUCTION 
From the literature survey, three main categories of problem were identified. These can 
be summarised thus: 
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- the methodology must be able to support two-way fault propagation since the causes of any given hazard can lie either upstream or downstream of the current location. 
- the most significant faults in process plants relate to control loops and trip systems since they are designed to counter the propagation of faults. Whilst a unit-based 
modelling technique approach makes the problem manageable and suitable for 
automation, it also invariably loses the implicit inter-relationships within the 
sub-systems which combine to form the control/trip systems. 
- checks are needed during the fault tree construction phase to ensure the consistency of the overall tree. 
The following sections will outline the approaches adopted by various workers to 
overcome these problems. 
2.8.2 TWO-WAY FAULT PROPAGATION 
Andow [Ref 2-2 1] and A ndow and Lees [Ref 2-22] describe a convention for achieving 
two-way fault propagation through the use of propagation equations. The essential 
requirement is that two variables are required, one defined at the outlet of the unit and 
the other at the inlet. Taking the propagation of flow, as an example, through the 
following pipe unit: 
1 -. -º 2 
Figure 2.13 
Schematic Representation of Pipe Model 
the following two equations would be used: 
Q2OUT=f(P 1 IN, -P2OUT) 
P1 IN=f(Q I IN, -Q2OUT) 
It should be noted that two variables, flow (Q) and pressure (P) are used. Q being 
defined at the outlet will trace the upstream causes, whereas P defined at the inlet will 
trace the downstream causes. 
If the event being developed is a high flow at the outlet of the pipe, then the sub-tree of 
Figure 2.14 would result from the above two propagation equations. Of the three events 
awaiting development in this tree: 
- P2OUT LO will propagate into the downstream unit 
- Q1IN HI will propagate into the upstream unit 
- Q2OUT LO is inconsistent and should be removed 
The last event highlights an inherent problem in setting up a two-way propagation 
mechanism; left to its own devices it will loop around indefinitely. This problem was 
highlighted by Martin-Solis et al in [Ref 2-23]; a solution based on the use of boundary 
conditions was presented. 
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Figure 2.14 
Minitree for High Flow in Pipe Model of Figure 2.13 
In the above paper Martin-Solis also highlights another problem in applying this 
approach. If basic events are included in the above tree then it would become: 
Figure 2.15 
Inclusion of Basic Faults in Minitree of Figure 2.14 
Clearly PART-BLK in the pipe cannot cause Q2OUT HI; it will tend to cause Q2OUT 
LO. Hence the concept of Not Allowed Faults was introduced to overcome this problem. 
Taylor [Ref 2-171 uses a similar technique to that described above for achieving 
two-way fault propagation. A pair of variables is used: SUPPR representing the supply 
pressure and tracing the upstream causes, and BACKPR representing a back pressure 
and tracing the downstream causes. 
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2.8.3 CONTROL LOOPS AND PROTECTIVE DEVICES 
Much of the complexity surrounding fault tree synthesis is the result of sub-systems of 
this nature in the plant configuration. In order to overcome this problem, the following 
three basic approaches have been illustrated by various workers: 
- the use of special operators when loops are encountered during the propagation path, 
e. g. by Lapp and Powers [Ref 2-1]. 
- to decompose the system based on the control/trip loops and to create models based on 
these sub-systems, e. g. by Shafaghi [Ref 2-10]. 
- to create failure models which contain not only information on failure modes, but also 
to AND these events with "No Compensation" events related to failures of the control 
loops and trip lops, e. g. by Taylor [Ref 2-171. 
2.8.3.1 OPERATORS OF LAPP-POWERS 
The Lapp-Powers [Ref 2-1 ] technique of fault tree synthesis is based upon the following 
principle: 
When the causes of an event are developed, it is necessary to check that nothing else 
happens which will cancel the original effect. 
In the methodology this is assumed to be true for all events other than those which are 
interconnected by feedback or feedforward loops in the digraph model. Consequently 
for those events which do not fall on loops of this nature, the causes can be linked by a 
simple OR gate; for events which fall on a loop the following two operators are applied 
dependent upon the type of loop. 
Output Event 
Large Loop Variable 
Dummy Disturbance Causes 
Enters Loop Disturbance 
External Loop Variable 
Disturbance Fails to Cancel 
Enters Loop Disturbance 
Figure 2.16 
Negative Feedback Loop Operator of Lapp and Powers 
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An important point about the above two operators relates to their application. In the case 
of the NFBL operator it is applied at each point along the loop. In the case of the NFFL 
operator it is applied just once when the point common to both sides of the loop is 
reached. 
Lambert in [Ref 2-4] reviews the NFBL operator of Lapp-Powers and presents a 
'simplified' alternative which need be applied just once when the loop is encountered. 
This operator is given in Figure 2.18, where: 
n number of nodes on the system digraph 
for the negative feedback loop. 
node where disturbance enters loop and 
propagates downstream around the loop. 
node of original entry into the negative 
feedback loop. 
2.8.3.2 WORK OF SHAFAGHI 
Shafaghi et al in [Ref 2-10] describe an alternative system decomposition and modelling 
technique. It is based on the premise that fault trees resulting from the unit model 
representation yield poorly structured trees which appear opaque to the user. This 
situation tends to be most noticeable in the case of systems containing control loops and 
protective loops. 
The technique described in the above paper is thus based on decomposition and 
modelling at the control loop and protective loop level. The following stages are 
involved: 
- identification and definition of the control 
loops and the controlled variables in the 
system. 
- the representation of the plant as a 
digraph of inter-connected control/protective loops. 
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DEVIATION OF VARIABLE ON 
NEGATIVE FEEDBACK LOOP 
NOISE DRIVES POSITIVE 
LOOP UNSTABLE 
LARGE/FAST EXTERNAL 
DISTURBANCES ENTER THE 
LOOP CAUSE DEVIATION 
OF VARIABLE ON NEGATIVE 
FEEDBACK LOOP 
NOISE LOOP IS POSITIVE 
(TRUE) (ODD NUMBER OF 
DEVICES REVERSED) 
n POSSIBLE 
INPUTS 
( 
<= 
MODERATE EXTERNAL 
DISTURBANCES ENTER 
LOOP CAUSE DEVIATION 
IN LOOP VARIABLE 
MODERATE EXTERNAL 
DISTURBANCES ENTER THE 
LOOP AT NODE j CAUSE 
DEVIATION IN LOOP 
VARIABLE 
MODERATE EXTERNAL 
DISTURBANCES 
ENTER AT NODE j 
Figure 2.18 
Modified Operator of Lambert 
UPSTREAM CONTROL 
DEVICES FROM NODE 
TO NODE 1 INACTIVE 
- creation of failure 'models' for each loop containing the disturbance and fault 
information. 
- synthesis of the fault tree is initiated by defining a deviation in one of the controlled 
variables. 
A generic control loop operator of the following format is employed: 
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The use of this technique is illustrated using the Propane Pipeline Plant of Lawley [Ref 2-24]. 
The biggest disadvantage of the technique is the need to model the failures associated 
with a control loop each time that any given system is decomposed. 
Kelly [Ref 2-25] and Kelly and Lees [Ref 2-15] describe a technique which combines 
the unit based technique with the sub-system level treatment required for control loops. The system decomposition and modelling is done at the unit level. However, the user is 
required to supply additional information to describe the functionality and structure of 
the sub-systems which make up the control loops and trip systems. 
Use is then made of operators analogous to those described by Shafaghi to correctly 
structure the tree. Further details of these operators can be found in Chapter 6 of this 
thesis. 
2.8.3.3 MODELLING TECHNIQUE OF TAYLOR 
Taylor [Ref 2-17] treats loops by extending the cause and effect graph modelling 
concept from components to the system level. Hence negative loops (whether feedback 
or feedforward) are included by using special minitrees in those components which can 
potentially counter the disturbances. These minitrees have the general structure which 
has already been given in Figure 2.7. The most important feature is the presence of the 
No Compensation Branch. 
2.8.4 FAULT TREE CONSISTENCY 
As all automated methodologies are dependent upon the linking together of failure 
mode information for sub-sections of the system to form the overall tree, there is a 
tendency for this procedure to introduce inconsistencies. One cause of this has already 
been outlined in Section 2.8.2 with respect to two-way fault propagation. 
Essentially two types of inconsistency may appear: 
a) impossible events 
b) certain events 
Consistency of trees is ensured by analysing events against those already synthesised 
and removing those which are contradictory. A good discussion of this problem is 
presented by Salem et al in [Ref 2-18]. 
2.9 FAULT TREE CONSTRUCTION CODES 
2.9.1 INTRODUCTION 
This section outlines the significant features of a number of automated fault tree 
construction codes. The following packages are reviewed: 
- DRAFT 
- FTS 
- CAT 
- RIKKE 
- FAULTFINDER 
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- WORK OF NAPIER AND PALMER 
- CAFTS 
2.9.2 DRAFT 
The application of this code is illustrated with respect to electrical systems in [Ref 2-20] by Fussell. The use of the technique is based upon: 
a) modular decomposition of the system to identify the components. 
b) creation of failure transfer functions for the components, as already described in 
Section 2.7.6. 
c) determination of sub-systems (termed the "component coalition scheme"). In the 
context of electrical systems this means identifying the circuit paths. 
d) the methodology differentiates between four categories of fault event: 
i) first order events - fault events used as top events, which need to be developed 
manually before the automated methodolgy can take over. 
ii) second order events - fault events which refer to sub-systems rather than individual 
components. 
iii) third order events - events which cause a component to fail due to sub-system failure 
as opposed to component failure. 
iv) fourth order events - fault events which cause component failure due to related 
component failure. These events are developed from the failure transfer functions. 
Hence in addition to creating the failure transfer functions for the components, it is also 
necessary to specify the first, second and third order events. 
e) the user has to specify the not allowed events of first and second order events. 
2.9.3 FTS (FAULT TREE SYNTHESIS) 
The application of this code is illustrated by Lapp and Powers in [Ref 2-1] using a heat 
exchanger system. The basic algorithm for this is as follows: 
a) generate the digraph and find all the negative feedback and feedforward loops, as 
already described in Section 2.7.2. 
b) select the node representing the top event. 
c) determine local causes of this event by noting the inputs to the node of the digraph. 
d) delete any local causes which violate consistency. 
e) select the appropriate operator depending on whether negative feedback/feedforward 
loop passes through the current node. If either one of these loops is involved then store 
the event for later consistency checks. 
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f) select a node corresponding to an undeveloped event and return to step c). If only 
primal events remain, stop. 
2.9.4 CAT (COMPUTER AUTOMATED TREE) 
The use of this technique has been illustrated by Salem et al in [Ref 2-18]. The basic 
algorithm for this is as follows: 
a) the system is decomposed into components. Failure models for each component type 
are created using decision tables, as already described in Section 2.7.4. The system is 
represented as a chart of inter-connected components. This is achieved by defining 
nodes. A node is connected to one or more succeeding components. Hence, for each 
component it is necessary to define the component type, output node number and the 
input node number. 
b) define the top event. This must be defined in terms of system states which can serve 
as starting points for the fault tree. 
c) link this to output events of appropriate component model. 
d) different rows of the decision table are linked by OR logic. 
e) the events in the columns within any given row are linked by AND logic. 
f) don't care events are left out of the tree. 
g) internal mode events are flagged as primary events. 
h) input events are developed further by backtracking to find causes in preceding 
components. 
i) consistency checks are based upon defining system states and boundary conditions. A 
system state is a specific condition of the system either in terms of a node or an internal 
mode. Boundary conditions are system states which cannot be reset and persist as the 
tree is constructed. 
All events at a particular point must be compatible with system states already defined. If 
a state has already been set then there are two possibilities: 
- state is identical, in which case it is deleted as sure to occur. 
- state is contradictory, in which case it is deleted as cannot occur. 
Consistency of the tree is checked at three levels: 
- during the construction of a gate, when checks are made against the pre-defined 
system states as described above. 
- the above step may yield excess, redundant or contradictory gates or events. 
These are 
removed after completing each gate or group of gates, using the following criteria: 
i) eliminating single input gates 
ii) checking all primary inputs beneath just completed AND gates for consistency and 
redundancy 
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iii) checking all primary inpUts beneath just completed OR gates for reduction of inputs 
to minimal cutsets. 
- removal of "good" states from the tree by assuming they have a probability very close 
to 1, and the production of transfers within the tree. 
2.9.5 RI KKE 
The use of this package has been described by Taylor [Ref. 2-17]. The essential aspects 
of the methodology have been described in Sections 2.7.3 and 2.8.3.3. Since a very 
detailed modelling procedure is used, whereby the minitrees contain compensatory 
events as well as fault causes, the synthesis algorithm itself simply involves the 
combination of these minitrees by propagating faults from one unit to another. 
The main features of the package are: 
- system is specified by defining the components and their inter-connections. This is done by building a system flow-sheet using a graphical front-end. 
- for each component type it is necessary to define the function and failure model. 
- the top event is defined in terms of output events of a given component mini fault tree. 
- fault tree construction proceeds by locating the mini fault trees for the input events and 
any non-normal condition events. The non-normal conditions are developed first, 
followed by the input events. Once the causes of an event within the component have 
been determined, then the causes are located by searching through the associated 
components. The system handles positive feedforward and negative 
feedforward/feedback loops using the following criteria: 
a) loops are detected by keeping track of which mini fault trees have been added to the 
tree, such that when new causes are sought for input events, a search is made to check if 
the input event is the output event of a mini fault tree already added to the tree. 
b) negative loops are handled by having special minitrees of the form "output 
disturbance arises if input arises and a component remains in non-compensating state". 
c) the causes of a non-compensating state are found by finding reasons why a 
compensation event should occur and then negating these causes. 
2.9.6 FAULTFINDER 
The use of this package is described by Kelly and Lees in [Ref 2-15]. The essential 
features of the methodology are reviewed in Chapter 3 of this thesis. 
2.9.7 WORK OF NAPIER AND PALMER 
The main thrust of their paper [Ref 2-26] is to consider the practical aspects of actually 
implementing a computer-based system, from the perspective of a design engineer. 
The 
following are cited as the minimum requirements: 
- programs must be highly interactive, allowing 
for changes in the design based upon 
the analysis. 
Page 2/26 
- it should be possible to alter and improve upon the logic implicit in the synthesis. 
- programs should be upwardly portable to derive the advantages from the more 
powerful generation of computers. 
The methodology is based upon developing an overall tree from a library of sub-trees. 
The illustrative examples presented are based upon a modular decomposition of the 
plant at the unit level and the synthesis of sub-trees for these. It is not clear how the 
methodology would handle control loops or how consistency is ensured. 
Much emphasis is placed upon the definition of an architecture suitable for enabling 
different fault tree construction techniques to be utilised to build a fault tree from the 
sub-trees. 
The most significant points relate to the issues raised in terms of developing a package 
which can be integrated into the design phase and making it appealing to the design 
engineer. 
2.9.8 CAFTS (COMPUTER AIDED FAULT TREE SYNTHESIS) 
The use of this package is described by Poucet in [Ref 2-27]. One of the main thrusts of 
this paper is to consider the relative merits of a fully automatic and an interactive 
approach to fault tree synthesis. The technique described is an automated methodology, 
which allows the user to control the synthesis of the tree at each level of development, 
in an analogous manner to a computer-aided design package. 
The following are the main steps in synthesising a fault tree: 
a) split the system into sub-systems. 
b) define the failure criteria for the top event at the output of a given sub-system. 
c) enter the description of the current sub-system. 
d) automatic generation of a macro fault tree for the sub-system output event, using 
transfer logic models which define the causes of an output event in terms of inputs and 
internal states. 
e) interactive expansion of the macro fault tree for the sub-system by specifying the 
components which go to make up each sub-system and using the modular component 
models. 
f) inputs to the system are further developed by repeating steps c) to e), and specifying 
the logic to link the events between the sub-systems. 
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3.0 OUTLINE OF METHODOLOGY 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter describes the basic methodology by outlining the three main stages involved in the generation of fault trees using FAULTFINDER. The three main stages 
are: 
system decomposition 
creation of failure models 
fault tree synthesis 
Each of these stages will be discussed more fully by reference to the Lapp-Powers Heat 
Exchanger System. This has already been used extensively in the literature by other 
workers in this field. A detailed description of this system can be found in Appendix B. 
3.2 SYSTEM DECOMPOSITION 
3.2.1 INTRODUCTION 
During system decomposition it is necessary to translate all the relevant features of this 
system into a form suitable for input to the computer program. For any system the 
minimum amount of information required is the unit models to be used, the way these 
units are linked together, and the top event of interest. 
3.2.2 THE DECOMPOSITION DIAGRAM 
The decomposition diagram for this system is given in Appendix B, Figure B. 2. The 
actual units specified will depend upon the decisions made at the decomposition stage. 
There is flexibility within the methodology to allow the user to choose the level of 
decomposition. Comparing the flow and decomposition diagrams for the current system, 
Figure B. 1 and B. 2 of Appendix B respectively, it can be seen that there is in general a 
one-to-one correspondence of units. The additional units in the decomposition diagram 
are: 
- dummy heads/tails (Units 1,6,7 and 11). These are specific units used to impose an 
envelope around the system under study. 
- pipe (Unit 4). It should be noted that the specification of connections between units does not in itself imply the existence of any physical links. The numbered streams in the 
decomposition diagram are the logical connections representing the flow of information 
from one unit to another unit. The arrow indicates the normal direction of flow. The 
single pipe unit has been included for demonstration purposes; it has not been 
universally modelled between each unit as this would produce a very large fault tree 
clouded with fairly trivial pipe-type faults. 
- the setpoint units (Units 13 and 15) represent the source of the setpoint value to the 
controller (Unit 12) and the trip switch (unit 14), respectively. The electrical power 
supply (Unit 17) and the instrument air supply (Unit 16) represent the flow of utility to 
the pump (Unit 7), controller (Unit 12) and the trip switch (Unit 14). 
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The representation of common components, like utilities, as separate units is a 
convention in the methodology to model common-mode failures. Consider again the 
setpoint units. If it had been assumed that the setpoint value had been assigned by the 
same person then both the controller and the trip switch would have been linked to the 
same setpoint unit. Using this technique, errors in the setpoint value would have been 
traced to the same unit, thereby correctly finding the common-mode failure. 
During the decomposition of this system it has been assumed that the two setpoint 
values were assigned independently. A more detailed discussion of this modelling 
convention is presented in Chapter 8, with respect to utility supply failures. 
3.2.3 OTHER LEVELS OF DECOMPOSITION 
There are other levels of decomposition which may be carried out. Consider the trip 
system in the decomposition diagram. The flow sensor (Unit 9) has been modelled as a 
single unit which emits a signal dependent upon the flow. One extreme would be to 
decompose the flow sensor as an orifice plate, the connecting pipework and valves, and 
a pressure transducer. The other extreme would be to decompose a number of items in 
the flow diagram as a single unit. For example the flow sensor (Unit 9) and trip switch 
(Unit 14) could be decomposed in this manner. 
The actual level of decomposition will depend upon the nature and depth of the analysis 
being carried out. The essential criterion is that the decomposed diagram should not 
alter the functionality of the system as given in the flow diagram. 
During this project an intermediate level of decomposition has been carried out which 
generally yields a one-to-one correspondence between units in the flow and 
decomposition diagrams. This is borne out by the current example. 
This level of decomposition has also yielded models which are fairly 
context-independent and so can be re-used in a number of applications, without 
unnecessarily complicating the modelling process. 
3.2.4 INPUT OF THE DECOMPOSITION DIAGRAM TO FAULTFINDER 
Having prepared the decomposition diagram, it is necessary to input this information to 
the computer program. Section B. 4 of Appendix B gives a complete listing of all the 
input required by FAULTFINDER to generate a fault tree for the current system. 
For each unit the corresponding model library reference number is specified. If the 
model does not exist in the model library, then it must be created using the model 
generation program. The information on how the various units are linked together is 
specified by reference to each connection. Four items of data are specified for each 
connection: the upstream unit and port numbers, and the downstream unit and port 
numbers. Upstream and downstream refer to the normal direction of information flow. 
For most systems this represents the minimum amount of information needed to 
synthesise the fault tree. However, the atomistic approach taken during the 
decomposition stage, whereby the flow diagram is translated into a series of 
inter-connected unit models, tends to destroy the relationship between components 
forming control and trip loops. The failure modes associated with these sub-systems 
cannot be modelled via the individual unit models. Consequently, additional 
information is needed to define the functionality of control and trip loops. 
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The additional information needed for control loops is: 
- sensor unit number 
- control valve unit number 
- the other units in the control loop, e. g. controller 
- the sensed variable 
- the connections where the sensed variable is regulated 
- whether there is a separate manipulated stream; if so, flow is manipulated 
- whether the control loop is feedforward or feedback 
The additional information needed for trip systems is: 
then the connections where the 
- trip valve unit number 
- other units in the trip system 
- if the trip system is one where the trip valve opens to provide flow, the connections 
which will have flow when the valve opens. 
Supplying this information alerts the synthesis algorithm to the presence of sub-systems 
which require special treatment. This information can then be used to re-structure the fault tree accordingly. Control loops and trip systems as used within the methodology 
are discussed more fully in Chapters 6 and 7, respectively. 
(A discussion of the other type of sub-system identified in Appendix B is contained in Chapter 5 on Divider-Header Combinations). 
3.3 MODELLING 
3.3.1 INTRODUCTION 
In order to synthesise a fault tree, failure models must exist for all the units identified 
during the decomposition stage. The general approach has been to generate 
context-independent models which can be used in a variety of applications. Partly due to 
this objective, the top event of a fault tree is modelled separately from the models for 
the units. If this were not the case, then any given top event would have to be included 
in each unit model. This is clearly a cumbersome approach and has thus been rejected. 
The purpose of a unit model is to express both how faults propagate through the unit 
and also how they initiate within it. The principles of unit modelling will be highlighted 
by reference to the heat exchanger model used in the Lapp-Powers system. A schematic 
representation of this model and the information needed to specify the failure model is 
given in Section B. 5 of Appendix B. 
3.2.2 UNIT PORTS 
Firstly it is necessary to identify the ports on the unit. A port is the entity via which 
information flows into and out of the model. The heat exchanger model thus has four 
ports. Ports 1 and 2 refer to the flow of nitric acid, and ports 3 and 4 refer to the flow of 
coolant. The ports can be numbered in any order, but any given unit is allowed a 
maximum of nine ports (numbered 1 to 9). It is also necessary to classify the type of 
port. The methodology recognises the five basic types of port given in Table 3.1 below: 
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PORT TYPE IDENTIFIER 
Inlet IN 
Outlet OUT 
Vessel VES 
Utility UTEL 
Signal SIG 
Table 3.1 
List of Port Types 
Hence ports 1 and 3 are inlets, and ports 2 and 4 the outlets. 
A vessel port is used to model the internal variables of a model, e. g. level. A utility port is reserved for modelling utility supply failures, e. g. power supply. A signal port is used to model failures in the signal flow, e. g. the signal to the control valve affecting its stem position. 
3.3.3 PROPAGATION EQUATIONS 
3.3.3.1 INTRODUCTION 
Propagation equations describe the propagation of disturbances through the unit. A disturbance is represented as a variable deviation of the form XNPTYPE DEV where: 
X is a variable from the list of variables 
N is the port number (1-9) 
PTYPE is the port type from the list of port types 
DEV is the deviation in the variable from the list of deviations 
A propagation equation takes the general form: 
X=F(Y, -Z) 
and would be interpreted as: 
X deviates high if Y deviates high or Z deviates low 
X deviates low if Y deviates low or Z deviates high 
Hence, the propagation equations are a convenient way of representing a lot of 
information and can either be arrived at heuristically or can be derived from the 
differential or algebraic equations applicable to the model. They are ideal for fault tree 
work, because the information of interest is the discrete deviation of variables from 
some normal value. 
The different port types have already been considered under Section 3.3.2 above. The 
complete set of variables and deviations recognised by FAULTFINDER is given in 
Tables 3.2 and 3.3 below: 
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VARIABLE IDENTIFIER 
Flow 
Pressure Gradient G 
Temperature T 
Reverse Temperature u 
Composition x 
Reverse Composition 
Signal s 
Level L 
Setpoint W 
Pressure P 
Relief R 
Table 3.2 
List of Variables 
DEVIATION IDENTIFIER 
High HI 
Low LO 
Some SOME 
None NONE 
No Change NCHA 
Should Activate SHAC 
No Pressure NOP 
No Relief NOR 
Reverse REV 
Table 3.3 
List of Deviations 
The use of each of these variables is described below in Section 3.3.3.2. Section 3.3.3.3 
then discusses the valid combination of deviations relating to each variable. 
3.3.3.2 FAULTFINDER VARIABLES 
3.3.3.2.1 Basic Conventions 
The basic modelling conventions will be described with respect to the flow variables. 
In order to achieve two-way fault propagation and ensure that the propagation chain 
does not break down, certain rules have to be followed in the setting up of propagation 
equations. Consider the equations for the flow of nitric acid through the heat exchanger: 
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Q2OUT=F(G l IN, G2OUT) 
G1 IN=F(Q 1 IN, Q2OUT) 
There are a number of points to note about these two equations: 
- flow Q, is modelled in terms of pressure gradient G, and vice versa. The absolute 
pressure P, is not used to model flow. This greatly simplifies the modelling process as 
there is a direct correspondence between the deviations in the G and Q variables, e. g. high pressure gradient yields high flow etc. 
- two variables are needed to achieve two-way fault propagation, one being defined at 
the inlet port and the other at the outlet. Figure 3.1 gives the partial fault tree for the 
high flow of nitric acid through the heat exchanger. The G2OUT HI branch would 
propagate to the downstream units and the Q1IN HI branch to the upstream units. The 
boundary condition checks prevent the propagation chain from looping around. This is 
the reason why Q2OUT HI would not appear as a cause of G 1IN HI. 
(DELETED) 
Figure 3.1 
Partial Fault Tree for High Flow at Outlet of Heat Exchan 
- the left hand side of the propagation equation is termed the output. 
The modelling 
convention developed stipulates that Q should be output at the outlet ports and G at the 
inlet ports, i. e. the propagation equations are in terms of Q2OUT and Gl IN. 
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3.3.3.2.2 Other Variables 
Pressure (P) and Relief (R) 
Although flow Q, is modelled in terms of pressure gradient G, an absolute pressure 
variable P, is available for modelling deviations in this variable. Again there is a need for two-way fault propagation, since the deviation can either arise upstream or downstream of a given point. Since a single variable can only trace faults in one 
direction, it is necessary to have a second variable to meet this requirement. The 
variable chosen for this is relief R. The equations for these two variables are: 
P2OUT=F(P 1IN) 
R1IN=F(R2OUT) 
It will be noted that unlike G and Q it has not proved possible to derive equations to 
directly relate the P and R variables. However, the principle is the same. P is defined at 
the outlet and so can find the upstream causes, whereas R is defined at the inlet and so 
can trace the downstream causes. One way that this principle has been used is illustrated 
in Figure 3.2. This top event model could be used for developing the causes of high 
pressure at the outlet of the heat exchanger in relation to the nitric acid stream. The P 
branch in this figure would use the P2OUT equation to find the upstream causes, 
whereas the R branches would find the downstream causes by using the equation for 
RUN. 
Figure 3.2 
Event Model for High Pressure 
This top event model indicates that a high pressure can occur due to any of the 
following reasons: 
- high pressure upstream (P2OUT 
HI) 
- reduced relief downstream (RUN 
LO, e. g. partial blockage) 
- no relief sink downstream (R 
l IN NONE, e. g. complete blockage) 
- relief reversal, i. e. back pressure 
(RUN REV) 
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Temperature (T/U) and Composition (X/Y) 
Temperature deviations can arise either due to flow in the normal direction and an 
upstream source causing the deviation, or reverse flow transmitting the deviation from a downstream point. Again in order to meet the two-way propagation requirement, two 
variables are needed. 
T2OUT=F(T1IN) 
U 1IN=F(U2OUT) 
In this case T2OUT is defined at the outlet to trace the upstream causes. The other 
variable, U 1IN, has been defined at the inlet to trace the downstream causes. An 
example of the use of these variables is given in the top event model for HIGHTEMP in 
Figure 3.5. 
Composition is modelled in exactly the same way as temperature, and in the absence of 
any mass transfer within the unit the propagation equations would simply be: 
X2OUT=F(X l IN) 
Y1 IN=F(Y2OUT) 
In this instance X2OUT would be used to find the upstream causes, and Y1 IN the 
downstream causes. 
Only in units where mass transfer is taking place, is it necessary to assign components 
to the composition variables. Thus for a binary system propagation equations would 
have to be written for XA2OUT, XB2OUT, YA 1IN, YB 1IN. 
Level (L), Signal (S) and Setpoint (W) 
Level is only applicable to vessel-type units and represents accumulation within the 
unit. Consequently, it would only be defined at a vessel port. The use of propagation 
equations in conjunction with vessel-type ports is elaborated in Chapter 4. 
The signal variable is used exclusively to model the flow of signals, electrical or 
pneumatic, in control and trip systems. It is defined at a signal port. It is much simpler to 
model than the process variables as the methodology does not require two-way 
propagation of this variable. The existence of a loop ensures that the complete path can 
be traced by simply tracing faults in one direction only. 
The setpoint variable is used exclusively to model the setpoint value to controllers and 
trip switches. It is defined at a signal port and is analogous to the signal variable. 
The use of the last two variables is illustrated by reference to the reverse-acting 
controller model of Figure 3.3. 
The propagation equation for signal flow through this unit is given below: 
S2SIG=F(-S 1 SIG, W3SIG) 
This says that the output signal will be: 
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a) Low, if the input signal is high or if the setpoint is low b) High, if the input signal is low or if the setpoint is high. 
3 
W. SIG 
S SIG 
1P 
PCONTROLLER S SIG 
2 
Figure 3.3 
Schematic Representation of a Controller Model 
3.3.3.3 DEVIATION OF VARIABLES 
The methodology makes use of nine deviation states as already given in Table 3.3. It 
should be noted that not all the deviations apply to all the variables. The deviations 
corresponding to any given variable are presented in Table 3.4: 
VARIABLE DEVIATION STATE 
HI LO NONE REV SOME NCHA SHAC NOR NOP 
Y Y Y Y Y - - - - 
G Y Y Y Y Y - - - - 
T Y Y - - - - - - - 
U Y Y - - - - - - - 
x y y - - - - - - - 
Y Y Y - - - - - - - 
P Y Y Y Y Y - - Y - 
R Y Y Y Y Y - - - Y 
S Y Y Y - Y Y Y - - 
L Y Y Y - - - - - - 
W Y Y - - - - - - - 
Table 3.4 
Deviations Corresponding to Each Variable 
It should be noted that a dash in the above table indicates that the deviation state does 
not apply to that particular variable, whereas aY indicates a valid combination. 
The approach taken has been to keep the number of deviation states to a minimum to 
facilitate the modelling. Most of these are self-explanatory. The meaning of the less 
obvious are summarised below: 
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S NCHA is used to indicate an invariant signal, when a change is expected. It is used to 
model both trip loop functional failure and control loop latent failure. 
S SHAC is used only to model trip loops and is a logical state variable. It is used to 
trace the events which should cause the trip to activate. 
P REV models a reversal of pressure. A pressure source is effectively turned into a 
relief sink. 
R REV models a reversal of relief. A relief sink is turned into a pressure source. 
The NOR and NOP deviations arise because P and R are used as a pair of variables and 
that one variable is only capable of tracing faults in one direction at a time. 
P NOR models a pressure deviation and indicates that the pressure is so high that there 
can be no relief at this point. 
R NOP models a relief deviation and indicates that the potential for relief is so high that 
there can be no back pressure at this point. 
3.3.4 EVENT STATEMENTS 
3.3.4.1 INTRODUCTION 
The propagation equations of a model describe how variable deviations propagate 
through the unit. However, variable deviations must initiate somewhere. Event 
statements are a means of defining initiating faults and the variable deviations arising 
from these. 
The general format of an event statement is: 
Identifier FAULT: Variable Deviation List 
The Identifier indicates the type of fault being modelled and can be one of the 
following: 
IDENTIFIER MEANING 
F Basic Fault 
0 Operator In action 
I Intermediate Event 
S Status Flag 
V Variable Deviation 
Table 3.5 
Fault Identifiers 
The FAULT is the actual fault name. A selection of fault names used by 
FAULTFINDER is given in Table 3.6. FAULTFINDER keeps a complete list of all the 
faults used in all the models. If a new fault name is utilised during the creation of a new 
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model, then the fault list should be updated by the user. Fault names are restricted to 
eight characters. 
FAULT NAME MEANING 
LK-LP-EN leak to a low pressure environment 
HV-F-SH hand valve fails shut 
COMP-BLK complete blockage 
SEN-STK sensor stuck 
CV-F-HI control valve fails in high aperture 
Table 3.6 
Selection of Fault Names Used in FAULTFINDER 
The colon separates the causes on the left from the output event(s) on the right. 
The right hand side will usually be a list of variable deviation events, as a single cause 
will normally affect a number of variables. 
3.3.4.2 EVENT STATEMENTS IN THE HEAT EXCHANGER MODEL 
The complete list of event statements as used in the heat exchanger example is presented 
in Section B. 5 of Appendix B. This is quite a lot of information for the user to have to 
specify. The next chapter in this thesis discusses ways of reducing this input. 
Each of the event statements will now be discussed. 
a) F EXT-HEAT: T2OUT HI, T4OUT HI, U1IN HI 
If there is an external heat source then the shell-side fluid - the coolant - will be heated, 
giving rise to T4OUT HI. This will result in the hot stream being insufficiently cooled, 
giving rise to T2OUT HI. If the flow of the hot stream were reversed then, the reverse 
temperature of this stream would also be high causing Ul IN HI. 
The event statement for an external cold source is analogous to the above, but with the 
deviations being LO rather than HI. 
b) F FOULING: T2OUT HI, T4OUT LO, WIN IN HI, U3IN LO 
It has been assumed that fouling increases the resistance to heat transfer but does not 
affect the flow. The increased resistance to heat transfer means that the hot stream will 
not be sufficiently cooled, resulting in the cold stream being heated to a lesser 
degree. 
This applies to both the normal and reverse flow directions. 
V G1IN LO: D(DUMMY) 
V GUN NONE: D(DUMMY) 
V GUN REV: D(DUMMY) 
I D(DUMMY): T4 OUT LO, U3IN LO 
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In order to explain the need for these event statements it is necessary to look at the 
propagation equation for T4OUT and to consider the way the model generation program 
analyses this equation. This equation is: 
T4OUT=F(G 1 IN, -G3IN, T l IN, T3IN) 
Using the rules specified earlier, one cause of T4OUT LO will be G1 IN LO. However, it can be seen that T4OUT LO will also result if G1 IN is NONE or REV. The latter will be the case if it is assumed that the reverse flow is less than the normal flow. 
Similar reasoning applies to the U3IN LO event. 
Another point to note is the use of the intermediate event D(DUMMY). There are three 
main reasons for the use of intermediate events in the methodology. Firstly, it is used 
for generic faults which may be caused by several initial faults but which give rise to the 
same output event. Here all the flow faults giving rise to the temperature deviations are 
grouped together to enhance the structure of the fault tree. Secondly, intermediate events 
are used to ensure that any given mini-fault tree in a model consists of only one level of 
development. Thirdly, they can be used to incorporate AND logic into the model (see 
the section on Decision Tables below). 
In a similar manner the event statements relating to E(DUMMY) model the deviations 
in the temperature of the hot stream as a result of deviations in the coolant stream that 
cannot be obtained from the propagation equations. 
d) The event statements relating to the faults LK-LP-EN, INT-LK, PART-BLK and 
COMP-BLK model the effects of leakages and blockages. For this model it has been 
assumed that LK-LP-EN would affect the flow of the shell-side fluid only; that the tubes 
are at a higher pressure than the shell, such that an INT-LK would cause flow from the 
tubes to the shell only; and that the faults COMP-BLK and PART-BLK apply only to 
the tubes. 
i) consider initially the event statement for LK-LP-EN. This will tend to increase the 
upstream flow but decrease the downstream flow. Flow is modelled using a pair of 
variables: G defined at the inlet and Q at the outlet. Since the deviations in G and Q are 
equivalent, the effect of a leak on the inlet pressure gradient can be obtained by simply 
considering the effect on the inlet flow. 
Hence LK-LP-EN will cause: 
G3IN HI, G3IN SOME, i. e. increase the inlet pressure gradient for flow, or create one 
where none existed before. 
Q4OUT LO, Q4OUT NONE, Q4OUT REV, i. e. reduce, terminate or even reverse the 
outlet flow. 
R3IN HI, R3IN SOME, R3IN NOP, i. e. increase the inlet relief or create a relief source 
where none existed before or even increase the inlet relief so as to eliminate any 
possibility of a back pressure. 
P4OUT LO, P4OUT NONE, P4OUT REV, i. e. reduce or even reverse the pressure at 
the outlet. 
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Additionally, a shell-side leak will reduce the amount of coolant flowing through the 
exchanger, resulting in an effect on the temperatures. All the outlet temperatures will thus be higher. 
ii) the assumption made above about the relative pressures of the shell and tubes, means that the effect of an internal leak will be to increase the inlet flow of the hot stream, but 
to reduce its outlet flow. Thus the influence on G, Q, P and R for the hot stream is 
analogous to that for LK-LP-EN given above for the shell side fluid. The effect of this 
on the coolant stream will be to decrease the flow into the exchanger but to increase the flow out of it. 
Thus considering the coolant stream only, the effect of an INT-LK will be: 
G3IN LO, G3IN NONE, G3IN REV, i. e. reduce or reverse the inlet pressure gradient. 
Q4OUT HI, Q4OUT SOME, i. e. increase or create an outlet flow where none existed before. 
R3IN LO, R3IN NONE, R3IN REV, i. e. reduce or reverse the relief into the heat 
exchanger. 
P4OUT HI, P4OUT SOME, P4OUT NOR, i. e. increase or create a pressure at the outlet 
of the exchanger. The pressure could be increased so much that there may be no means 
of relief into the unit. 
In addition to the flow deviations, the internal leakage will cause temperature and 
composition deviations. Since less of the hot stream is flowing through the tubes, it has 
been assumed that the outlet temperature of this will be lower, and since the hot stream 
is mixing with the cold stream, that the outlet temperature of the coolant will be higher 
than normal. 
The deviations X4OUT HI and Y3IN HI indicate the presence of impurity in the coolant 
stream. It is assumed that the hot stream is a single component, thus there is no need to 
use component indices with the X or Y variables. 
iii) a partial blockage will have the following effects: 
Gu IN LO, Q2OUT LO, i. e. partially reduce the inlet pressure gradient and the outlet 
flow. 
RUN LO, P2OUT LO, i. e. reduce the relief into and the pressure out of the unit. 
T2OUT LO, T4OUT LO, U3IN LO, i. e. reduce the respective temperatures since less 
hot fluid is passing through the system. 
iv) a complete blockage is analogous to a partial blockage and causes: 
G 1IN NONE, Q2OUT NONE, i. e. eliminates the pressure gradient into the unit and the 
flow out of it. 
R 11N NONE, RUN NOP, i. e. prevents relief into the unit and prevents a back pressure 
from propagating through the unit. 
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P2OUT NONE, P2OUT NOR, i. e. prevents pressure at the outlet and prevents the unit from providing a relief from downstream. 
T4OUT LO, U3IN LO, i. e. reduces the temperature of the coolant since no cooling is taking place. 
e) an assumption made is that the amount of reverse flow is small compared to the 
normal flow. Thus under reverse flow conditions U 1IN LO and U3IN HI for the hot and 
cold streams, respectively, would be normal events. 
The following event statement encapsulates this information: 
S NORMAL: U 1 IN LO, U3IN HI 
Of the five types of event statement highlighted, none appears in this model for operator (in)action. An example of such an event statement from a hand valve model which is 
normally open is given below: 
0 HV-D-SH: Q2OUT NONE, P2OUT NONE 
3.3.5 DECISION TABLES 
The general format of a decision table as used by the methodology is: 
I Cause I Cause T Output Event List 
where: 
I is the cause identifier and could be any one of F, 0, I, V and S as defined for the event 
statements. The Causes are the combination of events necessary to give rise to the 
output events. The Output Event List is the effects and can either be variable 
deviations or intermediate events. The T separates the causes from the effects. 
Any given effect can only occur if all the causes occur simultaneously. Hence, decision 
tables are used by the methodology for introducing AND logic into the model. 
No decision tables were used in the heat exchanger model. Their application can be 
highlighted by reference to the following hand valve model which is normally closed: 
1 2 
Figure 3.4 
Schematic Representation of Hand Valve Model 
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In order to get some flow at the outlet, there must be a pressure gradient for flow at the inlet and the valve must be open to allow flow. This scenario can be modelled by a combination of two event statements and a decision table: 
F HV-F-OP: A(DUMMY) 
O HV-D-OP: A(DUMMY) 
V MIN SOME I A(DUMMY) T Q2OUT SOME 
The opening of the valve either spontaneously or by operator action is included as 
causes of A(DUMMY). This event is then combined with an inlet pressure gradient deviation, via the decision table, to model the outlet flow deviation. This example illustrates how AND/OR logic can be combined in a model; the use of the intermediate 
event ensures that there is only one level of development at a time. The interpretation of decision tables as intermediate events is illustrated in section 3.3.7 below (see Figure 3.5). 
3.3.6 TERMINAL EVENT MODELLING 
For reasons already given, the top event of the fault tree is modelled separately from the 
unit models. The top event of interest will normally be a textual string, e. g. HIGHTEMP for the current example. The primary purpose of the top event model is to develop this into variable deviation events which can in turn be traced to the units in the plant. 
Assume that the top event of interest is a high temperature at the outlet of the pipe (Unit 4). This can be modelled by using the following two decision tables: 
V T2OUT HI V G1IN SOME V Q2OUT SOME T HIGHTEMP 
VU1 IN HI V Q2OUT REV T HIGHTEMP 
It is important that the port numbering in the top event model should match that of the 
unit where the top event is being specified. Since port 1 in the pipe model is an inlet and 
port 2 an outlet, this top event model will work correctly. In actual fact it would be 
adequate for any model where there was a similar correspondence of ports. 
3.3.7 MINI-FAULT TREES 
Thus far the sections on propagation equations, event statements and decision tables 
have described three paradigms that the user can use to input information relating to 
fault propagation and fault initiation. This section describes how the model generation 
algorithms translate this information into a suitable format for use by the synthesis 
algorithm. 
The basic procedure used is to generate mini-fault trees (minitrees) for all the output 
events in the model. The minitrees represent how the minitree top event (minitop) is 
caused within the model. 
The minitree arising from the above top event model for HIGHTEMP is presented in 
Figure 3.5. 
The events DTROW 1 and DTROW2 are just intermediate events and identify the 
decision table row representing the failure mode. 
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Figure 3.5 
Minitree for the Top Event HIGHTEMP 
3.4 FAULT TREE SYNTHESIS 
Once the unit and top event models have been created and the data on the decomposed 
system been specified, the synthesis process is entirely automatic. Fault tree synthesis 
commences with the top event and proceeds until all the branches terminate in basic or 
diamond event causes. 
Consider again the top event model for the current system given in Figure 3.5. This 
minitree contains five transmissive events awaiting development: T2OUT HI, GI IN 
SOME, Q2OUT SOME, U1IN HI and Q2OUT REV. The synthesis package will now 
search for minitrees corresponding to all these events in the pipe model. Taking T2OUT 
HI as an illustrative example, the package will find the mini-fault tree for high 
temperature at the outlet of the pipe and add it to the already developed tree. One cause 
of this new event will be high temperature at the inlet of the pipe. This is clearly an 
event requiring further development. The program will now determine which unit is 
upstream of the pipe and will search for the minitree for TlIN HI in this new unit. 
At the very simplest level, fault tree synthesis proceeds in this manner, whereby the 
minitrees are extracted from the respective models, and are then connected together to 
form an overall tree. Even with this fairly trivial approach, checks are needed to ensure 
the consistency of the resultant fault trees. These checks are essentially of two types and 
ensure series and parallel consistency of the tree. 
Series consistency refers to the consistency of events within any given branch; parallel 
consistency refers to the consistency between events in different branches. 
Consistency checks are carried out by noting the state of the plant at any given level of 
development. Boundary conditions are set up defining the events which would violate 
this state. Any inconsistent events are then deleted from the tree. Consistency checks are 
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considered in more detail in the next section. 
However, as mentioned during the account of the decomposition stage, the 
methodology requires that certain sub-systems be identified so that they may be 
accorded special treatment during the synthesis stage. 
In the Lapp-Powers System the event T2OUT HI, in Figure 3.5, can only propagate if the control loop and the trip system fail to take corrective action. Fault tree synthesis is 
therefore complicated by having to identify those events which these sub-systems can 
protect, and where necessary to incorporate the failures of these systems into the fault 
tree. 
A detailed discussion of these sub-systems is delayed for later chapters relating to trip 
systems, control loops and divider-header combinations. Chapter 10 gives a detailed 
account of each step of the synthesis algorithm for generating a fault tree for the Lapp-Powers heat exchanger system. 
3.5 CONSISTENCY CHECKS 
This section outlines five basic consistency checks carried out by the fault tree synthesis 
algorithm. 
3.5.1 BOUNDARY CONDITIONS 
Boundary conditions are automatically imposed by the variable deviations in the fault 
tree, and define the plant states which are inconsistent with the current plant state. 
Considering the model for the pipe unit: 
12 
Figure 3.6 
Schematic Representation of Pipe Model 
The fault tree for Q2OUT HI in the above model is given in Figure 3.7. It shows the 
joining together of two minitrees to form an overall tree. It should be noted that the first 
occurrence of Q2OUT HI imposes boundary conditions relating to the plant state. For 
the current branch the following checks would be imposed: 
- at the current location no other deviations in the flow variables can occur 
- the occurrence of the same deviation for the flow variable will add nothing to the fault 
tree. 
Hence, the second occurrence of Q2OUT HI would be deleted. 
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Figure 3.7 
Fault Tree fot O2OUT HI 
3.5.2 NOT ALLOWED FAULTS 
Since LK-HP-EN is noted as a cause of Q2OUT HI, it is obvious that LK-LP-EN cannot 
cause this event (although it is a valid cause of G1IN HI). Hence, LK-LP-EN would be 
deleted as a not allowed fault of Q2OUT HI. 
3.5.3 DUPLICATED EVENTS 
If instead of Q2OUT HI, the fault tree was being developed for Q2OUT LO for the pipe 
model, then it would have the form given in Figure 3.8. 
In this case the second occurrence of PART-BLK is a duplicated event and is removed 
from the tree, since it adds nothing new to the fault tree. 
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Figure 3.8 
Fault Tree for Q2OUT LO 
3.5.4 PORT CHANGES 
Consider the header model of Figure 3.9. Suppose the event G 1IN HI is being 
developed. The fault tree for this would be of the format given in Figure 3.10. 
When port 2 is reached, the path can either propagate out of the unit or it can reverse 
back into port 3. This is due to the two-way propagation facility. However, the reversal 
through port 3 will be inconsistent with the event GUN HI. 
This type of problem is overcome by counting the number of inlet/outlet ports through 
which the propagation path has passed. The number allowed is limited to two. Any 
other occurrences are deleted from the tree. Hence, G3 HI will be deleted since this 
event occurs at a third port in this unit. 
3.5.5 PARALLEL CONSISTENCY 
All the checks described thus far have been series consistency checks; they are carried 
out with respect to the branch already synthesised. Parallel consistency checks are 
needed to ensure that all the branches under an AND gate are consistent. They can only 
be carried out once the whole tree has been synthesised. 
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3 
Figure 3.9 
Schematic Representation of Header Model 
Figure 3.10 
Fault Tree for High Flow in Leg 1 
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3.6 ADVANCED FEATURES 
This section describes two advanced features of the methodology for handling 
sequential operations and secondary failures. 
3.6.1 SEQUENTIAL OPERATIONS 
The FAULTFINDER methodology has the ability to handle sequential operations. This 
is in connection with situations where the unit models comprising the plant need to be 
changed at the start of each step in the sequence. Under such circumstances the plant 
configuration at each step in the sequence needs to be defined. Examples of 
configurational changes are: 
- valve changing from open to closed 
- pump being switched on/off 
Since the failure models for an open/closed valve are different, it is necessary to specify 
which failure model should be used at each step in the sequence. Additionally, the user 
can specify a different top event model for each step in the sequence. 
For each step in the sequence, FAULTFINDER synthesises a separate sub-tree. The 
overall structure of the tree is as follows: 
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The above fault tree is shown for three steps only; a maximum of twenty steps are 
allowed. The top event by default is termed SEQ-ABRT (Sequence Aborts) for 
sequential operations. There are essentially two branches to this. SEQ-F-AT (Sequence Fails At) contains the sub-tree for that step; SEQ-F-AF (Sequence Fails After) traces down to the next step in the sequence. 
3.6.2 SECONDARY FAILURES 
It has already been mentioned that the FAULTFINDER modelling has been carried out in a context-independent manner. In keeping with this philosophy it is possible to create 
secondary failure models which can be applied to sections of the plant in specific 
applications. Examples of these scenarios for the Lapp-Powers system could be: 
- high temperature of coolant/process stream could be due to an exothermic reaction 
caused by the mixing of water and nitric acid. 
-a leakage in the coolant stream could be caused by the nitric acid leaking into it and 
causing corrosion. 
Failures relating to these scenarios can be incorporated into the tree by specifying which 
units or streams are susceptible to the given secondary failures. This information would 
be specified at the decomposition stage through the MASTER program. 
3.7 CONCLUSION 
This chapter has outlined the main features of the FAULTFINDER MK 1 methodology. 
Subsequent chapters will describe the enhancements made to this during the course of 
this project, culminating in FAULTFINDER MK2. 
PART B 
CHAPTER 4 ENHANCEMENT OF THE MODEL 
GENERATION ALGORITHM 
CHAPTER 5 ELIMINATION OF DIVIDER-HEADER 
COMBINATIONS 
CHAPTER 6 RULES FOR THE DECOMPOSITION 
OF CONTROL LOOPS 
CHAPTER 7 RULES FOR HANDLING TRIP SYSTEMS 
CHAPTER 8 MODELLING UTILITY FAILURES 
CHAPTER 9 FAULT TREE ANALYSIS 
CHAPTER 10 WORKED EXAMPLES 
CHAPTER 11 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
FOR FUTURE WORK 
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4.0 ENHANCEMENT OF THE MODEL GENERATION 
ALGORITHM 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
As mentioned in the previous chapter three basic modes of data input are available to 
the user for the creation of the unit models. These are: 
propagation equations 
event statements 
decision tables 
Each mode of input will be illustrated by reference to the following simple tank model: 
O 
Figure 4.1 
Simple Tank Model 
Examples of the three modes of input are: 
L3 VES=F(G l IN, -Q2OUT) 
F LK-LP-EN: L3VES LO 
V G1IN NONE V L3VES NONE T Q2OUT NONE 
4.2 DEFICIENCY IN MK1 MODEL GENERATION ALGORITHM 
It has already been outlined in Chapter 3 how the propagation equations are analysed to 
generate the minitrees for use by the fault tree synthesis algorithm. Considering the 
development of the minitree for L3VES HI, the above propagation equation would be 
used to include the following two causes: G 1IN HI and Q2OUT LO. It can be seen that 
only the direct or inverse cause-effect relationships are matched. Considering now the 
cause in the outlet stream, Q2OUT LO in greater detail, it is clear that other deviations 
of this variable can also give rise to L3VES HI. In fact two deviations, Q2OUT REV 
and Q2OUT NONE, could also give rise to this event. 
The only way of incorporating this information into the MK1 models was to make use 
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of event statements. Hence, event statements of the form given below would be required: 
V Q2OUT NONE: L3VES HI 
V Q2OUT REV: L3VES HI 
This is an undesirable feature since: 
a) it is possible to derive this form of relationship between the variables by developing a 
more 'intelligent' algorithm for the analysis of the propagation equations. 
b) resorting to the use of event statements complicates the modelling process. It leads to 
the creation of larger models which are more difficult to comprehend, especially for a 
novice user. 
4.3 PROPOSED SOLUTION 
Considering again the above example, it will be seen that NONE and REV are really 
more extreme deviations than LO. Hence, if the less extreme LO deviation can cause the 
minitop event L3VES HI, then the more extreme deviations should automatically be 
included as causes. 
Since the FAULTFINDER methodology has been developed using only the minimum 
possible set of variables and deviations, it is possible to define a 'scale of severity' for 
each variable and its associated deviations. The valid deviations associated with each 
variable have already been given in Chapter 3. Table 4.1 below, gives the 'scale of 
severity' developed from this. 
Variable Scale of the Deviation 
+3 +2 +1 0 -1 -2 -3 
G HI LO NONE REV 
HI LO NONE REV 
T HI LO 
X HI LO 
Y HI LO 
S HI LO NONE 
L HI LO NONE 
W HI LO 
PF NOR HI LO NONE REV 
R NOP HI LO NONE REV 
U HI LO 
PV REV NOR HI LO NONE 
Table 4.1 
Scale of Severity for Deviations 
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A number of points should be noted in interpreting this table: 
a) 0 represents some notional normal value for a variable. The +1 to +3 deviation levels 
represent increasingly higher than normal levels for this deviation; the converse being 
true for the -1 to -3 deviation levels. 
b) the deviations for the different variables are ranked on this scale between -3 and +3. A blank slot indicates that the variable does not have a corresponding deviation. 
c) the SOME deviation has been omitted. Propagation equations are only written for 
flow systems. SOME is generally used to represent a deviation where NONE is the 
norm, i. e. in no-flow situations. 
d) the SHAC and NCHA deviations for the S variable have not been included in this 
classification, since these represent logical states in the plant and are not true deviations 
in the variable itself. 
e) two pressure variables have been included in the above table. PV represents the 
pressure in a vessel, whereas PF represents the pressure in flowlines. This difference 
arises because: 
- in flow situations the normal correspondence of deviations for PF is: 
LO>NONE>REV. 
- in a no flow situation, like the gas space above a liquid level, the correspondence is illustrated by the following example propagation equation: 
QIN=F(-PVES) 
This means that: 
Q1 IN LO, if PVES HI 
Q1IN NONE, if PVES NOR i. e. no relief into the tank 
Q1IN REV, if PVES REV i. e. REV is more extreme than NOR. 
The application of Table 4.1 will be illustrated by considering two models from the 
MK1 methodology which had a large number of 'superfluous' event statements. 
4.4 APPLICATION TO TANK MODEL. 
4.4.1 INTRODUCTION 
The schematic representation of this model is given in Figure 4.2. This diagram 
represents a tank model with two inputs, two outputs, a kickback input and a level port. 
It is assumed to contain liquid below its boiling point. 
The MK1 methodology contained the list of propagation equations and event 
statements, given in Tables 4.2 and 4.3, respectively. Some event statements used to 
model the propagation of the reverse temperature and composition variables have 
been 
omitted since they are not pertinent to the current discussion. 
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0 
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Figure 4.2 
O 
0 
Schematic Representation of Contrived Tank Model from MK 1 Model Library 
Number Propagation Equation 
1 G1 IN=F 1IN-L6VES 
2 R1 IN=F -L6VES 
3 G2IN=F 2IN -L6VES 
4 R2IN=F -L6VES 
5 G3IN=F 3IN 
6 4OUT=F 6VES G4OUT 
7 T4OUT=F T6VES 
8 X4OUT=F X6VES 
9 P4OUT=F 6VES 
10 5OUT=F 6VES G5OUT 
11 T5OUT=F T6VES 
12 X5OUT=F X6VES 
13 P5OUT=F 6VES 
14 L6VES=F G 1ING2IN G3IN - 4OUT -Q5 OUT 
15 T6VES=F T1IN T2IN T3IN 
16 X6VES=F X1IN X2INX3IN 
Table 4.2 
List of Propagation Equations for Tank Model of Figure 4.2 
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Number Event Statements 
1 F LK-LP-EN: L6VES LO, L6VES NONE 
2 F EXT-COLD: T6VES LO 
3 F EXT-HEAT: T6VES HI 
4 V GUN NONE: A DUMMY 
5 VG2IN NONE: A UMMY 
6 V GUN REV: A DUMMY L6VES NONE 
7 V G2IN REV: A DUMMY 6VES NONE 
8 V 4OUT NONE: B DUMMY 
9 V Q50UT NONE: B DUMMY 
10 V Q40UT REV: B (DUMMY) 
11 V 5OUT REV: B UMMY 
12 V G3IN LO: C UMMY 
13 V G3IN NONE: C DUMMY 
14 V G3IN REV: C DUMMY 
15 IC DUMMY :A UMMY 
16 V G3IN HI: B DUMMY 
17 IA DUMMY : L6VES LO 
18 IB DUMMY : L6VES HI 
19 V L6VES HI: R1IN NONE, R2IN NONE, G1IN NONE, G2IN NONE, 
P4OUT NOR 5OUT NOR 
20 V L6VES LO: P4OUT REV P5OUT REV 
21 V L6VES NONE: P4OUT REV P5OUT REV 
Table 4.3 
List of Event Statements for Tank Model of Figure 4.2 
This is rather a long list of event statements. It would be advantageous if the user could 
be shielded from having to provide all this information. 
4.4.2 REMOVAL OF EVENT STATEMENTS 
The aim of this section is to show how event statements numbered (4-21) in Table 4.3 
above, can either be generated entirely automatically by the model generation program, 
or how it can prompt the user for additional information to incorporate the relevant 
failure modes into the model. 
The FAULTFINDER convention to model the continuity of flow in a model is to 
express Q in terms of G, and vice versa. This information is encapsulated in the 
form of 
propagation equations with one cause of the output event being defined at an 
inlet port 
and the other at an outlet port. Rule 1 below highlights this concept. 
The analysis of event statements 4-21 for this model indicates that these occur 
between 
two different variables where there is non-continuous flow. All the aforementioned 
event statements involve an inlet/outlet variable and a vessel variable, e. g. 
GUN and 
L6VES, P4OUT and L6VES. It is clear that the event statements in this model are 
needed to model the relationship between the flow streams at the 
inlet and the outlet, 
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and the accumulation within the vessel. 
The automatic derivation of these event statements is based on an analysis of the 
propagation equations in the model. In order to achieve this a number of rules have been formulated. These rules are outlined below. 
Rule 1- Determine the ports having a continuity of flow. 
This would be achieved by examining all the propagation equations defining the G 
variable. A continuity of flow would be detected if G was defined in terms of Q at two 
different ports. In this case there is no continuity of flow through the tank model of 
Figure 4.2. 
This point is made clearer by comparing the tank with a pipe-type model depicted below: 
12 
Figure 4.3 
Schematic Representation of a Pipe-Type Unit 
The pipe-type model would have a propagation equation of the form: 
G1 IN=F(Q 1 IN, Q2OUT) 
signifying a continuity of flow between ports 1 and 2. 
The tank model on the other hand has a propagation equation of the form: 
Gl IN=F(Q 1IN, -L6VES) 
indicating a non-continuous flow between this inlet port and any other outlet ports on 
the model. 
The following block diagram shows the relationships between the different ports in the 
tank model: 
PORTS 1& 2 PORT 6 PORT 6 PORTS 3,4 &5 
Figure 4.4 
Block Diagram Highlighting the Information Flow Between the Ports of the Tank Model 
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Rule 2- Identify the equations which express a relationship between two different 
variables, defined at ports where there is no continuity of flow. 
For this purpose the G and Q variables are considered to be synonymous. 
This rule would thus select the following propagation equations for further analysis: 
Number Propagation Equation 
1i G 1IN=F 1IN-L6VES 
22 R1IN=F -L6VES 
33 G2IN=F 2IN-L6VES 
4 R2IN=F -L6VES 
5 4OUT=F 6VES G4OUT 
6 P4OUT=F 6VES 
7 Ib 5OUT=F 6VES G5OUT 
81 5 P5OUT=F 6VES 
9 L6VES=F G1ING2IN G3IN - 4OUT - 5OUT 
Table 4.4 
Propagation Equations for Further Analysis 
As an illustrative example, consider equation (1) from Table 4.4. This has been selected 
since: 
a) there is non-continuous flow between ports 1 and 6 
b) only the G and Q variables are synonymous, G and L are therefore two different 
variables. 
Similar reasoning can be applied to the other propagation equations. On the other hand, 
for example, propagation equation (15) from the initial list is not considered further, 
since it contains only the temperature variable, T. 
Rule 3- Using the 'scale of severity' match the full range of cause-effect 
relationships. 
The normal analysis procedure would match the direct/inverse cause-effect 
relationships. By using the 'scale of severity' the program can now also include the 
more extreme deviations if they exist. Referring to the first propagation equation above, 
L6VES NONE as well as L6VES LO would be included as a cause of G1 IN HI. The 
inclusion of the more extreme deviations is, however, qualified under some situations; 
these qualifications are given below. 
Qualification 1 of Rule 3 
If the right-hand-side (RHS) variable is defined at a vessel port and the left-hand-side 
(LHS) variable is directly proportional to this, then only the direct cause-effect 
relationships should be matched. The importance of this is illustrated by considering 
propagation equation (6) from Table 4.4 above. The deviations in the pressure and 
level 
variables are closely coupled, since the manifestation of pressure at the outlet 
is 
dependent on a level of fluid being present in the tank. 
Note: the number given in () in Table 4.4 relates to the corresponding entry 
in Table 
4.2. 
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Nevertheless, there is one additional proviso to this statement that only the direct 
cause-effect relationships should be matched. This is that if the LHS variable has a deviation which is more extreme than the most extreme deviation in the RHS variable, 
then the user is prompted for more information. 
It can be seen from Table 4.1, that there is no deviation in the level variable to 
correspond to the REV deviation in the pressure variable. Under such circumstances the 
user is asked if this more extreme deviation in the pressure variable can be caused by the 
less extreme deviations in the level variable. This is illustrated by considering the event 
P4OUT REV. This represents the existence of reverse pressure, i. e. relief into the tank. 
The user is first asked if L6VES NONE can give rise to this event. If the answer to this 
is no, then the process is aborted; otherwise the user is next asked if L6VES LO can also 
give rise to this event. 
Using this technique both L6VES LO and L6VES NONE would be included as causes 
of P4OUT REV. 
Qualification 2 of Rule 3 
This situation is analogous to the previous case and covers the situation where there is 
an inverse relationship between the LHS and the RHS variables, and the corresponding 
deviation in the RHS variable does not exist. This situation is best illustrated by 
considering propagation equation (9), from Table 4.4. Since there is an inverse 
relationship between L6VES and Q4OUT, when the minitree for L6VES LO is 
developed, the cause Q4OUT HI is included. This illustrates that a -1 deviation LO, is 
matched with the +1 deviation HI. When the minitree for L6VES NONE is developed, 
there is no corresponding deviation for the Q variable. There is no deviation for the flow 
variable more extreme than HI. In this case the user is asked if the less extreme 
deviation HI can give rise to L6VES NONE. 
The application of the above rules either automatically generates the information 
encapsulated in the aforementioned event statements or issues suitable prompts to assist 
the user in configuring the event statements interactively. 
4.5 APPLICATION TO HEAT EXCHANGER MODEL 
The schematic representation of a heat exchanger is given in Figure 4.5. 
This represents a shell and tube heat exchanger. Ports 1 and 2 represent the tubes and 
carry the fluid to be cooled; ports 3 and 4 represent the shell-side and carry the fluid to 
be heated. The creation of the model assumes that the tubes are at a higher pressure than 
the shell and that there are no phase changes in the heat exchanger. 
The propagation equations and event statements for the MK1 model for this unit are 
given in Tables 4.5 and 4.6, respectively. 
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Figure 4.5 
Schematic Representation of a Heat Exchanger Model 
Number Propagation Equations 
1 G 1IN=F 1 IN2OUT 
2 R1 IN=F R2OUT 
3 Ui IN=F 2OUT -G3IN 
4 Y1 IN=F Y2OU 
5 2OUT=F G1 ING2OUT 
6 T2OUT=F G1 IN -G3IN T 1INT3IN 
7 X2OUT=F X 1IN 
8 P2OUT=F P1 IN 
9 G3IN=F 3IN4OUT 
10 R3IN=F R4OUT 
11 U3IN=F 4OUT G1 IN 
12 Y3IN=F 4OU 
13 4OUT=F G3IN G4OUT 
14 T4OUT=F G 1IN -G3IN T 1INT3IN 
15 X4OUT=F X3IN 
16 P4OUT=F P3IN 
Table 4.5 
List of Propagation Equations for Heat Exchanger Model of Figure 4.5 
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Number Event Statements 
1 F EXT-HEAT: T2OUT HI T4OUT HI ,U 1IN HI 
2 F EXT-COLD: T2OUT LO, T4OUT LO U3IN LO 
3 F FOULING: T2OUT HI T4OUT LO U1IN HI U3IN LO 
4 V MIN LO: D UMMY 
5 V G3IN LO: E DUMMY 
6 VG 1IN NONE: D DUMMY 
7 V G3IN NONE: E UMMY 
8 V G1 IN REVD DUMMY 
9 V G3IN REV: E UMMY 
10 ID DUMMY : T4OUT LO, U3IN LO 
1 IE UMMY : T2OUT HI U1 IN HI 
12 F LK-LP-EN: G3IN HI, G3IN SOME, Q4OUT LO, Q4OUT NONE, 
Q4OUT REV, R3IN HI, R3IN SOME, R3IN NOP, P4OUT NONE, 
P4OUT REV T2OUT HI, T4OUT HI U1IN HI 
13 F INT-LK: G1IN HI, G1IN SOME, Q2OUT LO, Q2OUT NONE, 
Q2OUT REV, RIIN HI, R1IN SOME, RIIN NOP, P2OUT LO, 
P2OUT NONE, P2OUT REV, G3IN LO, G3IN NONE, G3IN REV, 
Q4OUT HI, Q4OUT SOME, R3IN LO, R3IN NONE, R3IN REV, 
P4OUT HI, P4OUT SOME, P4OUT NOR, X4OUT HI, Y3IN HI, 
T2OUT LO, T4OUT HI 
14 F PART-BLK: GIIN LO, Q2OUT LO, RIIN LO, P2OUT LO, T2OUT LO, 
T4OUT LO, U3IN LO 
15 F COMP-BLK: GIIN NONE, Q2OUT NONE, RIIN NONE, RIIN NOP, 
P2OUT NONE, P2OUT NOR, T4OUT LO U3IN LO 
16 S NORMAL: U1IN LO, U3IN HI 
L Table 4.6 
List of Event Statements for Heat Exchanger Model of Figure 4.5 
The application of Rule 1, yields that there is a continuity of flow between ports 1 and 2, 
and ports 3 and 4. 
Rule 2 thus selects the following equations for further analysis: 
U 1IN=F(U2OUT, -G3IN) 
T2OUT=F(G 1IN, -G3IN, T 1IN, T3IN) 
U3IN=F(U4OUT, G l IN) 
T4OUT=F(G 1 IN, -G3IN, T 1 IN, T3IN) 
Note the analogy between these equations and those selected for further analysis in the 
tank model. In the tank model the variables of interest were the internal vessel variables 
arising due to the relative flows into and out of the tank. In the current example the 
variable of interest is the temperature, which again is the result of non-continuous 
flow 
between the hot and cold streams. The two streams interact by exchanging heat; this 
manifests itself by affecting the relative temperatures of the two streams. 
Using Rule 3 the information encapsulated in event statements 4-11 will be 
automatically inferred by the model generation program. 
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4.6 INCLUSION OF BASIC FAULTS IN THE MODEL 
4.6.1 INTRODUCTION 
Whilst the list of possible faults is almost infinite, the purpose of this section is to take 
some common faults and to write some general purpose event statements for them. This 
information can then be extracted and used in a number of applications when the event 
statements for any particular model can be developed. 
The six pipe-type faults: LK-LP-EN, LK-HP-EN, PART-BLK, COMP-BLK, 
EXT-HEAT and EXT-COLD will be considered in relation to the two models used 
above. The approach adopted to handle these will now be outlined. 
4.6.2 FAULT LIBRARY 
The purpose of the event statements is to express the relationship between the basic 
faults and variable deviations, for example: 
F EXT-HEAT: T2OUT HI 
It should be noted that the events appearing on the RHS of the event statement are the 
output events of the propagation equations, i. e. the variable deviation is written in terms 
of T2OUT and not Tl IN. 
Since the FAULTFINDER methodology comprises a fixed number of variables and 
corresponding deviations, it is possible to define the full set of deviations that can be 
caused by a given fault. For the six faults mentioned above, the fault library given in 
Tables 4.7 - 4.12 was developed 
Variable Port Deviation List 
G IN NONE 
OUT NONE 
T OUT 
X OUT 
Y IN 
S SIG NONE 
L VES 
W SIG 
P OUT NONE NOR 
R IN NONE NOP 
U IN 
P VES 
Table 4.7 
Effects of Fault COMP-BLK 
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Variable Port Deviation List 
G IN LO 
OUT LO 
T OUT 
X OUT 
Y IN 
S SIG LO 
L VES 
W SIG 
P OUT LO 
R IN LO 
U IN 
P VES 
Table 4.8 
Effects of Fault PART-BLK 
Variable Port Deviation List 
G IN LO NONE REV 
OUT HI SOME 
T OUT 
X OUT 
Y IN 
S SIG 
L VES HI 
W SIG 
P OUT NOR HI SOME 
R IN NONE LO REV 
U IN 
P VES NOR REV HI SOME 
Table 4.9 
Effects of Fault LK-HP-EN 
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Variable Port Deviation List 
G IN HI SOME 
OUT LO NONE REV 
T OUT 
X OUT 
Y IN 
S SIG 
L VES LO NONE 
W SIG 
P OUT LO NONE REV 
R IN HI SOME NOP 
U IN 
P VES LO NONE 
Table 4.10 
Effects of Fault LK-LP-EN 
Variable Port Deviation List 
G IN 
OUT 
T OUT LO 
X OUT 
Y IN 
S SIG 
L VES 
w SIG 
P OUT 
R IN 
U IN LO 
P VES 
Table 4.11 
Effects of Fault EXT-COLD 
Page 4/14 
Variable Port Deviation List 
G IN 
OUT 
T OUT HI 
X OUT 
Y IN 
S SIG 
L VES 
W SIG 
P OUT 
R IN 
U IN HI 
P VES 
Table 4.12 
Effects of Fault EXT-HEAT 
The information in the fault library will be illustrated by reference to the fault 
COMP-BLK contained in Table 4.7. The first point of note is that a fault of this nature 
can only affect the ports where there is flow. Hence, in general only the variables 
defined at port types IN and OUT can be affected. Additionally this fault can only affect 
the flow and pressure variables at these ports. The resultant deviations for these 
variables are thus included in the library. [The effect on the signal variable has also been 
included as it is just a special instance of a flow variable and a blockage can affect the 
flow of both electrical and pneumatic signals. ] 
Entries for the other faults are developed in a similar manner by analysing the likely 
effect on each of the variables. It should be noted that only the direct effects of a fault 
have been considered. More exotic scenarios such as: 
EXT-HEAT ==> Phase Change of Fluid ==> Composition Deviations, 
have been ignored. Only the direct effects such as: 
EXT-HEAT ==> Temperature Deviations, 
have been included. 
4.63 DATA INPUT BY THE USER 
When running the model generation program the user is required to enter two items of 
information: 
the name of the fault to be considered, and 
the port numbers affected by this fault 
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4.6.4 THE ANALYSIS ALGORITHM 
For each fault type to be considered, the LHS of each propagation equation is examined. If the variable and the port type of the LHS variable is also included under the specified fault in the library, then information on the valid deviations of this variable are extracted. 
For example, considering the tank model, the user could specify that the fault LK-LP-EN is to be considered and that this fault affects port number 6. The program 
will consider all the equations defined in terms of output variables at port number 6. The 
equations for the following three variables will be earmarked for further consideration: L6VES, T6VES and X6VES. 
Further, the program will identify port 6 as a VES port. When the information under the fault LK-LP-EN is examined, the only event which matches the LHS of the above three 
equations is LVES. So for the current fault the two events L6VES LO and L6VES 
NONE are included as the effects of LK-LP-EN. This corresponds to the first event 
statement in the model. 
The event statements generated using this procedure for the two models considered 
earlier are given in Tables 4.13 and 4.14. 
Number Event Statements 
1 F LK-LP-EN: L6VES LO, L6VES NONE 
2 F EXT-HEAT: T6VES HI 
3 F EXT-COLD: T6VES LO 
Table 4.13 
Event Statements for Tank Model 
Number Event Statements 
1 F LK-LP-EN: G 1 IN HI, G 1IN S OME, R 1IN HI, R 1 IN SOME, 
RI IN NOP, Q2OUT LO, Q2OUT NONE, Q2OUT REV, 
P2OUT LO, P2OUT NONE, P2OUT REV, G3IN HI, G3IN SOME, 
R3IN HI, R3IN SOME, R3IN NOP, Q4OUT LO, Q4OUT NONE, 
Q40UT REV P4OUT LO, P4OUT NONE, P4OUT REV 
2 F LK-HP-EN: G3IN LO, G3IN NONE, G3IN REV, R3IN LO, 
R3IN NONE, R3IN REV, Q4OUT HI, Q4OUT SOME, P4OUT NOR, 
R3IN REV, Q4OUT HI, Q4OUT SOME, P4OUT NOR, P4OUT HI, 
P4OUT SOME 
3 F PART-BLK: GIIN LO R1IN LO 2OUT LO P2OUT LO 
4 F COMP-BLK: GIIN NONE, RIIN NONE, R1IN NOP, 
Q20UT NONE 2OUT NONE P2OUT NOR 
6 F EXT-HEAT: T2OUT HI T4OUT HI 
7 F EXT-COLD: T2OUT LO, T4OUT LO 
Table 4.14 
Event Statements for Heat Exchanger 
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It will be noted that the event statements for the tank model are the same. However, those for the heat exchanger are slightly different, in that they do not contain all the output effects. It should also be noted that the fault INT-LK was actually modelled as two faults: LK-LP-EN affecting ports 1 and 2, and LK-HP-EN affecting ports 3 and 4. 
The differences between the two sets of event statements for the heat exchanger model 
will now be highlighted: 
a) The event statements for PART-BLK and COMP-BLK do not contain the effect on T4OUT and U3IN. In actual fact including this information in the event statements is 
unnecessary. The normal analysis procedure for the propagation equations will include Gl IN LO as a cause of T4OUT LO. Since PART-BLK is included as a cause of Gl IN LO, including it as a cause of T4OUT LO will lead to a duplication of information. The FAULTFINDER methodology will actually delete the second occurrence of the duplicated event. These two scenarios are clarified by the minitrees given in Figure 4.6. 
T4OUT LO T40UT LO 
G1 IN LO 
G1INLO 
COMP- 
BILK 
COMP- 
BILK 
COMP- [ Deleted: duplicated event) BILK 
Figure 4.6 
Minitrees Highlighting Duplicated Event 
b) In the original model LK-LP-EN, representing a leak of cooling medium to the 
environment, is included as a cause of T2OUT HI, T4OUT HI and U 1IN HI. Including 
these relationships requires a more intelligent algorithm. The current technique outlined 
only considers the direct effects on the stream upon which the fault manifests itself, e. g. 
a leakage affects only the flow variables. 
The three variable deviations given above arise due to the influence of heat transfer 
between the two streams. Using T2OUT HI as an example, the basis of a more thorough 
analysis algorithm could be as follows: 
i) look at the propagation equation for T2OUT. This is 
T2OUT=F(G 1 IN, -G3IN, T l IN, T3IN) 
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ii) look at all the output events caused by LK-LP-EN from the fault library. Two effects 
of this fault are to cause G3IN HI and Q4OUT LO. 
iii) looking again at the propagation equation it will be noted that T2OUT is inversely 
proportional to G3IN. Hence if LK-LP-EN gives rise to G3IN HI then this will in turn 
give rise to T2OUT LO. This is in fact contrary to the information included in the 
manually created event statement, which states that LK-LP-EN should cause T2OUT HI. 
iv) there is a need to carry out conflict resolution. It has already been noted that there is 
a continuity of flow between ports 3 and 4. A leakage in this stream will indeed cause a 
high flow at the inlet (G3IN HI); but it will also cause a low flow at the outlet (Q4OUT 
LO). Some sort of rule is needed to ascertain which effect is the stronger. In the current 
context it has been assumed that the net effect of this is to give rise to a higher 
temperature for the process stream (T2OUT HI). 
c) The other anomaly concerns the event statements used to include the effects of 
INT-LK, as a result of the hot fluid in the tubes leaking into the cold fluid in the shell. 
The automatically generated event statements obtained by modelling INT-LK as a 
combination of LK-LP-EN and LK-HP-EN do not include the events X4OUT HI, Y3IN 
HI, T2OUT LO and T4OUT HI. These events arise due to the mixing of the process and 
coolant streams and there is no means available to deduce this information automatically. 
It has not proved possible to generate generic rules to cater for this situation and so it 
would be up to the user to add this information manually. 
d) The basic fault FOULING has not been considered; this is too specific to the current 
application. 
4.6.5 USER MODIFICATION OF THE AUTOMATICALLY GENERATED 
EVENT STATEMENTS 
As indicated above for the heat exchanger model, the automatically generated event 
statements may not contain all the required information. Additionally as indicated for 
the fault INT-LK, this has been simulated by considering the combined effects of 
LK-LP-EN and LK-HP-EN. A facility has therefore been included for the user to be 
able to modify these event statements, once they have been derived by the model 
generation program. 
4.7 CONCLUSION 
This chapter has indicated how the model generation program has been enhanced to 
limit the amount of information required from the user. The propagation equation 
analysis algorithm has been enhanced to be able to include the complete set of 
cause-effect relationships. 
Additionally the foundations have been laid for generating the event statements 
containing the information relating to basic failures. A fault library has initially 
been 
developed for a set of six faults. This has been demonstrated to significantly reduce the 
information required from the user. It has also been shown how some more complex 
faults can be broken down and simulated using these basic faults. 
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5.0 ELIMINATION OF DIVIDER HEADER COMBINATIONS 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
Consider the section of plant below: 
123 
DUMMY DUMMY PIPE PIPE HEAD 123 TAIL 4 
Figure 5.1 
Simple Section of Plant 
The start of the fault tree for HIGH FLOW in stream 3 would be of the form: 
Figure 5.2 
Start of Fault Tree for High Flow in Plant Section of Figure 5.1. 
The G2 HI branch would thus find the upstream causes and the G3 HI branch the 
downstream causes. Although each model contains information for two-way fault 
propagation, the normal boundary conditions ensure that the path proceeds in the 
required direction. 
Now consider the following section of plant: 
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Figure 5.3 
Plant Section Incorporating a Divider Unit 
The start of the fault tree for HIGH FLOW in stream 3 would be of the form: 
Figure 5.4 
Fault Tree for High Flow in Plant Section of Figure 5.3. 
Note: the dotted line in the fault tree indicates missing intermediate steps in the 
propagation chain. 
When the propagation path reaches the divider, the causes of Q2 HI can occur in either 
the inlet leg or the other outlet leg(s). The causes in the inlet leg are found by the G1 HI 
branch, whereas the causes in the other outlet leg are found by the G4 LO/NONE/REV 
branches. 
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But now consider the following section of plant: 
Figure 5.5 
Plant Section Incorporating a Divider and Header in Combination. 
The fault tree for HIGH FLOW in stream 4 would be of the form: 
Figure 5.6 
Fault Tree for High Flow in Plant Section of Figure 5.5. 
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This tree is incorrect in that G5 LO or G2 LO can never give rise to Q4 HI. The problem 
arises because fault tree synthesis is done vertically, so consistency checks can only be 
carried out with respect to the path already traced. It is clear from the above figure that 
owing to the two-way propagation facility, a loop in the information flow has been 
created, which can only be handled by additional consistency checks after the initial tree 
has been synthesised or by introducing additional boundary conditions during the actual 
synthesis stage. 
5.2 FAULTFINDER MK1 SOLUTION 
Kelly [Ref 5-1] partially solved the problem by treating this situation as a special 
sub-system in a manner comparable to that for control loops and trip loops. Such 
sub-systems were classified as 'Divider-Header Combinations' (DHCs). It is thus 
necessary for the user to identify these sub-systems during the decomposition stage and 
to supply information to the MASTER program to convey their structure and 
functionality. This situation is further complicated by the methodology differentiating 
between three types of DHCs: 
a) a bypass system where both legs have flow, e. g. to regulate the temperature of a 
stream by adjusting the flow of the process stream through the heat exchanger. For 
simplicity the control valve set-up to regulate the flow between the two legs has been 
omitted from Figure 5.7. 
HEAT 
EXCHANGER 
Figure 5.7 
Bvuass With Flow Divider-Header Combination. 
b) a bypass system where one leg normally has flow but the other one does not, e. g. to 
enable on-line maintenance of a control valve. For simplicity the isolation valves around 
the control valve have been omitted from Figure 5.8: 
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HAND VALVE SHUT 
CONTROL VALVE 
Figure 5.8 
Bypass Without Flow Divider-Header Combination. 
c) a parallel system to handle redundancy, e. g. a pump bank with spare capacity (a 
maximum of five legs being allowed by this arrangement): 
Figure 5.9 
Parallel System Divider-Header Combination. 
Furthermore, the divider and header models used for each of these combinations were 
different and so it was also necessary for the user to select the correct models to suit the 
particular application. 
5.3 DEFICIENCY IN THE MK1 SOLUTION. 
Whilst the approach outlined by Kelly produced correct fault trees for the three types of 
DHC outlined above, the solution was restricted to these cases and could not for 
example cater for overlapping DHCs or where each leg on a divider did not match up to 
Page 5/6 
a corresponding leg on a header. (An example of an overlapping DHC is given later in 
this chapter - see Figure 5.11). 
Apart from these problems a more fundamental criticism can be levelled at classifying 
DHCs as a special sub-system on the same lines as control loops and trip loops. 
Control loops and trip loops are a significant feature in that the failure of these 
components introduces certain generic failure modes into the tree. Since they are an 
obvious and integral part of the plant, the user can reasonably be expected to identify, 
and then describe their structure and functionality in terms of the input required by the 
MASTER program. 
On the other hand, DHCs are a somewhat abstract concept, which has been introduced 
to solve various problems encountered by the synthesis algorithm. The user is being 
asked to determine the functionality of structures whose presence may not be all that 
obvious in the first place, particularly if the DHCs overlap or are separated by a large 
number of intervening units. In order to highlight this point consider the Lawley 
Propane Pipeline System [Ref 5-2]. 
5.3.1 LAWLEY PROPANE PIPELINE SYSTEM 
Figure 5.10 gives the flow diagram for this system. DHCs have been uniquely identified 
using the following convention: 
Each DHC has been assigned a number 1,2.. N. For DHC_1, the divider has been 
marked 1 and the corresponding header 1'. This is repeated for the other DHCs in the 
system. 
The following problems were encountered in identifying the various DHCs for the 
above system: 
- all the dividers have to be identified and then the legs on the divider have to be traced 
to find any corresponding headers. For a large system some DHCs could easily be 
over-looked. 
- two of the DHCs overlap. It is not clear how these should be represented. 
- in the three-way valve DHC, it is necessary to treat the three-way valve as a 
divider in 
its own right. 
- there are a number of dividers and headers present which 
do not match up to form 
DHCs. These tend to confuse the issue. 
Despite recognising all the DHCs in the above system, the fault tree would still be 
incorrect owing to the overlapping DHCs. However, the work by Kelly was important in 
identifying the problem and presenting a strategy which went some way towards 
providing a solution. 
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5.4 PROPOSED SOLUTION 
Looking again at the fault tree in Figure 5.6, it is necessary to delete the two branches 
(G5 LO under Q2 HI and G2 LO under Q5 HI). This is necessary since a loop exists in 
the information flow structure and these branches are tracing faults in the direction 
opposite to that required for the event Q5 HI. The solution outlined in this thesis relies 
to a large extent on detecting these loops in the information flow structure and then 
setting up appropriate boundary conditions at the synthesis stage. 
5.5 APPLICATION TO AN EXAMPLE SYSTEM 
The principles behind the proposed solution will be described with reference to Figure 
5.11. Although this is a rather contrived example, it nevertheless addresses many of the 
issues. Using the MK1 methodology it would not be clear how this configuration should 
be decomposed to specify the different DHCs. The three possible DHCs are given in 
Table 5.1 below: 
DHC DIVIDER UNIT HEADER UNIT 
1 3 7 
2 5 9 
3 3 9 
Table 5.1 
Possible DHCs for Plant Section of Figure 5.11 
Even if the rules on decomposition could be clarified, the methodology is inadequate for 
this application since the third combination is produced as a result of the first two 
overlapping. 
5.6 TERMINOLOGY 
Before proceeding any further, the terminology used will be described. Essentially there 
are three main terms of interest: 
loop 
balanced loop 
overall loop 
Each of these is described below. 
5.6.1 LOOP 
A loop defines a path in the information flow structure, which enables the propagation 
chain to double back on to itself. 
Hence, an important aspect of the MK2 methodology is to detect loops in the 
information flow structure and to take appropriate action at the synthesis stage. Thus for 
the configuration in Figure 5.11 the following loops would be detected: 
a) 3.3.4-5.5.6-7.12.11 
b) 5.5.6 - 7.7.8 - 9.14.13 
c) 3.3.4-5.13.14-9.8.7-7.12.11 
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For each group of three numbers: 
- the first number is the node number of the given divider or header. 
- the second number is the edge number linking to the current node. 
- the third number is the edge number linking to the next node. 
The synthesis package could then utilise this information to introduce the relevant boundary conditions. However, in addition to identifying loops, it is also necessary to 
ascertain whether each loop is 'balanced' or not. The concept of a balanced loop is 
discussed below. 
5.6.2 BALANCED LOOP 
A loop is balanced if in the direction of fault propagation, the loop has a single exit 
point. 
The significance of this point is illustrated with reference to the plant section of Figure 
5.11. Supposing the fault tree for LOW FLOW in stream 9 is being developed. Then 
neglecting reverse flow and assuming that the tree could be prevented from looping 
back onto itself, the resultant tree would be of the following format: 
Q 
F- I 
Q14 LO Q14 NONE 
04 LO Q4 NONE 
02 LO Q2 NONE 
Q 
G8 LO G8 NONE 
Figure 5.12 
Fault Tree for Low Flow in Plant Section of Figure 5.11. 
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Loop 5.5.6 - 7.7.8 - 9.14.13 is an unbalanced loop since it has an unbalanced leg via header unit 7. Hence, Q4 NONE at the 'inlet' of the loop can be a valid cause of Q9 LO, 
since the LO at the 'outlet' can be met by the unbalanced leg. 
However, loop 3.3.4 - 5.13.14 - 9.8.7 - 7.12.11 is a balanced loop since it contains no 
unbalanced legs. Consequently Q2 NONE is not a valid cause since for Q9 LO to occur, 
there must be some flow at this point. 
In actual fact the balance of a loop is also dictated by the direction of fault propagation. If the event of interest were G4 LO then loop 5.5.6 - 7.7.8 - 9.14.13 would be 
considered balanced since there is only one outlet from the loop. 
This data on balanced loops is represented in terms of streams which represent complete 
continuity of flow between the inlet and outlet of any loop. There would thus be four 
entries for the above system: 
a) 9-2 indicating that the loop is balanced in 
b) 2-9 both directions. 
c) 4-9 indicating that the loop is balanced in 
d) 7-2 in one direction only. 
Where continuity of flow exists the synthesis package would introduce boundary 
conditions to ensure that only the loop start deviation is propagated to the loop outlet. 
5.6.3 OVERALL LOOP 
It is important to note the difference between loops and overall loop. Consider the plant 
section shown below: 
Figure 5.13 
Parallel System Illustrating Difference Between Loops and Overall 
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The program will note three unique loops for this section system: 
a) 2.2.3 - 4.6.5 b) 2.2.3 - 4.8.7 
c) 2.5.6 - 4.8.7 
In terms of fault tree synthesis it is necessary to ascertain if there is a special relationship 
between connections 4 and 1. Since all three loops start and terminate at the same nodes, 
they need to be considered in unison. It is clear that the three loops in the above figure 
combine to form an overall loop. 
5.7 DETERMINATION OF LOOPS 
The user could be asked to specify the loops and to determine the balanced loops, as 
part of the input to the MASTER program. However, a more satisfactory approach 
would be to generate this data automatically from the information already provided on 
the way the units are inter-connected. This information is stored in an array and contains 
four items of information for each connection, as follows: 
upstream unit number 
upstream port number 
downstream unit number 
downstream port number 
This array for the configuration of Figure 5.11 is given below: 
STREAM UPSTREAM DOWNSTREAM 
NUMBER UNIT PORT UNIT PORT 
1 1 1 2 1 
2 2 2 3* 1 
3 3* 2 4 1 
4 4 2 5 1 
5 5 2 6 1 
6 6 2 7 1 
7 7 2 8 1 
8 8 2 9 1 
9 9 2 10 1 
10 10 2 11 1 
11 3* 3 12 1 
12 
13 
12 
5 
2 
3 
7 
13 
3 
1 
14 13 2 9 3 
Table 5.2 
Configuration Data for Plant Section of Figure 5.11. 
The steps involved in determining the loops will now be outlined. 
Page 5/13 
5.7.1 STEP 1 
Inspect the array and pick out the dividers and headers. The basic rule is that a divider has two/more outlets and only one inlet, whereas a header has two/more inlets but only 
one outlet. 
The relevant entries in Table 5.2, for divider unit 3 have been highlighted with an (*). 
Unit 3 is the downstream unit to one connection only, hence this unit has only one inlet. 
It is the upstream unit to two connections, i. e. it has two outlets. Hence, it satisfies the 
above rule. Similar logic can be applied to identify the other divider, unit 5 and the two 
headers, units 7 and 9. 
5.7.2 STEP 2 
Condense the above array such that the only nodes are the dividers and headers and the 
edges the connections between these units. 
The purpose of this step is to reduce the search space for the subsequent analysis. 
Essentially it disregards 'flow-through' units, having a single inlet and outlet, which 
contribute nothing to the detection of loops. The array given in Table 5.2 would thus be 
reduced to: 
STREAM UPSTREAM DOWNSTREAM 
NUMBER UNIT PORT UNIT PORT 
1 -4t 3 2 5 1 
2 5+6 5 2 7 1 
3 ß-i-8 7 2 9 1 
4l +ILt 5 3 9 3 
5 +t2 3 3 7 3 
Table 5.3 
Condensed Configuration Data for Plant Section of Figure 5.11. 
5.7.3 STEP 3 
The purpose of this step is to find all the loops in the configuration. The basic criterion 
used is that a loop exists if the path traces over the same node twice. 
To illustrate this point, consider starting at divider unit 3 in Figure 5.11. The possible 
flow legs are the two outlets or the inlet (streams 3,11 and 2). Each of these streams will 
then be considered to explore the different flow paths. Only one path can be traced at a 
time, the others being added to a stack for later processing. Any particular search path is 
terminated if it is not connected to a divider or header unit. Hence stream 2 would not 
be considered any further. 
When stream 3 is considered, streams 5 and 13 from the next divider will be added to 
the stack. To continue the search entries are removed from the stack on a last-in-first out 
basis. Assuming stream 5 to be the last entry to have been added to the stack, the next 
step will note that this stream is in turn connected to a header, unit 7. The other legs, 
streams 12 and 7 on this header unit will in turn be added to the stack. A continuation of 
this process will eventually trace stream 12 back to divider unit 3. Since the path 
has 
encountered unit 3 twice, there must be a loop in the information flow structure 
for this 
Note: the number given in () in Table 5.3 relates to the corresponding 
entry in Table 
5.2. 
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system. Hence, the loop 3.3.4 - 5.5.6 - 7.12.11 will be noted. The other loops will be 
similarly traced. 
5.7.4 STEP 4 
Step 3 invariably generates duplicate loops since the same loop could start at any node 
in the given path. This list is next reduced to the unique loops only. This is achieved by: 
a) re-arranging the information on a loop such that it always starts at a divider. 
b) ensuring that the first and last connections are outlet legs of the above divider 
c) sorting the entries by order of the number of nodes in each loop, thus ensuring that 
any sub-loops appear before any outer loops. 
Two loops are deemed to be the same if each entry for each node along the path is the 
same. 
In step 3 the scenario was developed along stream 3 for the divider unit 3 and the loop 
3.3.4 - 5.5.6 - 7.12.11 was detected. The search mechanism implemented is 
deterministic and exhaustive. Consequently, when the entry for stream 11 for this unit is 
developed the loop 3.11.12 - 7.6.5 - 5.4.3 is also noted. This is clearly the same loop as 
the one identified above. 
It is clearly undesirable to store and then process more information than is absolutely 
necessary. The objective of noting loops is to prevent the fault propagation path from 
doubling back on itself. Since the identification of either loop is sufficient to achieve 
this, it is necessary to remove any duplicated information. 
5.7.5 STEP 5 
It is necessary for the synthesis package to know the notional start and end of the loop. 
This may at first sight appear somewhat absurd, since a loop is normally regarded as a 
continuous entity with an undefinable start and end. However, for the current 
application it is necessary to define the primary divider and header which give rise to 
the loop. These two units can then be regarded as the two ends of the loop. In order to 
achieve this the following criteria are used: 
a) a loop is assumed to start at the first divider in the path as determined by step 4. 
b) the end of the loop will be assumed to occur at the last header in the path, where the 
path passes from one header inlet to another inlet on the same header. 
These principles will be clarified by reference to the loop 3.3.4 - 5.13.14 - 9.8.7 - 
7.12.11. This loop passes through two dividers and two headers. Unit 3 would be 
regarded as one end of the loop because, in the definition of this loop the path passes 
from one outlet leg, stream 3 to the other outlet leg stream 11, c. f. the other divider 
where the path passes from one inlet leg, stream 4 to an outlet leg, stream 13. This 
criterion is thus used to specify unit 3 as the primary divider. 
Using similar logic unit 9 would be regarded as the other end of the loop since for this 
unit the path passes from one inlet leg, stream 14 to another inlet leg, stream 
8, c. f. 
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header unit 7 where the path passes from an outlet leg, stream 7 to an inlet leg, stream 12. 
Having marked the primary divider as the loop start, then the primary header can be 
considered as the unit where the loop doubles back on itself. 
5.7.6 STEP 6 
For each loop starting and terminating at the same divider and header it is necessary to 
determine whether the overall loop is balanced or not. This is necessary to determine 
whether there is a continuity of flow between the loop inlet and outlet and so set up 
additional boundary conditions. This concept has already been discussed in Section 5.6 
5.8 USE OF A SINGLE DIVIDER/HEADER MODEL 
One limitation of the MK1 methodology already outlined was its dependence on three 
different types of divider-header combination. Since each of these makes use of 
different divider and header models, it was necessary for the user to select the correct 
models from the library at the decomposition stage. A significant advantage can be 
gained by having a single divider and header pair in the model library. 
The need for the different models in the MK1 methodology will be illustrated by 
reference to the following header model and consideration of the propagation of the 
flow variable: 
1 
2 
Note: the numbers refer to 
3 port numbers on the 
unit. 
Figure 5.14 
Schematic Representation of Header Model 
Figure 5.15 shows the minitrees for high flow through this unit; Figure 5.16 gives the 
corresponding minitrees for low flow through this unit. The differences can be 
summarised as follows: 
a) the only meaningful deviations along the no flow leg are SOME and REV. There 
is 
normally no flow, SOME flow thus represents a deviation in one direction and REV a 
deviation in the opposite direction. 
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b) if there is normally only one flow path, then there must be a direct correspondence of the flow deviations. This is illustrated by the minitree for Q2 LO for the bypass with 
no-flow system. The only deviation of G1 is LO since there is only one flow leg. 
c) the parallel system divider/header models had been set up to cater for a maximum of five legs. In order to handle the greater number of legs, without imposing a much 
greater memory load on the computer, an incomplete modelling of these units was 
carried out. The need for this is illustrated by reference to the five-legged header model 
of Figure 5.17. 
1 
3 
42 
5 
6 
Figure 5.17 
Schematic Representation of Five-legged Header Model 
The complete minitree for low flow at the outlet would be of the form: 
Figure 5.18 
Minitree for Low Flow for Five-legged Header of Figure 5.17 
Hence, there would have been 15 branches to this minitop event, with similarly large 
minitrees for other minitop events. Two simplifications were thus made: 
a) events in one inlet port cannot affect the events in another inlet port. 
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b) in the propagation of an event from an inlet to the outlet, only the direct deviations 
were matched. 
These two points are borne out by the minitrees given in Figure 5.15 and 5.16. 
It can be concluded from the above examples that there should be no differences between the models of a type 1 and type 3 DHC. The differences between a type 1 and a 
type 2 DHC arise because only a subset of the deviations is meaningful. 
It was thus decided for the MK2 methodology that the two-legged divider/header 
models of Type 1 DHC (bypass with flow) be used universally, with the following 
qualifications: 
a) the synthesis package should carry out some checks for the no-flow legs as described 
below (see Section 5.9). 
b) systems with more than two legs should be modelled using a special decomposition 
technique described later (see Section 5.10.1). 
5.9 NO FLOW LEGS 
Considering again the diagram of the header given in Figure 5.14, the minitree for Q2 
LO is: 
Figure 5.19 
Minitree for Bypass with Flow Header 
Now consider port 3 to be the no flow leg. If the propagation path passes down a no 
flow leg, then the only meaningful deviations of flow are REV and SOME. Hence, a 
rule is needed to delete causes from this leg if the deviation is neither REV nor SOME. 
G3 LO and G3 NONE would thus be deleted from the above minitree. 
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Now consider the minitree for Q2 HI: 
Figure 5.20 
Mintree for High Flow in Bypass with Flow Header 
In this case a rule is needed such that if a HI deviation is propagated to a no flow leg 
then it should be swapped for the SOME deviation. Hence, G3 HI would be replaced by 
G3 SOME. 
Additionally if there is only one flow leg, then owing to the continuity of flow, a rule is 
needed to ensure that only direct deviations are traced. The minitree for Q2 LO is thus 
modified to give: 
Figure 5.21 
Modified Minitree for Low Flow in Bypass without Flow Header 
5.10 DECOMPOSITION AND INPUT TO MASTER PROGRAM 
5.10.1 MORE THAN TWO FLOW LEGS 
As already indicated for the five-legged header, due to the increased memory size 
requirements imposed by the divider/header models, the standard models in the library 
have been created with only two inlet/outlet legs as depicted below: 
Page 5/21 
21 
12 
33 
Figure 5.22 
Schematic Representation of the Standard Divider and Header Models in MK2 Library 
This may at first sight appear to be a severe restriction on the applicability of such 
models. Consider again the pump bank shown in Figure 5.9. This system has three legs 
and cannot directly be modelled using the above models. Two approaches were 
considered. The first would have involved the creation of a pair of divider and header 
models with an increased number of legs. This approach was rejected because creating 
models to cater for five legs was imposing a much greater requirement on the memory 
than any of the other models in the library. Furthermore, even if models with five legs 
were created then it would still not be an all-encompassing solution as systems with a 
greater number of legs could still arise. 
The alternative solution adopted, has been to stick with the two-legged models but to 
carry out the decomposition on the following basis: 
Figure 5.23 
Decomposition Convention for Using Two-legged Models to Handle Systems 
with More Legs 
This approach is capable of handling an arbitrary number of legs. 
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5.10.2 FLOW CAPACITIES 
Having specified the dividers and headers as part of the configuration, the MASTER 
program proceeds to detect any loops in the information flow structure. Whether or not 
any loops are found, the program next prompts for the flow capacity of the legs on the different divider and header units. There are two reasons why this information is 
necessary: 
a) identify the no flow legs 
b) cater for excess capacity in parallel systems 
The standard divider and header models have been set up assuming that flow is the 
norm along both legs. The advantage of using a single divider and header pair of models 
has already been outlined. The action necessary to apply these models to the no flow 
situation has also been considered. Hence, during the decomposition stage it is 
necessary to identify any no flow legs on the dividers and headers so that the 
appropriate action may be taken by the synthesis program. 
Additionally, when the divider and header models were created, an implicit assumption 
was made that both legs were needed to provide the required throughput. Thus for the 
header shown below: 
1 
2 
3 
Figure 5.24 
Schematic Representation of Header Model 
The minitree for low flow would be of the form: 
Figure 5.25 
Minitree for Low Flow for Header Model of Figure 5.24 
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i. e. if there is a blockage in either leg then low flow will occur at the outlet. 
Now assume that each leg is capable of providing 100% of the capacity at the outlet. Under these circumstances an AND gate is required, since there must be blockage down both legs. 
In order to cater for these different situations the user has the option of specifying three different flow capacities: 0,50 or 100 indicating that the leg is capable of providing 0%, 50% or 100% of the required throughput. 
One further restriction is that each leg in a parallel system must have the same flow 
capacity. This information is only used if the deviation being propagated is low flow or 
pressure at the outlet and is a means of simplifying the tree structure. Consider the pump bank system of Figure 5.9 again, where each leg has a 50% flow capacity. The minitree for low flow at the outlet would simplify to: 
Low Flow 
at Outlet 
/3 
Low Flow Low Flow Low Flow 
Lin Leg 1 in Leg 2 in Leg 3 
Figure 5.26 
Minitree for Low Flow in Parallel System 
Having the same capacity allows an r/n gate to be used. If this were not the case, then 
each combination of legs would have to be evaluated. This could yield a much larger 
tree with much replication of branches and could quite easily lead to combinatorial 
explosion for a system with a large number of legs. 
5.10.3 INPUT TO ASSIST THE DETECTION ALGORITHM 
Consider the following schematic diagram of a heat exchanger model: 
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Having independent flow paths in the model complicates the process. Assume that the 
loop detection is progressing along the coolant stream and that the path is currently at 
port 3. The configuration will already have been specified such that this unit has two 
outlets, ports 2 and 4. Since no information is present to indicate that these are 
independent, the loop search algorithm does not know which path to follow. Under 
these circumstances the program will specify its current location and indicate the 
alternative flow paths present. The user is expected to select one of these alternatives so 
that the search mechanism may continue. 
There is scope for automating this step by analysing the failure models in combination 
with the loop search algorithm. The failure models will have propagation equations for 
flow, which should indicate the independent nature of the flow paths: 
Q2OUT=F(G l IN, G2OUT) 
Q4OUT=F(G3IN, G4OUT) 
This refinement has not been implemented in the methodology described in this thesis. 
5.11 EFFECTS ON FAULT TREE SYNTHESIS 
The identification of loops in the information flow structure and the specification of the 
flow capacities is sufficient for the synthesis program to set up the additional boundary 
conditions and so generate the correct fault trees. 
The switch of deviations for the no flow legs has already been described in section 5.9 
above. This section will thus concentrate on the boundary conditions necessary to lead 
the propagation path in the right direction. This will be illustrated by reference to 
simplified examples. 
Consider the following parallel system: 
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Consider that the fault tree for HI flow at stream 1 is being developed. When the path 
passes to streams 2 and 4, the information on the loops prevents the stream 2 branch 
from passing down stream 5, and the stream 4 branch from passing down stream 3. 
Furthermore, if two streams have a continuity of flow, as streams 1 and 6, then a 
boundary condition is imposed that the same variables at these locations should share 
the same deviations. This last point will be made clearer by reference to the next 
example. 
Consequently the general fault tree structure for the above example would be of the 
form: 
Figure 5.29 
Fault Tree for High Flow in Plant Section of Figure 5.28 
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One other point to note is that once the propagation path reaches stream 6 then the fault 
tree structure will be replicated. Under these circumstances only one branch is fully developed, the other being flagged as a looped event as indicated by the asterisk. Looped events are used in the methodology to prevent replication of the fault tree branches. 
Now consider a by-pass without flow system: 
PIPE 4 HV-SHUT 
23 
PIPE 
3 52 
61 
10 
PIPE CV-OPEN PIPE 
7 
49586 
Figure 5.30 
Schematic Representation of Bypass Without Flow System 
The fault tree for LO flow in stream 1 would be of the form: 
Figure 5.31 
Fault Tree for Low Flow in Plant Section of Figure 5.30 
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In this case it is not appropriate to prevent the Q7 LO branch from passing down stream 
5. The reason for this is that low flow at the outlet of the header can occur due to leaks 
in the units in the no flow leg and fluid can pass down this leg either as a result of some 
flow passing down stream 5 or due to some fluid reversing down stream 2. The 
importance of this scenario is highlighted by the following two sections of the fault tree: 
Low Flow Low Flow 
Stream 1 Stream 1 
Q2 REV Q7 LO 
G5 SOM E 
G3 REV 
LK-LP-EN 
Unit 3 
G4 SOME 
G4 REV LK-LP-EN 
HV-F-OP Unit 1 
Unit 2 
G5 REV 
LK-LP-EN 
Unit 1 
Figure 5.32 
Low Flow Branches for Plant Section of Figure 5.30 due to Faults in the No Flow Leg 
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By tracing the reverse flow branch it is seen that a leakage in unit 1 is ANDed with the hand valve failing open unit 2. However, the some flow branch indicates that a leakage in unit 1 alone is sufficient to give rise to the top event. This shows the need to be able 
to trace faults in both directions down a no flow leg in order to obtain the correct 
minimum cutsets. The normal boundary conditions are sufficient to prevent the 
propagation path from looping around indefinitely. 
It should also be noted in this case that the additional boundary conditions would 
prevent the G5 REV branch from passing down stream 6, since there is continuity of 
flow between streams 1 and 6. 
In the two examples considered above the given header unit was encountered from the 
outside. The next example illustrates the action taken when a unit is encountered from 
the inside. Figure 5.33 shows a common arrangement to regulate the temperature of a 
stream by controlling the flow of the process stream rather than the utility. 
The start of the fault tree for the event T7 LO in this system is given in Figure 5.34 
below: 
Figure 5.34 
Start of Fault Tree for Plant Section of Figure 5.33 
The same rules apply to the T9 LO and T5 LO branches as above; the former cannot 
have causes in stream 3 and the latter cannot have causes in stream 8. 
However, one cause of T5 LO is G4 LO. This is a different variable and the boundary 
conditions set for the temperature variable do not apply to this event. Furthermore this 
variable will encounter the divider/header units from the inside. 
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In this case boundary conditions are set to prevent stream 3 causes from propagating further than stream 9 and the stream 5 causes from propagating further than stream 8. 
5.12 PARALLEL SYSTEMS 
5.12.1 INTRODUCTION 
Some sections of plant are provided to allow redundancy. For example, consider the two 
arrangements below: 
J PUMP 56 12 
8 DUMMY DIVIDER 6 PUMP 3 HEADER DUMMY 
HEAD 12S41 TAIL 5 
74 
PUMP7 
Figure 5.35 
Redundancy in Pump Bank 
Each pump is capable of providing 50% of the required throughput. 
Pressure Pressure 
Relief Relief 
Valve Valve 
Figure 5.36 
Redundancy in Relief System 
Each relief valve is capable of providing 100% of the required throughput. 
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In such circumstances the number of legs which have to fail, to give insufficient 
throughput is variable. One approach could be to create divider/header models to cater for different flow capacities. However, this would be contrary to the objective of having 
a single divider and header model in the library. 
The alternative chosen is that the user should enter the flow capacities of each leg of the divider/header when entering the plant configuration. This allows the two models to be 
used in a context-independent manner. 
Since these arrangements are a means of providing spare capacity, the only deviations 
which require special consideration are low flow, pressure and relief through the system. 
5.12.2 APPLICATION TO AN EXAMPLE SYSTEM 
The principle will be outlined by reference to low flow through the system given in Figure 5.35 above. This can occur either as a result of blockage-type or leakage-type faults. The faults in the different legs need to be classified according to one of these two 
categories. They require special treatment, since they have a different influence on the fault tree structure. 
5.12.2.1 BLOCKAGE-TYPE FAULTS 
A blockage type fault is one which gives rise to reduced flow due to an increased 
resistance, e. g. a hand valve failing partially shut. As there is spare capacity it is 
necessary to group these faults under an r/n gate, where 
n= total number of legs 
and r is given by the formula: 
r=n-100+1 
c 
where c is the capacity of one leg expressed as a °Io. 
There is an assumption that the capacity of each leg is the same. This proviso has been 
made for two reasons: 
a) for parallel systems equal capacities will usually be the norm. 
b) otherwise the tree structure would be made unduly complex and large, with each 
combination of legs having to be evaluated separately. 
5.12.2.2 LEAKAGE-TYPE FAULTS 
This type of fault gives rise to low flow due to a loss of fluid from the system. It is 
assumed that a leakage in any one leg is sufficient to give rise to low flow since the loss 
of fluid from the system may be greater than the ability to compensate. They are thus 
fundamentally different from the above category of fault since an OR gate is called for. 
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5.12.3 PROPOSED SOLUTION 
The solution adopted is a modification of that used by Kelly [Ref 5-1]. The modification is needed since: 
a) the current methodology does not explicitly declare divider-header combinations; a loop-based approach is being used. 
b) more than two-legged divider/headers are modelled as nested systems, as described in Section 5.10. 
Furthermore, the MK I. methodology accorded this special treatment to low flow only. 
The current methodology has been extended to cater for low pressure and relief as well. 
The basic principle used to distinguish between the two types of fault is outlined below, 
with reference to the following pipe unit: 
1 --i 2 
Figure 5.37 
Pipe Unit 
The minitrees for low flow at the inlet and outlet are: 
Figure 5.38 
Minitrees for Low Flow in Pipe Unit 
Hence, a blockage-type fault is one which gives rise to the low deviation in both 
directions of fault propagation, e. g. PART-BLK. A leakage-type fault is one which 
causes a low deviation only in the direction of fault propagation. Hence, if the upstream 
causes are being traced, then LK-LP-EN is a leakage-type fault. 
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5.12.4 IMPLEMENTATION 
The generic form of the fault tree, for the plant section of Figure 5.35, is given below: 
Figure 5.39 
Generic Fault Tree for Low Flow in Parallel Redundant System 
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The domains of the internal and external branches are determined by there being a 
continuity of flow between streams 1 and 8. Hence the internal, leakage and blockage 
branches are prevented from tracing faults to either of these streams. Similarly, the 
external branch cannot trace faults back into the blockage and leakage branches. The 
criterion for deciding which faults to include in the leakage and blockage branches has 
already been described. The actual procedure for achieving this is outlined below. 
5.12.5 SEPARATING THE LEAKAGE AND BLOCKAGE TYPE FAULTS. 
Consider one leg of the above combination in greater detail: 
HV-OPEN 2 PUMP 
23 
PIPE 4 10 3 
Figure 5.40 
One Leg of the Parallel System 
Consider the direction of fault propagation to be from stream 4 to stream 1. To simplify 
the explanation only the low flow deviation will be developed. The fault tree for this 
section of the plant will be of the following form: 
Figure 5.41 
Fault Tree for Low Flow in Plant Section of Figure 5.40 
Page 5/35 
When the propagation path reaches G3 LO, the basic event causes of this are deleted, 
since they violate the prevailing boundary conditions. The two basic event causes of G3 LO, PART-BLK Unit 3 and LK-HP-EN Unit 3 are removed from the tree, because the former is a duplicated event whereas the latter is a not allowed fault of Q4 LO. A LK-HP-EN will tend to give rise to Q4 HI rather than Q4 LO. However, as mentioned 
earlier it is necessary to note the events which give rise to G3 LO as well as those that 
cause Q4 LO. Before the causes of G3 LO are deleted, a note of the events is made on a 
separate stack (G-stack) for later processing. This procedure would be similarly repeated for the other units, i. e. the pump and the hand valve in this case. 
When the initial fault tree is synthesised, the tree is developed with the internal and 
external branches only. During fault tree rationalisation the contents of the internal 
branch are copied. The original branch is now labelled as the BLOCKAGE branch and 
the copied one the LEAKAGE branch. Use is now made of the events stored in the 
above G-stack. Events in the BLOCKAGE branch which also appear in the G-stack are 
left in the blockage branch. Any events which occur in the blockage branch but do not 
appear in the G-stack are deleted from this branch. 
For the LEAKAGE branch the converse is true, i. e. any events which appear in both the 
G-stack and this branch are deleted from this branch whereas events appearing in this 
branch but not in the G-stack are retained in this branch. 
The above criteria are clarified by reference to the start of the fault tree given in Figure 
5.41: 
Q4 LO 
PAR-BLK 
[G3 
LO 
-LP-EN 
Unit 3 Unit 3 
Figure 5.42 
Start of Fault Tree Given in Figure 5.41 
The above section of the tree would be copied. It has already been stated that the 
G-stack for this level of development will contain the events PART-BLK Unit 3 and 
LK-HP-EN Unit 3. The Blockage branch will thus retain the event PART-BLK since it 
appears in the G-stack. The event LK-LP-EN will be deleted from this branch as it does 
not appear in the G-stack. 
Conversely, the PART-BLK event will be deleted from the Leakage branch since it does 
appear in the G-stack, but will retain the event LK-LP-EN as it does not appear in this 
stack. 
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5.13 CONCLUSION 
This chapter has described the enhancement of the FAULTFINDER methodology such 
that the user no longer has to treat Divider-Header Combinations as a special 
sub-system during the system decomposition phase. Instead the package automatically 
identifies the dividers and headers in the configuration and then determines the loops in 
the information flow structure. 
Additionally, the user is shielded from having to specify the type of divider/header 
model to use. A single pair of divider/header models can now cater for: 
bypass with flow systems. 
bypass without flow systems. 
parallel redundancy systems. 
However, in order to achieve this the user has to specify the flow capacity of each leg of 
the dividers and headers in the configuration. The package automatically prompts for 
this information. A decomposition convention has also been outlined to enable the 
two-legged divider/header models to handle an arbitrary number of legs in the system. 
Chapter 10 of this thesis presents a worked example based on the plant configuration of 
Figure 5.35. 
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6.0 RULES FOR THE DECOMPOSITION OF CONTROL LOOPS 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
The methodology described thus far has involved the decomposition of the plant 
representation into its constituent units and the connections between these. The 
problems inherent in this technique have been highlighted by Kelly [Ref 6-1] and by Shafaghi [Ref 6-2]. Generally two types of problem are encountered: 
- incorrect fault trees, since the combination of sensor, controller and control valve introduce failure modes into the tree which cannot be adequately modelled via an 
atomistic approach to the decomposition of individual components. 
- opaque fault trees. Unlike a human expert, automated methodologies cannot readily 
perceive the structure that the overall tree should have. The failure modes associated 
with control loops are an important constituent of the fault tree, which an automated 
methodology can easily obscure by less important failures. 
In order to overcome these problems, control loops are treated as a special sub-system 
during the decomposition stage, and the user is expected to supply additional 
information to describe the functionality of the control loop. 
6.2 TYPES OF CONTROL LOOP 
The methodology considers two basic types of control loop: 
feedback 
feedforward 
The following figure shows a feedback control loop. 
DUMMY 
TAIL 
SENSOR 
RE ý_ I DU 
HEADY ºI EXCHANGER 
HEAT 
TAILY 
CONTROLLER 
DUMMY CONTROL 
HEAD VALVE 
Figure 6.1 
Schematic Representation of a Feedback Control 
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The purpose of this control loop is to regulate the temperature of the tube-side medium downstream of the heat exchanger by manipulating the flow of coolant through the 
shell-side. The control loop is of the feedback type since the flow rate of coolant is 
adjusted only if there is a deviation in the temperature of the regulated stream. 
The following figure shows a feedforward control loop. 
DUMMY HEAD ý CONTROL 
STREAM B VALVE 
CONTROLLER 
DUMMY HEAD FLOW 
STREAM A SENSOR 
HEADER DUMMY 
TAIL 
Figure 6.2 
Schematic Representation of a Feedforward Loop 
The purpose of this control loop is to regulate the composition of the stream 
downstream of the header. This is achieved by sensing the flow of one stream and 
manipulating the flow of the other accordingly. The control loop is of the feedforward 
type since the flow rate of stream B is adjusted as soon as stream A deviates, thereby 
leaving the regulated stream unaffected. 
Additionally, the methodology needs to know whether the control loop has a separate 
manipulated stream. In essence all control loops act by adjusting the control valve 
aperture and so can be said to have a manipulating action. However, the distinction 
between a manipulated stream and a separate manipulated stream is of importance. Both 
control loops considered above have a separate manipulated stream, since the control 
valve is to be found in a separate process stream from that where the sensor is 
positioned. To highlight this distinction Figure 6.3 shows a system where there is no 
separate manipulated stream for the control loop. 
DUMMY 
HEAD 
PUMP 
ý---ý CONTROL 
VALVE 
CONTROLLER 
Schematic 
Figure 6.3 
entation of Control Loop without 
PRESSUR DUMMY 
SENSOR TAIL 
Manipulated Stream 
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6.3 FAILURE MODES FOR THE CONTROL LOOPS 
The distinctions highlighted above are important since the function of the control loop ultimately determines its generic failure modes. For this purpose the fault tree synthesis algorithm has been programmed with three basic control loop operators which structure the fault tree to reflect the type of control loop under consideration. 
For a feedforward or feedback control loop where a deviation in the regulated variable is being developed, the template to be applied is shown in Figure 6.4: 
REGULATED 
VARIABLE 
DEVIATION 
CONTROL CONTROL CONTROL CONTROL 
LOOP LOOP LOOP 
SPONTANEOUS LOOP 
INACTION MISLEADING OVERLOADING 
FAULTS FAULTS FAULTS 
CONTROL SENSED 
LOOP VARIABLE 
LATENT 
FAULTS 
DEVIATION 
Figure 6.4 
Control Loop Template for Regulated Variable Deviation 
If the control loop has a separate manipulated stream and a deviation in the manipulated 
variable is being developed then the templates are slightly different for a feedback and 
feedforward control loop. 
Figure 6.5 gives the template to be applied in the case of a feedback control loop. 
Figure 6.6 gives the template to be applied in the case of a feedforward control loop. 
Note: the meaning of the different branches in Figures 6.4,6.5 and 6.6 is explained 
on page 6/5. 
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MANIPULATED 
VARIABLE 
DEVIATION 
CONTROL CONTROL SENSED LOOP 
SPONTANEOUS LOOP VARIABLE 
FAULTS INACTION DEVIATION 
_7 
CONTROL MANIPULATED 
LOOP VARIABLE 
LATENT 
FAULTS DEVIATION 
Figure 6.5 
Manipulated Varaiable Deviation Template for a Feedback Control Loop 
MANIPULATED 
VARIABLE 
DEVIATION 
CONTROL MANIPULATED SENSED 
LOOP VARIABLE VARIABLE 
SPONTANEOUS 
FAULTS DEVIATION 
DEVIATION 
Figure 6.6 
ipulated Variable Deviation Template for a Feedforward Control 
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The spontaneous and latent failure branches in the above figures represent the two basic 
modes of failure of a control loop due to a malfunction in any of its components. The 
spontaneous failure branch traces the causes which give rise to either an increased or 
decreased aperture in the control valve. These two states are of course mutually 
exclusive and only one will be meaningful in any given application. The latent failure 
branch traces the causes which render the control loop invariant. This state represents 
the condition where the control valve aperture is stuck in the plant steady-state position, 
such that any deviations in the process conditions cannot be compensated. 
The distinction between the different templates will be highlighted by reference to a 
couple of examples. In the schematic representation of Figure 6.1, if the event being 
developed is a deviation in the temperature of the hot stream, then the template given in 
Figure 6.4 will be applied. The overload branch would contain faults like complete loss 
of coolant, since even the normal action of the control loop would be unable to 
compensate for this. The sensed variable deviation would trace the causes of the 
temperature deviation at the inlet to the sensor. Since the deviation in this stream is 
correctable by the normal action of the control loop, it is necessary to AND this branch 
with the latent failures in the control loop. It should be noted that there are no events 
which mislead this control loop. 
If instead the event being developed was a deviation in the flow of the manipulated 
stream, then the template given in Figure 6.5 would be applied. The deviation of the 
sensed variable branch would trace the causes of a deviation in the temperature to the 
inlet of the sensor. This represents the normal action of the control loop, since in order 
to rectify a deviation in the sensed variable there must be a corresponding adjustment of 
the manipulated stream. However, if a deviation in the manipulated stream occurs, then 
this will eventually manifest itself on the sensed variable. The control loop should be 
able to correct for these failures. Hence this branch is ANDed with control loop latent 
failures. 
The control loop in the schematic representation of Figure 6.2 is an example of a 
feedforward control loop. In this case, if the fault tree is being developed for a deviation 
in the manipulated stream then the template shown in Figure 6.6 would be applied. The 
basic difference between Figures 6.5 & 6.6 is that for the feedforward control loop the 
manipulated variable deviation is not ANDed with control loop latent failures. This is 
because unlike the heat exchanger example a deviation in the manipulated stream does 
not have an influence on the sensed variable. Since the control loop cannot detect 
deviations in the manipulated stream, then it is unable to correct for this type of failure. 
6.4 FILLING IN THE CONTROL LOOP TEMPLATES 
As mentioned earlier in Chapter 3, in order to correctly handle control loops in the 
methodology it is necessary to supply additional details. 
In order for the methodology to select the appropriate control loop template it is 
necessary to specify: 
- the sensed variable 
- the regulated variable(s) 
- the manipulated stream, if separate 
- whether the control loop is feedforward or 
feedback 
In order to define the scope of influence within the plant, it is necessary to specify: 
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- the streams where the variable(s) is(are) regulated 
- the streams where the flow is manipulated, if there is a separate manipulated stream. It is assumed within the methodology that only the flow can be manipulated by altering 
the control valve aperture. 
In order to define the components of the control loop spontaneous and latent failure branches it is necessary to specify: 
the control valve number 
the sensor unit number 
any intervening units between the sensor and the control valve, e. g. the controller. 
Additionally, the failure models for the control loop components need to observe certain 
modelling conventions in order to work correctly with the above control loop templates 
in the synthesis algorithm. 
6.5 DEFICIENCY IN THE MK1 METHODOLOGY 
The basic templates described above and the conventions for creating the failure models 
for the control loop components had been developed by Kelly. However, two 
fundamental problems were encountered during the course of this project: 
- there were no clear rules for decomposition, particularly in the case of complex control 
loops. 
- the rules for fault tree synthesis required further development, particularly in the case 
of complex control loops and combined control and trip loops. 
The rules for decomposition were developed by modelling a number of systems with a 
variety of control strategies. The rules developed will be illustrated by reference to a 
number of examples. 
The additional rules for fault tree synthesis will also be illustrated by reference to 
specific examples modelled during the course of this project. 
6.6 RULES FOR DECOMPOSING CONTROL LOOPS 
The basic rules will be described with reference to a modified representation of the 
Lapp-Powers Heat Exchanger system. Guidelines for applying these rules will be given 
by applying the rules to a number of examples. 
6.6.1 MODIFIED REPRESENTATION OF LAPP-POWERS HEAT 
EXCHANGER SYSTEM 
The schematic representation of this system is given in Figure 6.7. It should be noted 
that the trip system which normally forms a part of this configuration has been omitted 
for simplicity. 
6.6.1.1 RULE 1 
- identify the control loops in the system. 
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Figure 6.7 
Modified Representation of the Lapp-Powers System 
This is straightforward for this system, but will not always be the case as later examples 
will show. The criterion to be used is that each sensor sending a corrective signal to a 
control valve constitutes a control loop. In this system there is a single sensor (Unit 4), 
acting via the controller (Unit 11) and sending a corrective signal to the control valve 
(Unit 9). Hence, this system has a single control loop. 
6.6.1.2 RULE 2 
- determine whether the control valve is in the same process stream as the sensor or 
whether it is in a separate stream. 
The coolant and nitric acid streams are quite obviously two separate streams. Since the 
control valve is in a separate stream from the sensor, this control loop is said to have a 
separate manipulated stream. 
6.6.1.3 RULE 3 
- if the control loop has a separate manipulated stream, then determine the streams 
where the flow is manipulated. 
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The flow will be manipulated in all streams upstream and downstream of the control 
valve where there is a single, continuous flow path. Since the flow of coolant is a single flow path and there is no accumulation in any of the units, all the streams are specified 
as falling into this category. 
Note the flow would be non-continuous if there were scope for accumulation within a 
unit, e. g. level in a tank, and it would not be a single stream if any unit had more than 
two inlets or outlets, e. g. dividers and headers, since these potentially offer alternative 
flow paths. 
In general the tracing needs to be done both upstream and downstream of the control 
valve, until a unit of either of the above two types is located. All streams thus traced 
would be specified as having the flow manipulated in them. 
Although not implemented as part of the methodology being described in this thesis, 
there is scope for automating this search for the manipulated stream. The algorithm 
would be based on finding divider/header-type and vessel-type units. A procedure for 
achieving the former has already been outlined in the previous chapter. Vessel-type 
units could easily be located by noting the port-type that the path passes through. In the 
case of vessel-type units, the path must pass from an IN/OUT port to a VES port. 
6.6.1.4 RULE 4 
- identify the variables regulated by the control loop. 
If the control valve is in the same process stream as the sensor, then the sensed variable 
will also be the regulated variable. Any variables dependent on this variable would also 
be classified as being regulated by the control loop. 
In this example, however, the control valve resides in a separate stream to that of the 
sensor. In such a control system there must be an interaction between the sensed and 
manipulated streams. By examining the units on either side of the control valve it is 
found that this interaction takes place in the heat exchanger. The failure model for this 
unit contains a propagation equation linking the temperature of the nitric acid stream to 
the flow of the coolant. Since the temperature is the only variable in the hot stream 
affected by a change in the flow of the coolant, this is noted as being the only variable 
regulated by the control loop. 
Note that in general it is necessary to look both upstream and downstream of the control 
valve to find the place of interaction; the control valve could easily have been positioned 
downstream of the heat exchanger. 
6.6.1.5 RULE 5 
- define the streams where the variables identified in Rule 4 are regulated. 
For a control loop which operates via the influence of a separate manipulated stream, 
these streams are those downstream of the point where the interaction takes place, i. e. 
downstream of the heat exchanger in this case. All streams downstream of the heat 
exchanger should be specified up to the next unit where this variable can be altered 
within the confines of that unit. Examples of this type of unit would be heat exchangers, 
reactors involving endo/exo-thermic reactions, etc. 
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For this example there is no unit downstream of the heat exchanger which has the 
potential to alter the temperature of this stream by heat transfer. Hence, all streams downstream of the heat exchanger are specified as having the temperature regulated by the control loop. 
Again, although not implemented as part of the methodology being described in this 
thesis, there is scope to automate this search. For example, if there was a heat exchanger downstream of the section of plant of Figure 6.7, then the propagation equations for 
temperature in this unit could be used to ascertain the influence on the T variable. 
Assuming that ports 1 and 2 represent the flow of the hot stream and ports 3 and 4, the flow of the coolant, then this model would have a propagation equation of the following form: 
T2OUT=F(T1IN, -G3IN, G 1IN, T3IN) 
There is a continuity of flow between ports 1 and 2. Hence, since T2OUT is dependent 
upon parameters from another stream, it can be concluded that this unit has the potential 
to influence the T variable. 
6.6.1.6 RULE 6 
- determine whether the control loop isfeedforward or feedback. 
A control loop is feedback if it acts on a deviation in its regulated variable, otherwise it 
is feedforward. For the current example the control loop is feedback since it can only act 
upon a deviation in the temperature at the outlet of the heat exchanger, the regulated 
variable. 
6.6.1.7 RULE 7 
- determine the units which make up the control loop. 
The control valve and the sensor are obviously an integral part of any control loop. 
Additionally any units which lie between these two and which are responsible for 
transmitting a deviation in the sensed variable to the stem of the control valve, should be 
specified as forming part of the control loop. Hence, for the current example the 
controller and setpoint units are included in the definition of the control loop. The 
control loop latent and spontaneous failure branches are restricted to tracing faults in 
only these units. 
6.6.1.8 SUMMARY OF INPUT TO FAULTFINDER 
The following is a summary of the input required by FAULTFINDER to specify the 
control loop in the above system. 
SENSED VARIABLE: T 
VARIABLE SENSED IN UNIT: 4 
CONTROL VALVE UNIT NUMBER: 9 
OTHER UNITS IN CONTROL SYSTEM ARE: 11 12 
VARIABLE T REGULATED IN CONNECTIONS: 34 
FLOW MANIPULATED IN CONNECTIONS: 56789 
LOOP IS NOT OF THE FEEDFORWARD TYPE 
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6.6.2 FEEDFORWARD MIXER COMPOSITION SYSTEM 
The schematic representation of this system is given in Figure 6.8. This system 
illustrates the difference between a feedforward and feedback system. The summary 
input required by FAULTFINDER is given below: 
SENSED VARIABLE: Q 
VARIABLE SENSED IN UNIT: 8 
CONTROL VALVE UNIT NUMBER: 3 
OTHER UNITS IN CONTROL SYSTEM ARE: 12 13 
VARIABLE X REGULATED IN CONNECTIONS: 9 10 
FLOW MANIPULATED IN CONNECTIONS: 12 34 
LOOP IS OF THE FEEDFORWARD TYPE 
In this and all subsequent examples only the significant new features arising from the 
application of the rules developed for the Lapp-Powers system considered above, will 
be highlighted. 
Rule 3: gives streams 1-4 as having the flow manipulated in them; other connections 
further downstream are not included since the mixer violates the condition of a single 
stream. 
Rule 4: yields that the interaction between the manipulated and sensed streams takes 
place in the mixer. The mixing of the two streams alters the composition, hence this is 
specified as being the regulated variable of the control loop. This is the only regulated 
variable as the mixing process does not affect any other variables. 
Rule 5: indicates that both connections downstream of the mixer should be specified as 
having the composition regulated in them, since there is no scope for mass transfer to 
occur in the pipe (Unit 10). 
Rule 6: indicates that the control loop is feedforward since its action is not dependent on 
a deviation in the regulated variable. 
6.6.3 LEVEL CONTROL SYSTEM 
This system has been included to indicate how the rules outlined above in the context of 
flow systems can be applied to tank-type units where the internal variables are also of 
interest. The schematic representation of this system is shown in Figure 6.9. The 
summary input required by FAULTFINDER is given below: 
SENSED VARIABLE: L 
VARIABLE SENSED IN UNIT: 7 
CONTROL VALVE UNIT NUMBER: 5 
OTHER UNITS IN CONTROL SYSTEM ARE: 89 
VARIABLE L REGULATED IN CONNECTIONS: 6 
FLOW MANIPULATED IN CONNECTIONS: 345 
LOOP IS NOT OF THE FEEDFORW1\RD TYPE 
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Rule 2: yields that there is a separate manipulated stream. Owing to accumulation in the 
tank, the internal variables should be regarded as belonging to a separate 'stream', rather than to the inlet and outlet ports. 
Rule 3: gives that streams 3,4 and 5 have the flow manipulated in them; streams 1 and 2 
are not included since there can be accumulation in the tank. 
Rule 4: yields that the interaction between the sensor stream and the manipulated stream 
takes place in the tank. Deviations in the manipulated stream affect the level, hence this 
is the variable regulated by the control loop. 
Rule 5: gives that stream 6 is the one where the level is being regulated. In general for 
tank-type vessels the stream to which the sensor is connected will be the control loop 
regulated variable stream. 
Rule 6: gives that the control loop is feedback since its action is dependent upon 
detecting a deviation in the regulated variable. 
6.6.4 LIHOU HYDROCARBON/OXYGEN REACTOR 
This system highlights an important principle in counting the number of control loops in 
the system, and further clarifies the method of determining the regulated variables and 
the streams where they are regulated. A simplified, flow diagram, along with the 
decomposition diagram for this system are given in Figures 6.1Oa and 6.1Ob, 
respectively. 
The input required by FAULTFINDER to define the control loops is given below: 
CONTROL LOOP: 1 
SENSED VARIABLE: Q 
VARIABLE SENSED IN UNIT: 5 
CONTROL VALVE UNIT NUMBER: 4 
OTHER UNITS IN CONTROL SYSTEM ARE: 18 19 
VARIABLE Q REGULATED IN CONNECTIONS: 12 3456 
LOOP IS NOT OF TIE FEEDFORWARD TYPE 
CONTROL LOOP: 2 
SENSED VARIABLE: Q 
VARIABLE SENSED IN UNIT: 11 
CONTROL VALVE UNIT NUMBER: 10 
OTHER UNITS IN CONTROL SYSTEM ARE: 15 16 17 
VARIABLE Q REGULATED IN CONNECTIONS: 789 10 11 12 
LOOP IS NOT OF THE FEEDFORWARD TYPE 
CONTROL LOOP: 3 
SENSED VARIABLE: Q 
VARIABLE SENSED IN UNIT: 11 
CONTROL VALVE UNIT NUMBER: 4 
OTHER UNITS IN CONTROL SYSTEM ARE: 15 18 19 
VARIABLE X REGULATED IN CONNECTIONS: 13 22 
VARIABLE T REGULATED IN CONNECTIONS : 13 22 
FLOW MANIPULATED IN CONNECTIONS: 12 3456 
LOOP IS OF THE FEEDFORWARD TYPE 
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Rule 1: gives that there are three control loops, despite the fact that there are only two control valves and two sensors. The three control loops are: 
a) Sensor Unit 5 providing a corrective signal to control valve Unit 4. b) Sensor Unit 11 providing a corrective signal to control valve Unit 10. 
c) Sensor Unit 11 providing a corrective signal to control valve Unit 4. 
The other rules need to be applied to each control loop in turn. 
6.6.4.1 CONTROL LOOP 1 
The application of rules 2-5 indicates that there is no separate manipulated stream and that the regulated variable is flow, since the control valve is in line with the sensor. The flow is said to be regulated in streams 1-6. Other streams further downstream are not included since the reactor has more than one inlet. 
Rule 6: gives that the control loop is feedback, since corrective action is dependent upon detecting a deviation in the regulated variable. 
In the application of Rule 7 it should be noted that although Unit 15 is connected to Unit 18, it is not specified as part of this control loop. This is because this control loop acts 
purely on the signal received from sensor Unit 5. 
6.6.4.2 CONTROL LOOP 2 
The reasoning is identical to that for control loop 1. 
6.6.4.3 CONTROL LOOP 3 
Rule 2: gives that the control valve is clearly situated in a separate stream from that of 
the sensor. It can thus be deduced that there is a separate manipulated stream. 
Rule 3: gives that the flow is manipulated in streams 1-6. Other streams are not included 
since the reactor has more than one inlet. 
The application of Rule 4 indicates that the manipulated and sensed variable streams 
interact in Unit 13, the reactor. In essence this control loop is regulating the flow ratio to 
the reactor. Since a reaction is taking place, deviations in the flow ratio will manifest 
themselves via other simpler variables. These will be detected both within the reactor 
and at its outlet. 
The control loop is therefore indirectly regulating the composition, since the ratio of the 
two inlet streams will influence the degree of reaction. However, since the reaction is 
exothermic, the degree of reaction will also influence the temperature. Hence, the 
control loop is said to be decreasing deviations in both these variables. 
It is necessary to take this approach since the current treatment of control loops does not 
consider a complex variable like flow ratio in its own right for the diagnosis of control 
loop failures. 
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Rule 5: gives that the two variables are regulated in all the streams downstream of the 
reactor and also the streams connected to the vessel ports. Hence, streams 13 and 22 are 
said to have the temperature and composition regulated in them. Note the difference 
between this system and the level control system; level can only manifest itself at a 
vessel port, whereas temperature and composition will also manifest themselves at the 
inlet/outlet ports. 
The application of Rule 6 yields that the control loop is feedforward, since it is acting 
upon a variable other than either of the regulated ones. 
6.6.5 DISTILLATION COLUMN PROBLEM 
This example has been included as it illustrates how the methodology handles the added 
complexities of combined heat and mass transfer. The flow diagram, along with the 
decomposition diagram for this system are given in Figure 6.11 a and 6.11 b, respectively. 
The summary input required by FAULTFINDER is as follows: 
CONTROL LOOP: 1 
SENSED VARIABLE: T 
VARIABLE SENSED IN UNIT: 24 
CONTROL VALVE UNIT NUMBER: 8 
OTHER UNITS IN CONTROL SYSTEM ARE: 25 26 
VARIABLE X REGULATED IN CONNECTIONS: 3456789 10 11 25 
VARIABLE T REGULATED IN CONNECTIONS: 3 25 
FLOW MANIPULATED IN CONNECTIONS: 78 
LOOP IS NOT OF THE FEEDFORWARD TYPE 
CONTROL LOOP: 2 
SENSED VARIABLE: L 
VARIABLE SENSED TN UNIT: 27 
CONTROL VALVE UNIT NUMBER: 9 
OTHER UNITS IN CONTROL SYSTEM ARE: 28 29 
VARIABLE L REGULATED IN CONNECTIONS: 29 
FLOW MANIPULATED IN CONNECTIONS :9 10 11 
LOOP IS NOT OF THE FEEDFORWARD TYPE 
CONTROL LOOP: 3 
SENSED VARIABLE: T 
VARIABLE SENSED IN UNIT: 30 
CONTROL VALVE UNIT NUMBER: 22 
OTHER UNITS IN CONTROL SYSTEM ARE: 31 32 
VARIABLE X REGULATED IN CONNECTIONS: 33 12 14 15 16 17 
VARIABLE T REGULATED IN CONNECTIONS: 33 12 14 15 16 17 
FLOW MANIPULATED IN CONNECTIONS: 22 23 24 
LOOP IS NOT OF THE FEEDFORWARD TYPE 
Page 6/18 
w 
J 
J_ 
F- 
C/) 
..... .. a... o 
o 
COP) 
x 
U 
w 
PI 
I ° 
z 
j 
: 
. 
Q 
T _ _ J w O m Ui O 
--mo w o 
0 
z 0 w 
LL 
U 
w 
Page 6/19 
Z 2 i ä wa 
w _ a 
N 
M O 
co 
cr. 
r- 
N cr- 
J 
sJ Of 
_l 
0 
>Z 
co ý> 
Jw 
Z 
0 
U J 
rn 
OH ý 
`n 
N 
tD p 
F- a o> ý 
`n , -" T 
z 
ä 
O 
a 
O 
U 
w [ 
E 
N °` `ý LL N N Ö 
V) z °CCV) V z 
w 
O 
C'I LU LU (n cc 9 i- > Z -j r--4 a U 
co 
z 
O 
O 
U>> 
ý 
ýp L) 
Go 
cr LO 
LU N 
co 
Cl) 
J 1` 
N 
ao 
CC W 
Fý1 
(1 0 
ýp cc -j 0 
.ý 
w 0 
O Q U> >Z LLI ä 
p= U 
N 
N 
M 
N N F"1 
CL 
0N 
M N 0 
LU LLJ 
cc 4-6 
' U) 
z 
- vn 
0 
M co W 
D O 
e 
O 
p U U 
4. ) 
N 
Cl) 
M J MN N 
N M CC st 
cc: 
U 
N 
N} Cl) 
a 
MZM ' 
w 
0 0 < pQ 
U > 
M N 
r N 
C7 
} z 
0= 
w 
pp 
= 
U, 
Page 6/20 
CONTROL LOOP: 4 
SENSED VARIABLE: L 
VARIABLE SENSED IN UNIT: 33 
CONTROL VALVE UNIT NUMBER: 14 
OTHER UNITS IN CONTROL SYSTEM ARE: 34 35 
VARIABLE L REGULATED IN CONNECTIONS: 37 
FLOW MANIPULATED IN CONNECTIONS : 14 15 16 17 
LOOP IS NOT OF THE FEEDFORWARD TYPE 
The application of Rule 1 yields the following four control loops: 
a) Sensor Unit 24 providing a corrective signal to control valve Unit 8. 
b) Sensor Unit 27 providing a corrective signal to control valve Unit 9. 
c) Sensor Unit 30 providing a corrective signal to control valve Unit 22. 
d) Sensor Unit 33 providing a corrective signal to control valve Unit 14. 
6.6.5.1 CONTROL LOOP 1 
Rules 2 and 3 yield that there is a separate manipulated stream and that the flow is 
manipulated in streams 7 and 8. Other streams are not included since upstream there is a 
divider and downstream there is a vessel. 
Rule 4: gives that the sensed and manipulated streams interact in the distillation column, 
Unit 3. This control loop is effectively manipulating the reflux ratio; the equilibrium 
equations for the distillation column indicate that changes in the reflux ratio will affect 
the temperature and composition at the top of the column. Hence, these can be taken to 
be the control loop regulated variables. 
Rule 5: gives that these two variables must be regulated in the streams associated with 
the vessel ports and any outlets at the top of the column. Streams 3 and 25 are thus said 
to have both the temperature and composition regulated in them. 
Stream 3 leads to a condenser. Since heat transfer takes place in this unit, no other 
streams can be said to have the temperature regulated in them. However, if it assumed 
that total condensation takes place in the condenser then streams 4-11 are also said to 
have the composition regulated in them. 
Rule 6: gives that the loop is feedback since it obviously acts upon a deviation in one of 
its regulated variables. 
6.6.5.2 CONTROL LOOP 2 
This control loop is analogous to the level control system already discussed. The only 
significant point of note is that the flow is only manipulated in streams 9,10 and 11. 
Streams 5 and 6 are not included, since the flow along these can be influenced by the 
other outlet leg of the divider, Unit 7. 
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6.6.5.3 CONTROL LOOP 3 
The main problem posed by this control loop is in determining the control loop 
regulated variables and the streams where those variables are regulated. Unlike all the 
previous examples there is no direct interaction between the manipulated stream and the 
sensed stream. In this case there is an indirect interaction, since the manipulation of the 
steam flow to the reboiler alters the boil-up rate to the distillation column. 
Adjusting the boil-up rate regulates the temperature and composition in the bottom half 
of the distillation column. Hence, both these variables are said to be the control loop 
regulated variables. 
Both the variables are regulated in streams 33,12,14,15,16 and 17. The inclusion of 
streams 14-17 may at first sight appear strange, since the reboiler is a source of heat and 
mass transfer. However, there is a significant difference between this unit and the 
condenser which influenced control loop 1. Unlike the flow of coolant to the condenser, 
the flow of steam to the reboiler is being directly manipulated by this control loop. 
6.6.5.4 CONTROL LOOP 4 
This is analogous to the level control system already described and poses no new 
problems. 
6.6.6 COMPLEX CONTROL LOOPS 
In all the examples considered thus far any variable in any given stream has been under 
the influence of only one control loop. By correctly decomposing the control loops, the 
synthesis algorithm is able to apply the appropriate control loop operator whenever it 
detects deviations in the variables which have been specified as being regulated or 
manipulated by the control loops. 
The next two examples will highlight the situation where more than one control loop is 
influencing the same variable. 
6.6.6.1 COMPOSITION CONTROL LOOP 
A simplified version of this example has already been considered. In the current context 
a feedback control action has also been included. The schematic representation of this 
system is given in Figure 6.12. 
The summary input required by FAULTFINDER is given below: 
CONTROL LOOP: 1 
SENSED VARIABLE: X 
VARIABLE SENSED IN UNIT: 11 
CONTROL VALVE UNIT NUMBER: 3 
OTHER UNITS IN CONTROL SYSTEM ARE: 14 15 16 
VARTART PX RFC', TT1. ATn IN CONNECTIONS: 9 10 11 12 L 1J LL XLLLI La 1W VV ýa ý -- ----- -- 
FLOW MANIPULATED IN CONNECTIONS: 12 34 
LOOP IS NOT OF TIE FEEDFORWARD TYPE 
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CONTROL LOOP: 2 
SENSED VARIABLE: Q 
VARIABLE SENSED IN UNIT: 8 
CONTROL VALVE UNIT NUMBER: 3 
OTHER UNITS IN CONTROL SYSTEM ARE: 14 15 16 
VARIABLE X REGULATED IN CONNECTIONS: 9 10 11 12 
FLOW MANIPULATED IN CONNECTIONS: 12 34 
LOOP IS OF TIE FEEDFORWARD TYPE 
The application of Rule 1 yields two control loops: 
a) Sensor Unit 11 providing a corrective signal to control valve Unit 3. b) Sensor Unit 8 providing a corrective signal to control valve Unit 3. 
6.6.6.1.1 CONTROL LOOP 1 
Owing to the mixer Unit 5, Rules 2 and 3 indicate that there is a separate manipulated 
stream. The flow is said to be manipulated in streams 1-4. 
The manipulated stream interacts with the sensed stream in the mixer, to influence the 
composition. Hence, this is specified as being the regulated variable in the streams 
downstream of the header. 
The action of this control loop is obviously feedback since it depends upon detecting a 
deviation in the regulated variable in order to supply a corrective action. 
6.6.6.1.2 CONTROL LOOP 2 
The definition of this control loop is the same as that given in the earlier example. 
6.6.6.1.3 PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED BY THE SYNTHESIS ALGORITHM 
Control loops of this nature present additional problems to the fault tree synthesis 
algorithm. Consider the situation where a fault tree is being developed for a composition 
deviation in any of the streams downstream of the header. Since this variable has been 
specified as being regulated by both the control loops, the synthesis algorithm is aware 
that the control loop operators should be applied, to include failures in these 
components into the fault tree. 
However, the package cannot decide which operator should be applied first. Figure 6.13 
illustrates how the order of application of the operators influences the structure of the 
fault trees. In this it has been assumed that the top event of interest is a high composition 
of component B and that the operator for control loop 1 is applied first. 
The sequential application of operators assumes that one control loop is dominant over 
the other. This is illustrated in Figure 6.13, where control loop one is able to correct for 
failures in the components of control loop two but that the reverse is not true. 
For this system the sequential application of the control loop operators is correct, since 
one control loop is feedforward whereas the other is feedback. However, this is not 
always the case as the next example will show. 
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Figure 6.13 
General Form of Fault Tree for High Composition of the Regulated Stream 
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The synthesis algorithm can cope with this type of system if the following rule is 
observed: the master loop should be specified before the slave loop during the 
decomposition stage. This has been done in the above example as the master control 
loop has an index of 1, whereas the slave control loop has an index of 2. 
Nevertheless, there are still a number of defects in this tree. They arise because the two 
control loops share a number of common components, and the fact that the control loop 
operator has been applied sequentially. Two examples of this type of defect are 
illustrated below: 
- the CL-STK Loop 1 branch is anded with the CL-F-LA Loop 2 branch. The former 
will contain the failure CV-STK, whereas the latter will contain the failure CV-F-LA, 
for the control valve which is common to both control loops. Since control loop 1 is 
dominant and the operator for this is applied prior to that for control loop 2, what is 
required is a procedure which deletes any contradictory events in the slave loop 
template. 
- both control loop templates contain branches for control loop overload, i. e. CL-O-LD 
Loop 1 and CL-O-LD Loop 2. It has already been intimated that the control loop 
overload branch will essentially contain failures related to the complete loss of the 
control loop manipulated stream, i. e. no flow. Since both the control loops are 
manipulating the same stream, there is likely to be much replication of faults in these 
branches. The only events which are different are those which relate to the control loop 
components and which are unique to each control loop, i. e. the sensors in this case. 
They can cause a complete loss of the manipulated stream by failing in a position which 
causes the control valve to completely shut. Hence, a procedure is necessary to 
rationalise the events appearing in the control loop overload branches to avoid this 
replication of faults and thereby enhance the transparency of the tree. 
A detailed discussion of this system is delayed until Chapter 10, since some features to 
be introduced in later chapters have a bearing on this discussion. 
6.6.6.2 PRESSURE REDUCTION INSTALLATION 
This is a simplified version of a system to be discussed in Chapter 10. Figure 10.55 in 
Chapter 10 gives the flow diagram for this system. The system discussed here, 
essentially comprises four control loops. The decomposition diagram for this is given in 
Figure 6.14. 
The purpose of the control loops is to ensure a correct pressure in Stream 8. PCL and 
PCH are reverse-acting controllers. The signal selector selects the lowest signal from the 
two controllers to feed to the control valve which is of the air-to-open type. PC and PCO 
are both direct acting controllers; the signal selector selects the highest signal from these 
to feed to the control valve which of the air-to-close type. 
Using the rules developed earlier there is no problem in deriving the following 
information to input to the MASTER program: 
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CONTROL LOOP: 1 
SENSED VARIABLE: P 
VARIABLE SENSED IN UNIT: 7 
CONTROL VALVE UNIT NUMBER: 5 
OTHER UNITS IN CONTROL SYSTEM ARE: 11 12 13 6 
VARIABLE P REGULATED IN CONNECTIONS: 56789 
VARIABLE Q REGULATED IN CONNECTIONS: 12 3456789 
LOOP IS NOT OF THE FEEDFORWARD TYPE 
CONTROL LOOP: 2 
SENSED VARIABLE: P 
VARIABLE SENSED IN UNIT: 6 
CONTROL VALVE UNIT NUMBER: 5 
OTHER UNITS IN CONTROL SYSTEM ARE: 11 12 13 7 
VARIABLE P REGULATED IN CONNECTIONS: 56789 
VARIABLE Q REGULATED IN CONNECTIONS: 12 3456789 
LOOP IS NOT OF THE FEEDFORWARD TYPE 
CONTROL LOOP: 3 
SENSED VARIABLE: P 
VARIABLE SENSED IN UNIT: 8 
CONTROL VALVE UNIT NUMBER: 3 
OTHER UNITS IN CONTROL SYSTEM ARE: 14 15 16 4 
VARIABLE P REGULATED IN CONNECTIONS :3456789 
VARIABLE Q REGULATED IN CONNECTIONS: 12 3456789 
LOOP IS NOT OF THE FEEDFORWARD TYPE 
CONTROL LOOP: 4 
SENSED VARIABLE: P 
VARIABLE SENSED IN UNIT: 4 
CONTROL VALVE UNIT NUMBER: 3 
OTHER UNITS IN CONTROL SYSTEM ARE: 14 15 16 8 
VARIABLE P REGULATED IN CONNECTIONS: 3456789 
VARIABLE Q REGULATED IN CONNECTIONS: 12 3456789 
LOOP IS NOT OF THE FEEDFORWARD TYPE 
Since there is a single continuous stream, it can be concluded that there is no separate 
manipulated stream. Adjusting the control valve aperture will influence the flow and 
pressure in the system. Therefore all the control loops are classified as feedback, since 
they are dependent upon detecting a deviation in the regulated variable before a 
corrective action can be applied. 
However, in this system care is needed in defining which units go to make up each 
control loop. Since signals are compared in the selectors, the following classification of 
units to control loops is necessary: 
a) Units 5,6,7,11,12,13 are all specified as part of control loops 1 and 2. 
b) Units 3,4,8,14,15,16 are all specified as forming a part of control loops 3 and 4. 
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Altering the control valve aperture will affect both the pressure and the flow variables in this stream. The effect on flow will be the same both upstream and downstream of the 
control valve; however the effect on pressure will be contradictory. For example, 
reducing the control valve aperture will decrease the flow both upstream and downstream; however the effect on the pressure variable will be to increase the pressure 
upstream, but to decrease it downstream. 
Hence, the flow variable has been specified as being regulated in all the upstream and downstream connections, whereas the pressure has been specified as being regulated in 
the connections downstream of the control valve. Consequently, if the event of interest is a deviation in the pressure in stream 9, then failure modes for all four control loops 
have to be incorporated into the fault tree since they are all capable of correcting the deviation. 
The major problem imposed by this system relates to the fact that there are no master or 
slave loops; a failure in any loop is correctable by another loop. Hence, the sequential 
application of control loop operators is inappropriate in this case. What is required is a 
fundamental change in the methodology for applying the control loop operators. 
The presentation of the solution to this problem is delayed until Chapter 10, as some 
features to be discussed in subsequent chapters have a bearing on this discussion. This 
system has been introduced here to highlight the generality of the rules for the 
decomposition of control loops. 
6.7 AUTOMATIC DETECTION OF CONTROL LOOPS 
Chapter 5 on Divider-Header Combinations has highlighted a technique for detecting 
loops in the information flow structure. By maintaining a list of control valves and 
sensors in the model library, it would be possible to automatically identify the control 
loops in the system based on the configuration data supplied to the MASTER program. 
This would be done by tracing the signal flow from the sensors to the control valves. 
A prototype of an algorithm to achieve this was developed which successfully identified 
the control loops in a number of test cases. Being able to do this for all systems would 
free the user from having to specify the following items of data: 
- control valve unit number 
- sensor unit number 
- other units in the control loop 
Having achieved this the next stage would be to program the rules given in this chapter, 
to identify the regulated and manipulated streams, based on information contained in the 
failure models. The principle of this technique is illustrated by reference to Figure 6.7 
again. 
The following steps could be followed to derive the necessary information: 
a) by consulting the list of control valves and sensors, the algorithm would trace the 
path from sensor Unit 4 to control valve Unit 9 and thus be able to define the physical 
components making up the control loop. 
b) by analysing the failure model for sensor Unit 4, it can be ascertained that the signal 
feeding to the control valve is dependent upon the temperature variable. 
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c) by tracing along the process stream containing the sensor in both directions, the 
control valve will not be found. Hence, it can be concluded that the control loop has a 
separate manipulated stream. 
d) consequently by tracing along the stream containing the control valve it will be noted 
that the heat exchanger is common to both the sensed and manipulated streams. Hence, 
this is the point of interaction. By analysing the failure model it will be noted that the 
manipulated stream affects the temperature in the sensed stream. Hence, this will be 
noted as the control loop regulated variable. 
The above were only initial ideas for an algorithm to automatically specify the control 
loops in the configuration. Insufficient time was available on this project to develop 
these any further. However, they are a basis for further work which should be 
undertaken to facilitate the use of FAULTFINDER. 
6.8 CONCLUSION 
This chapter has highlighted a number of rules to facilitate the decomposition of control 
loops. These rules should not only assist the user in the manual decomposition of 
control loops but will also enable the development of an automatic algorithm. The 
algorithm would be extensible to the case of trip systems which are the subject of the 
next chapter. 
A detailed discussion of some aspects relating to the application of the control loop 
operators by the synthesis algorithm has been deferred, as some of the techniques used 
to arrive at a solution are to be described in later chapters. 
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7.0 RULES FOR HANDLING TRIP SYSTEMS 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
Trip systems are an added layer of safety, generally in addition to control loops. They 
are called upon to act only as a last resort to either provide a flow path where none 
existed before, or to shut off the flow path where flow normally exists. Their action is dependent upon monitoring one or more process variables and then activating the trip 
valve if the value of the variable should exceed its threshold. In conjunction with control loops the trip system should only activate under circumstances where the control loop is 
unable to regulate the variable within the required limits. 
Trip systems are an important feature of fault trees since they are designed to prevent 
the propagation of faults. They can fail in two basic modes: 
Operational Failure - trip valve activates when there is no demand from the process Functional Failure - trip valve fails to activate when there is a demand from the process 
Trip loops, in common with the overall methodology, are modelled by decomposition at 
the unit level, i. e. sensor, trip switch and trip valve. However, in an analogous manner to 
the control loops this component-based approach cannot fully model the failure modes 
associated with trip systems. Hence, at the decomposition stage it is necessary to 
provide additional information which will treat the trip loop as a special sub-system and 
for which special treatment will be afforded by the fault tree synthesis algorithm. 
7.2 BASIC APPROACH 
As mentioned above, trip loops have two basic failure modes: trip loop operational 
failure (TL-OP-F) and trip loop functional failure (TL-FN-F). TL-OP-F requires no 
special treatment by the synthesis program and can be adequately modelled via the trip 
loop components. This is primarily because this failure mode simply represents an 
alternative failure path in the fault tree. This is illustrated by the following example: 
DUMMY ý TRIP VALVE HEAD 
PIPE DUMMY 
TAIL 
Figure 7.1 
Simple Section of Plant Incorr tins a Trip Valve 
If the trip valve is normally open and the event being developed is NO FLOW then the 
fault tree for this would be of the following form: 
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Figure 7.2 
Fault Tree for No Flow in Plant Section of Figure 7.1 
The TL-OP-F branch would trace the causes of spurious maloperation of trip loop 
components. It is linked to the rest of the tree by an OR gate. No special treatment is 
needed during fault tree synthesis since the trip system is not designed to protect against 
the event currently being propagated. This situation should be compared with TL-FN-F. 
In the case of TL-FN-F, for a fault to propagate there has to be a deviation in the process 
variable AND a failure in the trip loop components preventing its activation. Diagnosing 
TL-FN-F does require special treatment in the methodology. The basic approach as 
outlined by Kelly [Ref 7-1], has been adopted and can be summarised thus: 
Step 1 
Synthesise the fault tree as normal, noting any events which propagate through the trip 
valves. These events will later be considered as possible candidates for ANDing with 
TL-FN-F. 
Step 2 
Synthesise a "SHOULD ACTIVATE (SHAC)" tree for each trip loop. This tree will 
propagate from the trip valve, through the trip switch and sensor, to the process stream. 
This tree will define the range of process conditions under which the trip system is 
designed to operate. 
Step 3 
Synthesise a sub-tree for the TL-FN-F branch. The causes of this will lie in the trip loop 
components and are failures which prevent the sub-system from activating, e. g. trip 
valve stuck. 
Step 4 
Compare the two trees synthesised under Steps 1 and 2. Any events which the system 
can detect and prevent are then ANDed with the TL-FN-F sub-tree. 
The biggest problem arises in deciding what events the trip system can prevent. At first 
sight it might appear that the trip system should be able to protect against all the events 
which cause the trip to activate. However, later sections will show that this step is 
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complicated by a number of factors. These will be highlighted and the steps taken to 
achieve a generic solution to the problem will be outlined. 
7.3 TYPES OF TRIP SYSTEMS 
The FAULTFINDER MK2 methodology differentiates between three types of trip 
system. They can be classified according to the following categorisation: 
Trip System --> 1) Closed Valve 2) Open Valve --> a) Acts on Sensed Variable b) Acts on Other Than Sensed Variable 
The distinction between an open valve trip system (OVT) and a closed valve trip system (CVT) is quite straightforward. In an OVT the valve is normally open and closes on demand; for a CVT the converse is true. The distinction between the two classes of OVT is more subtle and essentially differentiates between feedback and feedforward 
OVT systems. 
An example of a CVT is contained in the following schematic representation: 
Figure 7.3 
Schematic Representation of a Closed Valve Trip S 
In this a kick-back leg is provided from the outlet of the pump back to the tank. Upon 
detecting a low flow, the trip valve is activated and opens to provide an alternative flow 
path, thus preventing the pump overheating. 
Figure 7.4 contains an example of a Type 2a trip system. 
Normally the control valve regulates the downstream pressure. If the deviation in this 
variable should exceed the capacity of the control system, then the trip system is called 
upon. 
The trip system senses the pressure and the valve is shut upon the detection of the 
pressure reaching its threshold value. This prevents the propagation of high pressure 
further downstream. It is thus a feedback trip system. 
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TRIP 
SWITCH 
CONTROLLER 
PUMP ICONTROUTRIP 
VALVE 
PRESSURE 
SENSOR 
Schematic 
Figure 7.4 
sentation of an Open Valve T 2a Trip System 
An example of a Type 2b trip system is included in the following figure: 
Hot 
Stream TRIP HEAT 
VALVE EXCHANGER 
TRIP 
SWITCH 
Coolant FLOW 
SENSOR 
Figure 7.5 
Schematic Representation of an Open Valve Type 2b Trip System 
Upon sensing the loss of coolant in one stream, the trip system acts to cut off the flow of 
nitric acid in the other stream. It is thus a feedforward trip system. 
The classification of the trip systems according to this categorisation plays a significant 
role in deciding what events any particular system can protect against. The criteria 
developed for handling these different systems are presented below. 
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7.4 OPEN VALVE FEEDBACK TRIP SYSTEMS 
7.4.1 INTRODUCTION 
Consider the following section of plant, adapted from Figure 7.4: 
TRIP 
SWITCH 
TRIP PRESSURE PUMP PIPE_1 
VALVE 
PIPE-2 
SENSOR 
Figure 7.6 
Modified Plant Section from Figure 7.4 
The hazardous top event of interest is a HIGH PRESSURE at the outlet of the pressure 
sensor. The fault tree for this event would be of the form given in Figure 7.7. This figure 
gives the status of the tree before the diagnosis and addition of TL-FN-F, and 
corresponds to the Step 1 tree as outlined in Section 7.2 above. 
High Pressure at 
Pressure Sensor 
-K-HP-EN in PIPE 
-2 
into TRIP VALVE 
High Pressure 
into PIPE_2 
High Pressure 
into PIPE_t 
* 
LK-HP-EN 
in PIPE 
-1 
PUMP 
SURGE 
Fault Tree for Hi 
Figure 7.7 
Pressure in Plant Section of Figure 7.6 
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The SHOULD ACTIVATE tree for this system would start: 
Trip Should 
Activate 
Pressure Switch 
Emits Signal 
Pressure Sensor 
Senses High 
Pressure 
Figure 7.8 
Should Activate Tree for Plant Section of Figure 7.6 
The rest of this tree would be the same as the tree given in Figure 7.7. Hence, it can be 
seen that all the events which cause the hazardous top event would also cause the trip to 
activate. However, even if the trip is activated, it cannot protect against all these events. 
Consider the event LK-HP-EN in Pipe_2; even if the trip valve is activated it will not be 
able to shut off this source of high pressure. Although for this system this is a fairly 
trivial fault and arises because the pipe model was created in a context-independent 
manner, there are instances when this type of situation is highly significant. It illustrates 
an important principle in the diagnosis of the functional failure of trip systems and leads 
to the following rule. 
7.4.2 BASIC RULE (RULE 1) 
For a feedback trip system the only events it can protect against are the causes of the 
deviation which propagate through the trip valve. Hence, only the causes of the event 
marked with an * in Figure 7.7 will fall into the protection domain of the trip system. 
7.4.3 REFINEMENT OF THE BASIC RULE 
This rule is actually an over-simplification, since the direction of fault propagation and 
the variable concerned, are also important considerations. FAULTFINDER has the 
ability for two-way fault propagation; the trip valve can thus either be encountered via 
its outlet or inlet ports. In order to tackle the difficulties presented by this, the 
functionality of this type of trip system was investigated further and the following two 
conclusions reached. 
Firstly, it was concluded that of the variables contained within the FAULTFINDER 
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methodology, a trip system of this nature could only directly counter deviations in the following four variables: 
flow 
pressure 
composition 
temperature 
Secondly, since the activation of this type of trip system will totally cut off the flow, it is invariably going to act on a HIGH deviation in one of the above variables. 
It should be noted that, whilst a feedback trip system can protect against deviations in 
vessel variables, e. g. level, the variable actually propagating across the trip valve will be 
the flow variable. 
Using the above criteria, the basic rule can be refined to handle the complete set of 
circumstances which are likely to arise. 
In order to do this, consider the simple schematic given below: 
Normal Direction of Flow 
PHI 
TRIP Q HI 
VALVE X HI 
T HI 
Direction of Fault Propagation 
Figure 7.9 
Fault Propagation Schematic-1 
The first refinement of Rule -1 can 
be summarised thus: 
RULE_l. l 
For a feedback open valve trip system, if the trip valve is encountered via its OUTLET 
port during fault propagation, then the trip system can protect against the causes of the 
event which propagates through the trip valve, provided that these events would also 
cause the trip to activate. 
Supposing now that the direction of fault propagation had been in the other direction as 
depicted in Figure 7.10, overleaf. 
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Normal Direction of Flow 
QHI 
OO 
TRIP 
X HI 
PIPE 
VALVE 
T HI 
Direction of Fault Propagation 
Figure 7.10 
Fault Propagation Schematic-2 
This situation is more complicated and so it is necessary to consider the deviation in 
each of the variables in turn. 
a) PHI 
The tree for this event would be of the following form: 
Figure 7.11 
Fault Tree for High Pressure 
This gives rise to the following refinement of Rule-1. 
RULE_1.2 
The trip system can only protect against the events downstream of the valve giving rise 
to reverse flow. Hence, the only branch that the trip system can protect against in this 
case, is the causes of R3 REV; this represents a build-up of pressure due to flow reversal 
through the valve, i. e. reverse relief. 
The system cannot protect against the other events since: 
- the causes of PI HI are all on the same side of the trip valve as the top event. 
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- the causes of R2 LO/NONE downstream of the valve will be blockage-type faults, i. e. 
giving rise to low or even no relief. The activation of the trip valve will probably 
aggravate the situation. 
b) T HI/X HI 
The trees for these two events would be similar and of the following form: 
Figure 7.12 
Fault Tree for High Temperature 
Figure 7.13 
Fault Tree for High Compositi 
In each case the event can either be caused by a deviation in the variable upstream or by 
a deviation in the variable downstream being transported by reverse flow. Based upon 
reasoning similar to that for R2 REV above, the following refinement of Rule-1 is 
needed. 
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RULE_1.3 
In this case the trip system can only protect against the causes of G2 REV. 
Generally in the methodology it has been assumed that for deviations in temperature and 
composition to propagate, the state SOME FLOW is taken as a normal event. Shutting 
the trip valve will certainly prevent flow, and this may suggest that the causes of Ti HI 
and X1 HI could be prevented from propagating to location 2 in Figure 7.11. However, 
if the deviation occurs due to a cause in close proximity of location 2, then it could 
manifest itself by other means, e. g. internal molecular motion of the fluid without any 
requirement for flow. Hence, the conservative approach has been taken that this trip 
system cannot protect against the causes of T1 HI or X1 HI. 
c) Q HI 
The situation of flow is more complicated than for the other three variables. The start of 
the tree for high flow at location 2 in Figure 7.10 would be of the following form: 
Figure 7.14 
Fault Tree for High Flow 
The trip system will be able to protect against the causes of the event G2 HI which lie 
downstream of the trip valve. These will essentially be leakage-type faults giving rise to 
an increased pressure gradient for flow. 
However, in this case the trip system can also protect against the causes of Q1 HI. This 
is because for a high flow to exist, there must both be a source and a sink. The branch 
Q1 HI will trace the causes of the source of high flow upstream; there is an inherent 
assumption that there will be a sink for flow further downstream. 
In the methodology it is assumed that if high flow exists then there must be a flow path. 
This greatly simplifies the modelling as each deviation in the flow does not have to be 
ANDed with the existence of a corresponding flow path. This has proved a satisfactory 
approach in all other areas of the methodology. The diagnosis of functional failure in 
open valve trip systems is one instance where it would be necessary to have this AND 
gate. The presence of this AND gate in the pipe model would modify the tree given 
above in the way depicted by Figure 7.15. 
In this instance the G2 SOME branch of Figure 7.15 would cross the trip valve. The 
causes of Q1 HI which would cause the trip system to activate would therefore be 
correctly diagnosed since they occur under the same AND gate as G2 SOME. 
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Figure 7.15 
Modified Fault Tree for High Flow 
However, this approach was not favoured as it would have made the modelling 
unnecessarily complicated and cumbersome. Although this is a shortcoming in the 
methodology, it is only applicable to this fairly narrow field. The following refinement 
to Rule 
_1 was 
thus developed for circumstances where the trip valve is encountered via 
the inlet port. 
RULE 1.4 
Owing to the requirement of a flow path for these deviations to exist, it can be 
concluded that this type of trip system will be able to protect against both the causes of 
the G HI branch which lie further downstream of the trip valve, and also the causes of Q 
HI branch which are upstream of the trip valve. 
The problem thus arises in being able to flag the Q1 HI branch since it will never 
propagate through the trip valve. This was solved by carrying out backtracking up the 
tree already synthesised, when the G2 HI branch was flagged as having encountered the 
trip valve via its inlet port. In order to do this the search procedure had to satisfy two 
goals: 
- there must be two causes of a deviation in the flow, one at an inlet port and the other at 
an outlet port. This criterion will identify the location where the two-way fault 
propagation had started. 
- both these deviations in the flow must be HIGH. 
Applying these criteria to the fault tree of Figure 7.14 means that when the G2 HI 
branch is flagged, backtracking would be done to the previous level, i. e. Q2 HI, the top 
event in this case. It will be noted that this event has two causes and that: 
- both are deviations in the flow 
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- one deviation is at an inlet port of the pipe and the other at the outlet port 
- both deviations are high 
Hence, Q1 HI is the required branch, which this trip system can protect against. This 
was an extremely trivial example as there were only two levels to the tree. A more 
complicated, though somewhat contrived example used to test this approach is presented below: 
DUMMY 
HEAD 
3 
PIPE CLOSED 
VALVE 
47 
HEADER PIPE 
6 
DIVIDER 
2 
18 
PIPE PIPE 
9 TRIP 
VALVE 
I1 DUMMY 
HEAD 
Figure 7.16 
Plant Section Incorporating a Divider and Header Unit 
Supposing that the event of interest is HIGH FLOW at location 2. The tree for this event 
would be of the nature given in Figure 7.17. 
In this case the event propagating through the trip valve, via the inlet port, is G9 HI. In 
accordance with the criteria outlined above, it is necessary to backtrack up the tree to be 
able to flag Q1 HI as being preventable by the trip system. One divider and one header 
model have been included in this configuration to show the generality of the 
backtracking algorithm. Although these two units give rise to the events G2 HI and G6 
HI, the causes of which partially fulfil the criteria, it is only the causes of Q2 HI which 
are fully compatible. Hence, the event G1 HI will be suitably flagged as a potential 
candidate for ANDing with TL-FN-F. 
7.5 OPEN VALVE FEEDFORWARD TRIP SYSTEMS 
An example of such a trip system has already been presented in Figure 7.5. The trip 
valve is located in a flow stream physically separate from the sensed stream. In order for 
the trip to be effective there must be an interaction between the sensed and manipulated 
streams. In the current example this interaction occurs in the heat exchanger model in 
the form of heat transfer. 
The problems presented in the feedback trip systems relating to the ability of the system 
to be able to compensate for a deviation in the same stream are not inherent in this case. 
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Figure 7.17 
Fault Tree for High Flow in Plant Section of Figure 7.16 
Hence, a much simpler diagnostic criteria can be applied. This is summarised in the 
following rule. 
RULE_2 
Any events which can activate the trip system and which also give rise to the top event 
should be ANDed with the functional failure of the appropriate trip system. Unlike the 
feedback systems, the domain of protection of the trip system is not restricted to events 
which propagate through the trip valve. 
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7.6 CLOSED VALVE TRIP (CVT) SYSTEMS 
A modified version of the closed valve trip system given in Figure 7.3 is presented below: 
Figure 7.18 
Closed Valve Trip System 
The purpose of this type of trip system is to provide an alternative or new flow path 
where none existed before. The divider unit is therefore an integral part of this type of 
trip system. In order to function correctly leg 3 of the divider unit must provide 
adequate flow/relief upon demand. There is a special divider model in the model library 
which must be used. In this the appropriate deviations in legs 1 and 2 are ANDed with 
insufficient flow/relief down the no flow leg. Functional failure of the trip system can 
thus be caused either by a failure in any of the trip loop components, thereby preventing 
the activation of the trip valve or by there being LO/NONE/REV flow/relief down leg 3. 
The following rule applies regarding diagnosis of those events that the trip system can 
protect against: 
RULE_3 
The causes of the deviations which are ANDed with failures down the no flow leg in the 
divider model (i. e. LO/NONE/REV flow/relief) should be compared with the SHOULD 
ACTIVATE (SHAC) tree to see if they should be ANDed with TL-FN-F. 
7.7 INCLUSION OF TL-FN-F 
The criteria for identifying the events which may require ANDing with trip loop 
functional failure have been described in the various rules above. The causes of these 
events are compared with events in the SHOULD ACTIVATE (SHAC) tree. Any events 
in the main tree which are common to the SHAC tree are then ANDed with trip loop 
functional failure. 
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This is illustrated by the following schematics: 
Figure 7.19 
Fault Tree Schematics Illustrating Inclusion of TL-FN-F Branches 
Since event B is common to both the Main and SHAC trees, the event in the Main tree 
is ANDed with the event TL-FN-F. In order to accommodate this, an intermediate event 
denoted by X is incorporated into the tree. 
7.8 RATIONALISATION OF TL-FN-F BRANCHES 
A simple comparison of events between the SHAC and main trees, and the ANDing of 
common events in the main tree with TL-FN-F, leads to an opaque structure of the tree. 
Two rules are used to rationalise the location of these TL-FN-F branches. 
a) Main Tree b) SHAC Tree 
c) Modified Main Tree 
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RULE_4 
If all the events under an OR gate are ANDed with TL-FN-F then the output of this gate should be ANDed with TL-FN-F instead. 
This is illustrated below: 
Figure 7.20 
Illustration of Rationlisation of TL-FN-F Branches-1 
RULE_5 
If any event under an AND gate is ANDed with TL-FN-F, then the output event should 
be ANDed with TL-FN-F instead. 
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This is illustrated below: 
It should be noted that both these actions are purely cosmetic and improve the 
transparency of the fault tree. They do not alter the logic in any way. 
7.9 SEQUENTIAL OPERATIONS 
The FAULTFINDER methodology has the ability to handle sequential operations. This 
is in connection with situations where the unit models comprising the plant can change. 
Under such circumstances the plant configuration at each step in the sequence needs to 
be defined. Examples of configurational changes are: 
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- valve changing from open to closed 
- pump being switched on/off 
Since the failure models for an open/closed valve are different, it is necessary to specify 
which model should be used at each step in the sequence. Additionally, the user can 
specify a different top event model for each step in the sequence. 
This section outlines the solution to a shortcoming in the FAULTFINDER MK 1 
methodology which meant that it was unable to handle trip loop failures for situations 
where there were sequential operations. 
For each step in the sequence, FAULTFINDER synthesises a separate sub-tree. The 
overall structure of the tree is as follows: 
SEQ-AB 
SEQ-F-AT 
Step 1 
Sub-tree 
for Stea 1 
SEQ-F-AF 
Stea 1 
SEQ-F-ATJ 
Step 2 
Sub-tree 
for Step 2 
Figure 7.22 
General Structure of Sequential ( 
SEQ-F-AF 
Step 2 
SEQ-F-AT 
Step 3 
Sub-tree 
for Step 3 
Lions Fault Tree 
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The above fault tree is shown for three steps only; a maximum of twenty steps are 
allowed. The top event by default is termed SEQ-ABRT for sequential operations. 
There are essentially two branches to this. SEQ-F-AT contains the sub-tree for that step; SEQ-F-AF traces down to the next step in the sequence. 
As has already been mentioned, the fault tree is initially synthesised without including 
the TL-FN-F branches. During the initial synthesis phase only the events which might 
require ANDing with TL-FN-F are noted. When this stage is complete, then the SHAC 
tree is synthesised to determine which events cause the trip system to activate. 
There was a shortcoming in the MK 1 methodology, in that the SHAC algorithm did not 
consider each step of the sequence in isolation and so ended up synthesising the 
incorrect SHAC trees; it is necessary to synthesise a SHAC tree for each step in the 
sequence reflecting the plant state represented by the failure models applicable to that 
step. 
This algorithm was thus extended to treat events on a step-by-step basis. 
7.10 COMBINED CONTROL AND TRIP LOOPS 
A modified section of the plant relating to a combined control/trip loop given in Figure 
7.4, is presented below: 
SET POINT 
TRIP 
SWITCH 
AIR 
SUPPLY 
VENT 
CONTROLLER VALVE 
PUMP CONTROL/TRIP PRESSURE 
PRESSURE 
VALVE SENSOR SENSOR 
Figure 7.23 
Modified Representation of a Combined Control and Trip Loop 
A combined control/trip loop is one which has shared components between the two 
sub-systems. This would normally be the control/trip valve, but can include additional 
items, e. g. the vent valve in the above figure. 
The problem arises because the control/trip valve is common to both the control and the 
trip system. For high pressure/flow to propagate through the system both the control and 
the trip loops have to fail. 
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Since the control loop is the primary protective system, the control loop algorithm imposes the tree structure shown in Figure 7.24: 
HIGH FLOW 
OF BUTANE 
CONTROL LOOP 
LATENT FAILURE 
CONTROL LOOP DEVIATION OF 
STUCK SENSED VARIABLE 
I/ OTHER 
CV-STK CAUSES 
Figure 7.24 
Annlication of the Control 
CONTROL LOOP 
SPONTANEOUS 
FAILURE 
OTHER 
CV-F-HA CAUSES 
Template 
The program then recognises the secondary protective system and includes the 
functional failure of the trip system as shown in Figure 7.25: 
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The three failure states used for the control/trip valve are: 
a) CV-STK, i. e. control valve fails in its normal position 
b) CV-F-HA, i. e. control valve fails giving a high aperture 
c) CV-F-LA, i. e. control valve fails giving a low aperture 
The control loop algorithm needs all three states in the control valve model in order to 
correctly diagnose the control loop failure branches. 
For the trip system to function the valve must close to prevent any flow. Therefore any 
of the above valve states is a valid cause of trip loop functional failure. However, the 
tree of Figure 7.25 is incorrect, since mutually exclusive failure states of the valve are 
being ANDed together. Consequently the program has been modified to check for 
common components between control and trip loops and to delete any events from the 
trip loop functional failure branch which are inconsistent with the control loop failure 
branches. The outcome of this action is highlighted in Figure 7.26. 
Note that the trip loop functional failure branch is ANDed separately with each of the 
control loop failure branches and that the valve failure contained in it is consistent with 
that in the control loop failure branch. 
7.11 CONCLUSION 
This chapter has highlighted a number of rules to diagnose trip loop functional failure 
and to enhance the appearance of these branches in the final fault tree. In particular the 
shortcoming in the MK1 methodology with respect to combined control/trip loops and 
sequential operations has been addressed. 
Chapter 10 of this thesis presents some worked examples including trip systems in the 
configuration. 
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8.0 MODELLING UTILITY FAILURES 
8.1 INTRODUCTION 
Faults in utility supplies are important because they are a potential source of common 
mode failures. Consider the section of plant given in Figure 8.1 below: 
TRIP 
VALVE SENSOR-1 SENSOR_2 01 
TRIP 
SWITCH 
Figure 8.1 
Schematic Representation of a Trip System 
The activation of the trip switch is dependent upon the sensors detecting a deviation in 
the process stream, The reliability of the system is improved by duplicating the sensors; 
for the system to fail both the sensors must fail. 
However, if both the units are connected to a common utility supply, then the failure of 
this is sufficient to fail the system. This is thus a common mode failure. 
8.2 MODELLING 
For the above system the utility supply failures could be modelled within the sensor unit 
models. However, this approach would be inadequate to alert the conventional fault tree 
analysis programs to the existence of the common mode failure and would result in the 
generation of incorrect cutsets. 
If the utility supply failure were modelled within the sensor unit, then FAULTFINDER 
would incorporate a branch in the fault tree of the nature given in Figure 8.2, for the 
system given in Figure 8.1. 
The Fault Tree Analysis program would include the following second order cutset for 
this sub-tree: 
Utility Supply Failure Sensor 1 AND Utility Supply Failure Sensor 2 
The only way to bring out the common mode nature of the fault is to be able to extend 
the fault propagation into the common mode unit. Hence, it is necessary to represent the 
configuration of Figure 8.1 as depicted in Figure 8.3. 
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TRIP SYSTEM FAILURE 
SOR 1 FAILS I ISENSOR 2 FAILS 
UTILITY UTILITY 
FAILURE FAILURE >ENSOR 1 SENSOR 2 
Figure 8.2 
Fault Tree Branch Incorporating Utility Failures for Plant Section of Fi 8.1 
Figure 8.3 
Alternative Representation for Schematic of Figure 8.1 
This configuration would produce a fault tree of the format given in Figure 8.4. In this 
case the Fault Tree Analysis program would yield a single first order cutset: 
Utility Supply Failure 
in addition to the second order cutset: Sensor 1 Failure and Sensor 2 Failure. 
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Figure 8.4 
Fault Tree Branch Incorporating Utility Failures for Plant Section of Figure 8.3 
8.3 DEFICIENCY IN THE MK1 SOLUTION 
A basic limitation of the above technique was its inability to handle partial utility failures. In this context partial utility failure refers to failure of the utility to only some 
of the components in the configuration; it does not refer to the situation where insufficient utility is available to any particular unit, e. g. drop in pressure of the instrument air supply. 
This situation is highlighted by the plant section given in Figure 8.5 below. The purpose 
of this plant section is to maintain a constant level in the tank by manipulating the flow 
into it. 
DUMMY 1 CONTROL 2 
HEAD VALVE 
AIR 
3 SUPPLY 
9 
8 
REVERSE 4 LEVEL 5 TANK ACTING SENSOR CONTROLLER 
6 10 
DUMMY 
SETPOIN TAIL 
Figure 8.5 
Schematic Representation of a Level Control System 
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In this instance the control valve, controller and sensor are dependent upon the same 
common air supply utility. Consider the case of a high flow of liquid into the tank. One 
cause of this would be spontaneous failure of the control loop resulting in higher than 
normal control valve aperture. 
The control valve is of the air-to-open type. Using the models and synthesis algorithm 
of the MK1 methodology, a tree of the following form would be produced: 
If the action of the control loop is studied in detail, it becomes apparent that there is a 
branch missing from the above tree. 
The controller is reverse acting. It will emit a high signal to the control valve (causing 
an increase in its aperture) not only if it receives a low signal from the sensor, but also if 
it receives no signal. This effect could not be modelled using the MK1 methodology, as 
it would have introduced an inconsistency into the tree. The following figure shows the 
effect of including this event in the models: 
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As can be seen from the above figure, the sensor will not emit a signal either if it fails in 
a position indicative of no level in the tank, or if there is a loss of utility, since the 
sensor cannot function without a correct supply of utility. 
The tree of Figure 8.7 is incorrect since the utility supply failure can never give rise to 
the top event; a utility supply failure would result in the control valve failing shut, 
resulting in no flow into the tank since it is of the air-to-open type. 
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8.4 PROPOSED SOLUTIONS 
Two solutions were considered to overcome this problem. Each of these is described below. 
8.4.1 SOLUTION 1 
Consider again the tank level control system of Figure 8.5. It could be argued that since 
the control valve is dependent upon a supply of utility for normal functioning, the model 
should have this knowledge incorporated into it. Hence, the minitree for CL-F-HA in 
the control valve model should be of the following format: 
Figure 8.8 
Modified Minitree for CL-F-HA for Control Valve 
This should be compared to the normal minitree: 
Figure 8.9 
Normal Minitree for CL-F-HA for Control Valve 
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The difference between the two minitrees is that in the former the requirement for some 
utility supply has been explicitly stated. This branch would eventually be traced to the 
Utility Supply unit itself. The standard FAULTFINDER methodology would suggest 
that the utility supply model should contain an event statement to the effect: 
S NORMAL: UTL-SOME 
i. e. the utility supply unit normally delivers some utility. Hence, in effect since a normal 
event should not be included in a failure tree, then the branch for some utility would be 
deleted from the final tree. 
However, this could be circumvented by incorporating a pseudo-fault event into the 
utility supply unit thus: 
F UTL-OK: UTL-SOME 
Hence, the tree of Figure 8.7 given above would be changed to that given in Figure 
8.10. It should be noted that the tree given below contains only those events pertinent to 
the current discussion. 
Figure 8.10 
Modified Form of Tree of Figure 8.7 Incorporating Some Utility State 
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This would thus prevent the generation of the first order cutset AIR SUPPLY 
UTL-FAIL, since it is ANDed with AIR SUPPLY UTL-OK. A post-cutset generation 
algorithm could then be written to reject any cutsets containing these mutually exclusive 
events for the same unit. 
This approach was, however, rejected, since it unnecessarily complicated the modelling 
procedure. Additionally the inclusion of NORMAL events/states into a FAULT tree was 
considered to be both undesirable and unacceptable, in an attempt to overcome a limitation in the methodology. The alternative solution described below was chosen instead. 
8.4.2 SOLUTION 2 
This is based on the MASTER program being able to detect the utility supply units in 
the configuration. All the units which are linked to these utility units are then noted. 
Hence, considering the plant representation of Figure 8.5, the MASTER program would 
note that there is one utility air supply unit and that it feeds the control valve, controller 
and sensor. 
The algorithm for this is based on the following criteria: 
- utility units are differentiated from the others because they have multiple outputs via 
utility ports. Additionally this is the only type of port associated with this unit. 
- the units connected to these utility supply units are established by tracing back from 
the unit via its utility port until a utility supply unit is found. 
This is based entirely on the information which is already present in the failure model, 
and that which has been supplied by the user, by virtue of the way that the various units 
are connected together, during the decomposition phase. 
The fault tree synthesis algorithm can then utilise this information to generate logically 
consistent trees. This is best illustrated by reference to a worked example. 
8.5 WORKED EXAMPLE 
8.5.1 INTRODUCTION 
The plant section of Figure 8.1 la will be used; the decomposition diagram for this 
system is given in Figure 8.1 lb. The system consists of an effluent holding tank, which 
feeds into a river. There are two trip systems attached to this to prevent the discharge of 
contaminated effluent into the river. One trip system requires the manual intervention of 
the operator to shut the hand valve at the outlet of the tank. In this instance an alarm 
signal is generated upon detection of a high concentration in the tank. 
The other trip system is automatic and would only operate if the operator fails to take 
corrective action. It should be noted that the trip valve in this is fed via a three-way 
solenoid (vent) valve. The trip valve is of the fail-safe mechanism because: 
- it is of the air-to-open-type. If the air supply fails, then the trip valve will close. 
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- the solenoid is of the de-energise to vent type. Hence, if the power supply fails, then 
the vent valve will de-energise, causing the air to vent and resulting in the closure of the 
trip valve. 
The hazardous top event of interest is the release of toxic waste into the river. The fault 
tree resulting from the MK 1 methodology is presented in Figure 8.12. 
It should be noted that there are three main branches to this tree. These are: 
Branch A: Failures related to Trip System 1 (automatic). 
Branch B: Failures causing a high composition of pollutant. 
Branch C: Failures related to Trip System 2 (manual). 
It should be noted that these three branches are all ANDED together, since for the 
hazardous top event to occur there must be a high concentration of pollutant and both 
the trip systems must fail to act. 
However, the detail of the fault tree is not quite correct. Consider Branch A in greater 
detail. This is incorrect, since failures of the sensor (Unit 5) are traced to the failure of 
the power supply (Unit 13). It has already been stated that since the solenoid valve is of 
the de-energise-to-vent type, a failure of the power supply will cause the trip valve to 
shut and thereby prevent the top event from materialising. 
8.5.2 IMPLEMENTED SOLUTION 
The solution implemented is really a fault tree rationalisation step, i. e. it is executed 
once the original fault tree has been synthesised. The fault tree produced by the 
synthesis algorithm of the MK 2 methodology is presented in Figure 8.13. A discussion 
of the resultant fault tree is presented below. 
It should be noted that two main differences have occurred with respect to Branch A: 
- the power supply failure associated with the sensor unit has been eliminated. 
the UTL-OK event has been incorporated into this branch. 
The procedure for accomplishing this is outlined below. 
The fault tree is searched from the top down, to locate those units which have been 
identified to be connected to power supply units. The first unit (in the propagation path) 
in Branch A which is connected to the power supply unit is the trip switch (Unit 14). It 
will be noted that although this unit is connected to the power supply unit, it does not 
have any faults associated with the power supply. Hence, it can be inferred that this unit 
expects a normal power supply and that no other units below this point in the fault tree 
may have faults associated with the power supply. 
Although the power supply failure event has been deleted as a direct cause of the sensor 
failing, faults in the local power supply line to sensor are left in the tree. Whilst the 
actual faults are not strictly realistic, since the standard pipe model was used, they 
nevertheless illustrate the principal quite well. 
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TOXIC RELEASE 
AND 
ABC 
TL-FN-F X6 HI TL-FN-F 
TRIP 1 TRIP 2 
OR X1 HI OR 
S18 NCHA TV-FT-SH HV-FT-SH ,. 
UNIT 6 I 
OR 
F- -1 
SIG-CB A(DUMMY) SV-FT-OP 
UNIT 15 UNIT 16 UNIT 15 
AND 
S17 NCHA UTL-OK 
UNIT 13 
OR 
W19 HI SIG-CB S16 NCHA TSW-DIS TSW-STK 
I UNIT 14 I UNIT 14 UNIT 14 
OR OR 
OR 
S9 NCHA ANB OKE S15 NONE 
UNIT 10 IR 
OR 
POW-LOSS 
UNIT 13 
W10 HI SIG-CB TSW-S7 
UNIT 9 UNI 19 
SET-P-HI OR 
UNIT 16 S25 NONE SEN-STK 
I 
UNIT 5 SET-P-HI I 
OR 
UNIT 11 
17 
LK-LP-EN COMP-BLK 
UNIT 19 UNIT 19 
UNIT 4 
JlL Nl. r1A 
OR 
OP-FAIL S11 NCHA 
UNIT 12 
S14 NONE TSW-DIS S8 NCHA 
UNIT 9 
OR OR 
II 
POW-LOSS SEN-STK 
UNIT 13 UNIT 8 
Figure 8.13 
FAULTFINDER MK2 Fault Tree for System of Figure 8.11 
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Additionally, the UTL-OK event has been included at the point where the trip switch 
was first encountered in this branch. This is necessary to ensure consistency with the 
events in the other trip loop functional failure branch. The need for this is exemplified by the following scenario. 
Considering now Branch C, there is nothing to prevent the POW-LOSS Unit 13 event from being ANDed with the event TV-FT-SH Unit 6 in Branch A. However, it is not 
correct to AND POW-LOSS Unit 13 with any events below the point where the 
propagation path passes through the controller unit as this needs a normal power supply 
to function. 
Although the tree of Figure 8.13 is logically consistent, the standard fault tree analysis 
packages will give rise to incorrect cutsets. In the absence of the UTL-OK event, cutsets 
of the following nature will be generated: 
POW-LOSS Unit 13 AND TSW-STK Unit 14 
The inclusion of the UTL-OK event will transform the above cutset into: 
POW-LOSS Unit 13 AND TSW-STK Unit 14 AND UTL-OK Unit 13 
Since this cutset contains two different failure modes for the same unit, then a 
post-cutset generation algorithm could be used to reject these erroneous cutsets. 
Further discussion of this aspect will be delayed until Chapter 9, when fault tree analysis 
is discussed in greater detail. 
8.6 CONCLUSION 
This chapter has outlined a modelling convention for handling the common mode 
aspects of utility supply failures. A procedure has been outlined for detecting the utility 
supply units in the configuration and for ensuring the consistency of the trees with 
respect to faults related to these units. The problem of logically consistent trees 
generating incorrect cutsets has also been introduced, along with a solution to the 
problem. A detailed discussion of this latter point is delayed until the next chapter. 
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9.0 FAULT TREE ANALYSIS 
9.1 INTRODUCTION 
This thesis has concentrated mainly on the synthesis of fault trees. Fault tree analysis is 
a research topic in its own right and was not a requirement of this project. However, a 
means of evaluation was needed to assess the consistency of the fault trees produced by 
FAULTFINDER. The primary criterion used to achieve this was the generation of 
minimal c'. . . sets. Since automatic fault tree analysis is more advanced than automatic 
fault tree s .: lthesis, a number of programs are available 
for evaluating fault trees. Two 
such programs: PREP [Ref 9-1] and FTAP [Ref 9-2], were used for determining the 
minimal cutsets. 
9.2 MINIMAL CUTSETS 
Cutsets are the combinations of events which are sufficient to give rise to the top event 
of the fault tree. Consider the two schematic representations given in Figure 9.1 below: 
TOP TOP 
ABAB 
CDCA 
TREE A TREE B 
Figure 9.1 
Schematic Fault Tree Representation 
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Fault tree (A) would have the following two cutsets: 
a) A 
b) C and D 
i. e. if either A occurs or if both C and D occur then the top event will occur. 
Fault tree (B) would also have two cutsets: 
a) A 
b) C and A 
However, the second cutset would be deleted since it is non-minimal. The first cutset 
says that A alone is sufficient to cause the top event. Hence, the requirement for C to 
co-exist with A is not necessary. 
The order of the cutset is also important. A first order cutset contains a single event, e. g. 
A; a second order cutset contains two events, e. g. C and D, and so on. 
9.3 INTERFACE WITH THE ANALYSIS PROGRAMS 
Data files are used for creating the input to FTAP and PREP and also for storing the 
output from these. Both programs expect data input in a fixed format. The nature of the 
input created by the FAULTFINDER synthesis algorithm is summarised below. 
9.3.1 FTAP FORMAT 
The synthesis program creates an input file for this program conforming to the 
following format: 
Column 1 Column 21 Column 31 Column 41 
G1 + BEI. G2 
G2 * G6 -BE2 
G6 + BE3 BE4 
Table 9.1 
FTAP Format 
Each record contains the following information: 
a) gate node name, e. g. G1 
b) logic indicator (+ - OR, *- AND, k- an integer in k-out-of-n redundancy) 
c) immediate subnodes, e. g. BE land G2. 
The following conventions are adhered to: 
a) 8 fields per record with 10 columns per field 
b) each field is left justified 
c) node names are restricted to 8 or less characters 
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d) a dash in columns 20,30,40,50,60 or 70 indicates event complementation, e. g. 
-BE2 
e) if a gate has more than 6 causes, then these are continued on to the next record. In this case fields 1 and 2 are left empty. 
Additionally, at the end of the file after defining the tree structure it is necessary to define various parameters to control the action of FTAP. At the very minimum the following three instructions are required: 
a) ENDTREE 
b) *XEQ 
c) ENDJOB 
The first instruction indicates the end of the fault tree definition; the second instructs FTAP to commence the generation of cutsets; and the final stops further processing. 
9.3.1.1 OPTIONS WITH FTAP 
The following two options were used during the course of this project: 
a) MAXSIZE N, this restricts the generation of cutsets to a maximum order of N. 
b) PROCESS G1, G2.... By default FTAP generates all cutsets for the top event of the fault tree. By specifying gate nodes using this command, cutsets can be generated for 
sections of the tree. This feature is useful for the SEQUENTIAL OPERATIONS fault 
trees, where cutsets need to be evaluated separately for each SEQ-F-AT Step branch. 
9.3.2 PREP FORMAT 
PREP actually comprises two different programs: TRIAD and CUTSET. The fault tree 
synthesis program thus creates two files for input to these two programs and conforming 
to the specified format. 
The input to TRIAD defines the fault tree structure and has a format similar to FTAP. 
Each record defines one level of the tree structure; the contents of each record are 
outlined below: 
a) 1st field - output gate node b) 2nd field - gate type, either AND or OR or k-n 
c) 3rd field - number of transmissive inputs to this gate d) 4th field - number of basic event inputs to this gate 
e) Fields 5-9 - up to 5 inputs to the gate 
If more than five inputs exist to any given gate, then these are continued on to the next 
line, in which case fields 1-4 would be left empty. It should also be noted that PREP 
does not allow event complementation. 
The final record in this file contains the text END, signifying the end of the tree 
structure. 
The TRIAD program processes this file to create a suitable representation of the fault 
tree for use by the CUTSET program. 
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The fault tree synthesis program also creates an input file to the CUTSET program. This file specifies the options to be used in determining the cutsets. Only the minimum 
necessary information for PREP to be able to generate cutsets was provided. The 
structure of this file is as follows: 
a) 1st record - name of the configuration under study b) 2nd record -* DATA, indicating start of options data 
c) 3rd record - minimum and maximum order of cutset to be found d) 4th record - END, indicating end of file 
TRIAD and CUTSET need to be executed sequentially and a large number of 
intermediate files are generated. To facilitate this process a command procedure has 
been written, which automatically manages the files and executes the programs. 
933 INTERFACE PROBLEMS 
For both FTAP and PREP it was necessary to modify the programs to accept input using 
data files. A further problem was that both the fault tree analysis programs allowed a 
maximum of eight characters for the specification of events in the tree. However, 
FAULTFINDER requires up to twelve characters for defining these events. 
In the case of PREP the program was further adapted to overcome this restriction. 
However, for FTAP the indices of the events, as used by the synthesis program, were 
used to define the tree structure. A post-FTAP procedure was implemented to 
subsequently convert the indices into actual event names. This latter approach was 
adopted, since other post-cutset determination manipulations were also needed. 
Generally during the course of this project FTAP was used for generating the cutsets. 
9.4 POST-CUTSET ANALYSIS ALGORITHMS 
This section describes some features implemented to overcome conflicts between the 
FAULTFINDER fault trees and the limitation of the FTAP package. 
9.4.1 MUTUALLY EXCLUSIVE EVENTS 
9.4.1.1 INTRODUCTION 
The problems inherent with this will be illustrated with reference to a system that was 
modelled during this project. 
One application of FAULTFINDER was to generate rules for alarm analysis. The flow 
and decomposition diagrams for this system are given in Figures 9.2a and 9.2b, 
respectively. The purpose of the plant is to maintain a constant head of fluid in the open 
tank for an unspecified downstream unit. The level is controlled by manipulating the 
flow of liquid into the tank using the control valve (Unit 3), which in turn is directed by 
the reverse-acting controller (Unit 13). The controller receives its level signal from Unit 
11, which is connected through a shared sampling port via the vessel port splitter to the 
tank. 
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The alarm logging system is represented by Unit 16, which monitors the tank level via the two level sensors and also the flow of the manipulated stream via the flow sensor. The purpose of the second level sensor is to provide redundancy in the system. 
9.4.1.2 MODELLING AN ALARM COMBINATION 
The following combination of events was modelled via the top event: a low level signal from Unit 15 and a high level signal from Unit 11. The start of this fault tree was as indicated in Figure 9.3 below: 
Figure 9.3 
Start of Fault Tree for Tank Level Control System of Figure 9.2 
9.4.1.3 THE PROBLEM 
The two branches S9 HI and S9 LO will contain mutually exclusive events; however, 
because of the way that the top event has been specified the fault tree itself is logically 
consistent. The fault tree synthesis algorithm cannot, and indeed should not, delete 
events from either branch. This is because the events do not occur immediately beneath 
the AND gate. Only the combination of events in the S9 HI and S9 LO branches is 
inconsistent; the combination of all other branches, e. g. SEN-F-LO UNIT 15 and S9 HI 
is valid. 
Nevertheless as the fault tree stands, the standard fault tree analysis packages, FTAP and 
PREP, will not appreciate that some of the events in the fault tree are mutually exclusive 
and will consequently give rise to incorrect cutsets. 
9.4.1.4 PROPOSED SOLUTION 
One possibility to overcome this problem would be to re-organise the fault tree 
structure, to make the mutual exclusivity explicit. This is outlined in Figure 9.4. 
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Figure 9.4 
Modified Form of Tree Given in Figure 9.3. 
However, this technique was not pursued as it was found not be generally applicable. 
This type of tree rearrangement was possible in this case since the mutual exclusivity 
occurred at the top of the tree and was quite obvious. In more complicated examples the 
rearrangement of the tree would have proved quite messy and would have resulted in 
rather opaque trees. 
The solution adopted was to utilise the ability of FTAP to handle event 
complementation. Essentially, event complementation entails the inclusion of those 
events which must not occur, for the ouput to be true. This is equivalent to the use of 
NOT logic in the tree. Hence, when writing the FTAP file for the above tree, it would 
automatically alert FTAP so as not to AND the causes of the S9 LO branch with those 
of the S9 HI branch. Although the fault tree itself is not modified, the FTAP file would 
be equivalent to the tree structure given in Figure 9.5. 
It should be noted that any valid cutsets below the complemented event will also include 
this event. However, this was overcome by removing the complemented events from the 
final cutsets by a post-cutset generation algorithm. This is possible because the 
FAULTFINDER methodology does not itself utilise event complementation. 
9.4.1.5 DETERMINATION OF MUTUALLY EXCLUSIVE EVENTS 
The main problem arises in determining the mutually exclusive branches so that these 
can be flagged in the FTAP input file. 
The outline algorithm for achieving this is as follows: 
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Figure 9.5 
Removal of Mutual Exclusivity Using Event Complementation. 
a) Search down the tree from the top event for AND gates. 
b) If an AND gate is found then compare the events in each branch with those in all the 
other branches under this gate. Flag those events which are deemed to be mutually 
exclusive. 
c) When writing the FTAP input file, consult the above flagged events and introduce 
event complementation at the appropriate points. 
Two basic criteria are used for determining the mutually exclusive events: 
i) analysis of variable deviations. Since a variable deviation defines the status of the 
process streams, then these can be used to determine the mutually exclusive plant states. 
Each variable has a discrete number of states within the FAULTFINDER methodology; 
consequently two different deviations of a variable at the same location represent 
mutually exclusive states. Hence, the variable deviations in the different branches are 
analysed and if they have the same variables and stream numbers, BUT different 
deviations, then they are flagged as mutually exclusive. This criterion would thus flag 
the S9 HI and the S9 LO branches as being mutually exclusive. 
ii) analysis of special intermediate events. The above criteria would be adequate if the 
fault tree consisted entirely of variable deviation events. This is, however, not the case. 
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As far as mutual exclusivity is concerned, intermediate events are also of interest, 
particularly those which are at the head of the control loop templates. These events 
represent failure modes of the control loop. The different branches in any given template 
are by their very definition mutually exclusive, e. g. CL-STK and CL-F-HA. 
This latter case will be highlighted by reference to the tank level control system of 
Figure 9.2 again. A different alarm condition is modelled in this instance: an indicated 
high flow into the tank and an indicated low level in the tank. Since the level in the tank 
is the control loop regulated variable, controlled by manipulating the flow into it, then 
these two events can only persist if the control loop has failed. In general the control 
loop failures associated with a high flow into the tank are contradictory to those for a 
low level in the tank, e. g. a high flow of the manipulated stream will be caused by 
CL-F-HA whereas a low level would be caused by CL-F-LA. The resultant fault tree for 
this system would be of the form given in Figure 9.6 below: 
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Once again unless special treatment is afforded, mutually exclusive failure branches of 
the fault tree will be ANDed together by the fault tree analysis packages, e. g. the 
CL-F-HA branch would be ANDed with both the CL-F-LA and CL-STK branches. 
To overcome this problem, the control loop failure states which were considered to be 
mutually exclusive were defined and applied during the determination of mutually 
exclusive events for FTAP. The branches which may be ANDed together between the 
regulated and manipulated variable templates are summarised in Table 9.2 below: 
Regulated Template Manipulated Template 
CL-F-HA CL-F-HA 
CL-F-LA CL-F-LA 
Sensed Variable Branch + CL-STK Manipulated Variable Branch + CL-STK 
Overload Branch CL-O-LD Sensed Variable Branch (CL-ACT) 
Table 9.2 
Branches Which May Be ANDED Together 
Entries on the same row in the above table may be ANDed together. 
The first two entries in Table 9.2 allow the ANDing together of the appropriate control 
loop spontaneous failures. The third entry allows the combination of the control loop 
latent failures. The fourth entry allows the ANDing together of failures in the process 
streams which may co-exist; the CL-O-LD branch will trace faults in the manipulated 
stream, e. g. no flow, whereas the CL-ACT branch will trace the causes of the level 
deviations in the tank. The variable deviation mutual exclusivity checks will be able to 
prevent the ANDing together of any inconsistent events in these branches. 
9.4.2 COMBINATORIAL EXPLOSION 
There may be instances when more than one control loop is controlling a process stream 
and there is no slave or master relationship. An example of this is the British Gas 
Pressure Reduction Installation (see Chapter 10 for details), where one control loop is 
able to correct for failures in another control loop. For a two control loop scheme the 
required fault tree form would be of the format given in Figure 9.7. 
Essentially this says that the top event will occur only if both control loops fail (in case 
of control loop latent failure there must also be a deviation in the process stream). The 
FAULTFINDER methodology differentiates between three different failure modes for 
the control loop: CL-STK, CL-F-HA and CL-F-LA. In any given application only one 
of CL-F-HA and CL-F-LA will be meaningful. Hence, as in the above example the 
control loop template contains two of these three failure modes. 
In general the number of combinations of these two failure modes is given by: (2) to the 
power of N, where N is the number of control loops. Hence, the above two control loop 
system has a total of four combinations for the control loop failure branches. 
The decomposition of the British Gas Control System yielded five control loops which 
would have required thirty-two branches in the fault tree. This would clearly 
have made 
the fault tree structure rather opaque. To overcome this problem, the structure of the 
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Figure 9.7 
Template for Multiple Control Loops (2 Loops) 
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Figure 9.8 
Modified Form of Fault Tree Given in Figure 9.7 
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fault tree was simplified by the use of combined OR and AND logic as shown in Figure 
9.8. 
Comparing this with Figure 9.7, it can be seen that the location of the AND and OR 
gate has been exchanged. Doing this allows the number of branches to be reduced to the 
number of control loops. However, there is one problem with this approach. When the 
cutsets are now generated for the Spontaneous Failure Branch there will be the 
following four combinations, as opposed to the three indicated in Figure 9.7: 
1) CL-F-HA 1 CL-F-HA 2 
2) CL-F-HA 1 CL-STK 2 
3) CL-STK 1 CL-F-HA 2 
4) CL-STK 1 CL-STK 2 
It can be seen that the additional combination is the last one. When the minimum cutsets 
for this combination are generated all those from the Latent Failure Branch in Figure 9.8 
will be rejected since the presence of the Deviation in Sensed Variable Branch makes 
them non-minimal. Hence, the price paid for increased fault tree transparency is that 
there will always be one combination which is invalid (combination of CL-STK modes). 
There is thus a need to flag this in the fault tree and to prevent the cutset packages 
yielding incorrect cutsets. To achieve this, the fault tree structure of Figure 9.9 was 
adopted. 
In this case the spontaneous failure modes are all ANDED with a Dummy Basic Event: 
Unit 0. This can be distinguished from the other basic events since it has an invalid unit 
number (0) associated with it. Hence, when the cutsets are generated for this branch, 
CL-STK 1 AND CL-STK 2 from the previous example, will now in fact become 
CL-STK 1 AND CL-STK 2 AND DUMMY Unit 0. Hence, the package will not reject 
the cutsets from the Latent Failure branch on the grounds of non-minimality. 
Of course, all the cutsets generated from the spontaneous failure branch will now 
contain the Dummy Unit 0 event in them. A post-cutset generation algorithm was 
therefore written to enable the 'normalisation' of these cutsets. Two main criteria were 
used to achieve this: 
a) remove the event Dummy Unit 0 from all cutsets 
b) remove any cutsets which are subsets of other cutsets. 
An example of the former is: 
CL-F-HA 1 AND CL-F-HA 2 AND Dummy Unit 0 becomes 
CL-F-HA 1 AND CL-F-HA 2 
An example of the latter is that 
CL-STK 1 AND CL-STK 2 AND Dummy Unit 0 would become 
CL-STK 1 AND CL-STK 2 
but it is in fact rejected, since it is a subset of the cutset arising from the 
latent failure 
branch which will give a cutset of the form: 
CL-STK 1 AND CL-STK 2 AND Process Variable Deviation 
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Figure 9.9 
Modified Fault Tree Structure for Fault Tree of Figure 9.8 
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9.5 CONCLUSION 
This chapter has described how FAULTFINDER was interfaced to two standard Fault 
Tree Analysis Programs. The problem of incorrect cutsets being produced for logically 
consistent trees by the mechanistic use of the Fault Tree Analysis Programs has been 
highlighted. Some techniques for generating correct cutsets, whilst retaining a 
transparent fault tree structure, have been outlined. 
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10.0 WORKED EXAMPLES 
10.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents a set of worked examples which were modelled during the course 
of this project. The first example gives a detailed description of each step to illustrate 
the fundamental fault tree construction algorithm. Subsequent examples will then only 
highlight the significant new features of that system. 
10.2 LAPP-POWERS SYSTEM 
The flow diagram, decomposition diagram and the input required by FAULTFINDER 
are given in Appendix B. This section therefore, illustrates the steps involved in 
synthesising the fault tree for the hazardous top event of a high temperature at the outlet 
of the temperature sensor, Unit 5 in the decomposition diagram. 
The top event model for this is given below: 
OVRTEMP 
OR 
F- I 
DTROW1 DTROW2 
AND AND 
Q2OUT REV U1 IN HI T2OUT HI Q2OUT SOME 
Figure 10.1 
Ton Event Model for Lapp-Powers S 
Since this is being applied to the outlet of the temperature sensor model, it would be 
translated into the configuration-specific nomenclature as shown in Figure 10.2. 
In order to facilitate the discussion each branch will be developed in turn. The 
development of the left hand, reverse flow effects, branch of Figure 10.2 will be 
described first. 
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OVRTEMP 
Unit 5 
OR 
DTROW1 DTROW2 
AND AND 
05 REV U4 HI TS HI D5 SOME 
Figure 10.2 
Application of Top Event Model to Temperature Sensor 
10.2.1 REVERSE FLOW EFFECTS BRANCH 
The causes of both Q5REV (Q2OUT REV) and U4HI (UlIN HI) are to be found in the 
temperature sensor model. When these are added the tree will have the following format: 
DTROW1 
AND 
7 
05 REV U4 HI 
OR U5 HI (diamond) 
G4 REV LK-LP-EN G5 REV (diamond) 
Unit 5 
Figure 10.3 
Start of the Reverse Flow Effects Branch 
The causes of G5REV and U5HI lie in the unit downstream of the temperature sensor. 
From the configuration array, the algorithm will note that this unit is the dummy tail, 
Unit 6. At this stage both G5REV and U5HI will be flagged as diamond events as they 
have crossed the system boundary. They need further development; however this is not 
possible as the system configuration is undefined. 
The event LK-LP-EN is a basic event and so does not require further development. 
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Therefore, the only event in this branch requiring further development is G4REV. The 
causes of this are given by the minitree for GUN REV for the temperature sensor unit. When this minitree is added, this section of the tree will become: 
DTROW 1 
AND 
I 
_7 
Q5 REV U4 HI 
OR U5 HI (diamond) 
G4 REV LK-LP-EN G5 REV (diamond) 
Unit 5 
OR 
Q4 REV LK-HP-EN 05 REV (deleted) 
Unit 5 
Figure 10.4 
Development of the Reverse Flow Effects Branch 
It should be noted that at this point Q5 REV will be deleted since it has already occurred 
in this branch. The event LK-HP-EN Unit 5 will also be deleted since it is a not allowed 
fault of Q5 REV (it should actually cause Q5 HI). 
The only remaining event therefore is Q4REV; the causes of this will lie in the unit 
upstream of the temperature sensor. This unit will be determined by the methodology by 
looking at the configuration array. This unit will be the pipe (Unit 4). 
By applying similar logic to that described above this branch will be expanded as shown 
in Figure 10.5. 
It should be noted that the section of tree in Figure 10.5, represented by the dotted line 
will be deleted. The start event for TL-FN-F, and hence trip SHAC will be noted. 
TL-FN-F will be afforded special treatment later, see Section 10.2.7. Similarly the 
TL-FN-F events will be removed from any other events propagating through the trip 
valve. 
There are no further events in this branch requiring development. Hence, returning to 
the sub-tree of Figure 10.2, the only events awaiting development are TSHI and Q5 
SOME from the normal flow effects branch. The development of this branch will now 
be described. 
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DTROW 1 
1 
AND 
Q5 REV U4 HI 
OR 
G4 REV LK-LP-EN G5 REV 
Unit 5 (diamond) U5 HI 
OR 
I 
(diamond) 
Q4 REV 
OR 
I1 
G3 REV LK-LP-EN 
Unit 4 
OR 
I 
Q3 REV 
I 
OR 
G2 REV INT-LK 
Unit 3 
OR 
I 
Q2 REV 
AND 
G1 REV TL-FN-F 
Unit 2 
OR 
I 
Q1 REV (diamond) 
Figure 10.5 
Complete Sub-tree for Reverse Flow Effects Branch 
10.2.2 NORMAL FLOW EFFECTS BRANCH 
The development of the Q5 SOME event will be considered first. There are no new 
principles involved in developing this; Figure 10.6 gives the section of the fault tree 
related to this event. 
However, the methodology will delete the whole of the sub-tree of Figure 10.6, since 
the SOME flow events at dummy heads and dummy tails are deleted as CERTAIN 
events. Deletion will continue up the tree until an AND gate is found. The effect of this 
is to delete events under a common OR gate, since if one event under an OR gate is 
certain to occur, then the inclusion of the other events is superfluous. (Note: the AND 
gate below Q2 SOME will have been converted to an OR gate due to the removal of the 
TL-FN-F event as described above). 
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Q5 SOME 
OR 
G4 SOME LK-HP-EN G5 SOME (diamond) I Unit 5 
OR 
1 
Q4 SOME 
OR 
G3 SOME LK-HP-EN 
Unit 4 
OR 
I 
Q3 SOME 
OR 
G2 SOME INT-LK 
I Unit 3 
OR 
Q2 SOME 
AND 
G1 SOME TL-FN-F 
I Unit 2 
OR 
I 
Q1 SOME (diamond) 
Figure 10.6 
Sub-tree for SOME Flow 
The net effect of the above is to reduce the right hand, normal flow effects branch of 
Figure 10.2 to the following: 
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OVRTEMP 
Unit 5 
OR 
DTROW1 DTROW2 
AND OR 
T5 HI 
Q5 REV U4 HI 
Figure 10.7 
Elimination of SOME Flow Event from Figure 10.2 
The development of the T5 HI branch will now be considered. The methodology will 
note that the T variable at this location has been specified as falling within the domain 
of protection of the control loop. Hence, the control loop operator for the deviation in 
the regulated variable of a feedback control loop will be applied thus: 
DTROW2 
OR 
T5 HI 
OR 
C(DUMMY) E(DUMMY) F(DUMMY) 
Loop 1 Loop 1 Loop 1 
1 
OR 
Spontaneous D(DUMMY) 
Failures Loop 1 
AND 
CL-STK Deviation In 
Loop 1 Sensed Variable 
Figure 10.8 
Application of the Control Loop Operator 
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At this point there are a number of unknowns in the above template. These are: 
- it is not known whether CL-F-HA or CL-F-LA would give rise to the event T5 HI. 
- which deviation in the sensed variable will give rise to the event T5 HI. 
- whether any events would overload the control loop. 
The key to filling in these branches is: 
a) trace the causes of the current event, T5 HI, adding these causes to the C(DUMMY) branch. 
b) this branch will eventually trace through the control valve. The control valve model 
will give the necessary information on whether CL-F-LA or CL-F-HA is the cause of 
the event T5 HI. This event will then be moved to the spontaneous failure branch and be developed in the normal way. The control loop latent failure branch CL-STK will also be found from the control valve model. 
c) the control loop sensed variable deviation, which gives rise to the event T5 HI will be found by noting the event at the inlet of the sensor, which would give rise to the 
spontaneous failure branch. This is illustrated by the following schematic representation: 
CONTROL 
SENSOR VALVE 
CONTROLLER 
Figure 10.9 
Schematic Representation of a Feed-Back Control Loop 
If the event being developed is CL-F-HA and the controller is reverse-acting then the 
deviation at the inlet of the controller causing this is a low signal, which will eventually 
be traced to a low deviation at the inlet of the sensor. 
d) the methodology assumes that the only events which can overload the control loop 
are the None and Reverse deviations in the flow of the manipulated stream. Hence, 
whenever the propagation path is along a manipulated stream, then if the variable is 
flow G/Q, and the deviation is NONE/REV, then the event will be transferred to the 
overload branch and be developed there in the normal manner. 
Hence, returning to the event T5 HI, it is necessary to develop this and add the causes of 
this to the C(DUMMY) branch. The development of the tree up to the heat exchanger is 
quite straightforward and presents no new problems. This tree is given in the following 
figure: 
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The events EXT-HEAT, FOULING and LK-LP-EN are all basic events and require no 
further development. Of the other events: T2 HI, T9 HI and G2 HI can be developed 
fairly readily and pose no new problems. The resulting tree when these three events are 
fully developed is given in the following figure: 
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T3 HI 
OR 
T2 HI T9 HI E(DUMMY) G2 HI EXT-HEAT FOULING LK-LP-EN II Unit 3I Unit 3 Unit 3 Unit 3 
OR OR OR 
T1 HI T8 HI 
(diamond) I Q2 HI Q3 HI 
OR 
OR OR 
T7HI 
G1 HI G3 HI 
OR II OR OR 
T6 HI EXT-COLD Q1 HI 04 HI 
(diamond) 
Unit 8 (diamond) 
I 
OR 
I 
G4 HI 
OR 
05 HI 
OR 
G5 HI 
(diamond) 
Figure 10.11 
Development of the C(DUMMY) Branch 
The development of E(DUMMY) Unit 3 is more complicated. When the minitree for 
this event is extracted from the heat exchanger model and added to the tree above, it will 
be expanded thus: 
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T3 HI 
OR 
T2 HI T9 HI E(DUMMY) G2 HI EXT-HEAT FOULING LK-LP-EN 
Unit 3 Unit 3 Unit 3 Unit 3 1 
OR 
G9 LO G9 REV G9 NONE 
Figure 10.12 
Development of the E(DUMMY) Unit 3 Branch 
At this point the methodology will note that stream 9 has been specified as having the 
flow manipulated in it, and that both G9 REV and G9 NONE are events which will 
overload the control loop. Hence, both these events will be moved to the control loop 
overload branch and developed there. G9 LO will therefore be the only event requiring 
further development. The causes of this will be developed thus: 
G9 LO 
OR 
Q10 LO 09 LO 
OR 
I OR 
G10 LO (diamond) 
PART-BLK 
Unit 10 
CL-F-LA DTROW2 LK-LP-EN 
UnitlO UnitlO 
AND 
CL-STK G8 LO 
Figure 10.13 
Development of the G9 LO Branch 
Page 10/11 
At this point the propagation chain has reached the control valve and the causes of the 
current event are related to the spontaneous failure and latent failure of the control loop. The events CL-F-LA and CL-STK will be moved to the spontaneous failure and latent failure branches, respectively, and developed there. Therefore the only event requiring further development, in Figure 10.13, is G8 LO. This can be developed in the normal 
way and will yield the following tree. 
E(DUMMY) Unit 3 
OR 
G9 LO 
OR 
Q9, LO 
DTROW 2 
Unit 10 
G8 LO 
OR 
Q8 LO 
OR 
G) LO 
OR 
Q) LO 
OR 
G6 LO LK-LP-EN A(DUMMY) 
Unit 8 Unit 8 
OR 
I OR 
06 LO (diamond) 
PART-BLK CAVITATN AIR-LOCK IMPLR-F 
Unit 8 Unit 8 Unit 8 Unit 8 
Figure 10.14 
Complete Sub-tree for E(DUMMY) Unit 3 Branch 
At this stage the C(DUMMY) branch is fully developed. The start events of the 
spontaneous and latent failure branches have been found, and two events have been 
identified for the overload branch. It is next necessary to develop these branches. Firstly, 
the spontaneous failure branch will be developed. 
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10.2.3 SPONTANEOUS FAILURE BRANCH 
The start event for this is CL-F-LA and the causes of this are to be found in the control valve model. The sub-tree for this event will be developed thus: 
The event T4 HI has traced the spontaneous failure branch to the inlet connection of the 
sensor. Hence this is the deviation, HI, which is required for the sensed variable 
deviation branch. Furthermore the event T4 HI will be removed from this tree; the 
control loop spontaneous failure branch contains failures in the control loop components 
only; the event T4 HI has traced causes into the process stream. 
Next the latent failure branch will be developed. 
10.2.4 LATENT FAILURE BRANCH 
In a similar manner to the spontaneous failure branch, the latent failure branch will be 
developed. The sub-tree for this event is given in the following figure: 
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CL-STK 
Loop 1 
1 
OR 
CV-STK S12 NCHA 
Unit 10 
OR 
CNT-STK S11 NCHA CNT-MAN 
Unit 12 I Unit 12 
OR 
SEN-STK 
Unit 5 
Figure 10.16 
Sub-tree for Control Loop Latent Failure Branch 
Next the two events relating to control loop overload will be developed. 
10.2.5 CONTROL LOOP OVERLOAD BRANCH 
The development of this branch poses no new problems. The two events causing control 
loop overload, G9 REV and G9 NONE, have been identified above during the 
development of the C(DUMMY) branch. The resulting sub-trees for these two events 
are presented in Figures 10.17 and 10.18. 
Now the only event awaiting development from Figure 10.8, is the deviation in the 
sensed variable. The sensed variable is known to be T; the development of the 
spontaneous failure event has revealed that the deviation in this event is HIGH. Hence, 
the event requiring development is T4 HI. 
It will however be noted that T4 HI has already been developed under the C(DUMMY) 
branch. There is no need to develop this event again. 
The next step is a fault tree rationalisation step. 
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G9 REV 
OR 
09 REV Q10 REV 
(diamond) 
OR 
LK-LP-EN G8 REV 
Unit 10 1 
OR 
G7 REV 
OR 
Q7 REV 
OR 
DTROW1 LK-LP-EN Unit 8 Unit 8 
AND 
G6 EV B(DUMMY) 
OR OR 
06 REV 
(diamond) SHUTDOWN S19 NONE 
Unit 81 
OR 
POW-LOSS 
Unit 17 
Figure 10.18 
Sub-tree for Reverse Flow in Control Loop Overload Branch 
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10.2.6 FAULT TREE RATIONALISATION 
For the current system, the events in the C(DUMMY) branch are compared with those in the sensed variable branch. Any events which are common to both are deleted from 
the C(DUMMY) branch. In this case all the events under the C(DUMMY) branch 
would be deleted since the start of this branch is actually T4 HI and so it does not 
contain any other failures. 
This procedure is necessary since there may be circumstances in which the C(DUMMY) branch will contain events which the control loop cannot sense but which can give rise 
to the top event. These would normally be events which mislead the control loop. 
However, no such events exist in this system. 
The next thing to do, is to add the trip loop functional failure events. In order to do this 
it is necessary to develop both the trip 'should activate' sub-tree and also the trip loop 
functional failure sub-trees. 
10.2.7 ADDITION OF THE TL-FN-F EVENTS 
The start events for trip loop functional failure (TL-FN-F) and trip should activate 
(SHAG) have already been noted when events propagated through the trip valve (see 
Section 10.2.1). Firstly, the trip loop functional failure event will be developed. This 
will have the following causes: 
TL-FN-F 
Trip 1 
I 
O R 
TV-FT-SH S15 NCHA SIG-CB 
Unit 2 I Unit 2 
OR 
TSW-STK W16 LO TSW-DIS S14 NCHA SIG-CB S18 NONE 
Unit 14 I Unit 14 I Unit 14 I 
OR OR OR 
SET-P-LO SEN-STK IAR-LOSS 
Unit 15 Unit 9 Unit 16 
Figure 10.19 
Sub-tree for Trip Loop Functional Failure 
In a similar manner to the control loop spontaneous/latent failure branches, the sub-tree 
for TL-FN-F will be prevented from tracing any causes into the process stream. 
The SHAC tree will then be developed. In this instance there will not be any need to 
accord any special treatment to any sub-systems, e. g. control loops. The purpose of the 
SHAC tree is to simply trace all the basic failure events which should cause the trip to 
activate. 
Note: to find the relative location of the C(DUMMY) and sensed variable branches, 
refer to Figures 10.10 and 10.21a, respectively. 
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The sub-tree for this is given in the following figure: 
Since this trip system is feedforward, it is necessary to compare all the causes of the top 
event of the main tree with the basic and diamond event causes in the SHAC tree. Any 
., 1A 1kTT. -- --_L 
rM T-XT r. _ 
L- 
events which are common to both trees wouia then de AINLea Will 1L-r1N-r III uic 
main tree. 
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Since the trip system is designed to act upon No Flow of the manipulated stream, then 
the SHAC branch will only have events in common with the control loop overload branch. Figure 10.21, thus shows the net effect of including the TL-FN-F events in the 
causes of the G9 NONE event from the control loop overload branch. 
G9 NONE 
OR 
09 ONE PROTE TN Trip 1 
AND 
TI _FAI_F 010 NÖNF 
(diamond) 
PROTECTN Trip 1 PROTECTN Trip 1 LK-LP-EN PROTECTN Trip 1 
AD AND 
Unit 10 AD 
TL- NF FCOMP-BLK TL-FN-F G8 NONE 
Unit 10 
TL 
CL-F-NA 
Unit 10 
ÖR 
rv_G_cu cI nintiI ci1_ra 
i OR 
f 
G7 NONE 
OR 
Q7 NONE 
,,. -U -.. I I 
Unit 10 
VILI. w ,. L I.. -., 
I. .p 1 Unit 10 
OR 
S11 NONE CNT-F-LO S17 NONE 
I Unit 12 I B(DUMMY) LK-LP-ENCOMP-BL K G6 NONE 
OR OR I Unit 8 Unit 8 I 
SEN IF-LO IAR 
-LOSS OR OR 
Unit 5 Unit 16 
NONE Q6 
SHUTDOWN S19INONE (diamond) 
Unit 8 
OR 
POW-LOSS 
Unit 17 
Figure 10.21 
Addition of Trip Loop Functional Failure Causes 
It should be noted that all the causes of control loop overload as a result of No Flow of 
the manipulated stream, other than LK-LP-EN Unit 10, can be protected by the trip 
system. The trip system cannot protect against LK-LP-EN Unit 10, since although 
it 
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may be a cause of no flow of the manipulated stream through the heat exchanger, it will actually tend to indicate a high flow at the flow sensor, Unit 9. 
10.2.8 OVERALL TREE 
The overall tree is too large to present in one figure. Hence, Figure 10.21 a below, presents an outline of the overall tree. References are made to sub-trees which have been developed above, thus enabling this tree to be expanded into the overall tree. 
OVRTEMP 
OR 
DTROW1 DTROW2 
FIG 10.5 
T5 HI 
i OR 
F(DUMMY) E(DUMMY) 
LOOP 1 LOOP2 
OR OR 
G9 ONE G9 REV D(DUMMY) SPONTANEOUS 
FIG 10.21 FIG 10.18 LOOP 1 FAILURES 
& 10.19 I FIG 10.15 
OR 
DEVIA ION IN CL-STK 
SENSED VARIABLE LOOP 1 
FIG 10.16 
T4 HI 
T3 HI 
FIG 10.11 
& 10.14 
Figure 10.21a 
Outline of the Overall Tree for Lapp-Powers System 
10.2.9 CONCLUSION 
This example has highlighted the basic working of the fault tree synthesis algorithm. In 
particular the following aspects have been demonstrated: 
- linkage of minitrees by propagating faults from one unit to another. 
- consistency checks. 
- application of the control loop operator. 
- diagnosis of trip loop functional failure. 
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10.3 PIPELINE MIXER SYSTEM 
This system is based on that used by Taylor to illustrate the RIKKE code. Figures 10.22 and 10.23 give the flow and decomposition diagrams, respectively. The purpose of the plant is to regulate the mixture of the two streams, such that the downstream 
composition is unaffected. It can be seen that the system comprises a complex, though 
quite common control strategy. There are two control loops. One is feedback, since it acts by sensing the downstream composition and then manipulates the flow of one of the feeds. The other is feedforward, since it acts by sensing the flow of one feed stream 
and then manipulates the flow of the other feed stream. 
Additionally both control loops share a common controller and control valve. 
Figure 10.22 
Flow Diagram for Pipeline Mixer System 
103.1 INPUT REQUIRED BY MASTER PROGRAM 
The following is the input required by the MASTER program to specify the control 
loops in the above configuration. 
Control Loops 
Number: 1 
Sensed Variable: X 
Variable Sensed in Unit: 11 
Control Valve Unit Number: 3 
Other Units in Control System are: 14 15 16 
Variable X Regulated in Connections: 9 10 11 12 
Flow Manipulated in Connections: 12 34 
Loop is Not of Feedforward Type 
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Number: 2 
Sensed Variable: Q 
Variable Sensed in Unit: 8 
Control Valve Unit Number: 3 
Other Units in Control System are: 14 15 16 
Variable X Regulated in Connections: 9 10 11 12 
Flow Manipulated in Connections: 12 34 
Loop is of the Feedforward Type 
It is important to note that the feedback control loop is able to correct for failures in the 
feedforward control loop, whereas the converse is not true. Hence, the feedback control 
loop has been specified first. 
10.3.2 FAULT TREE 
Figure 10.24 gives the overall fault tree structure for this system. The main branches 
have been numbered. Example faults for each of these branches are given in the 
following table: 
Branch Number Start Event for Branch Example Faults 
1 Control Loop Overload 
Loop 1 
COMP-BLK Unit 4 
2 CL-F-LA Loop 1 CV-F-LA Unit 3 
3 CL-STK Loop 1 CV-STK Unit 3 
4 C(DUMMY) Loop 2 XB5 HI/ XB 1 HI 
5 Control Loop Overload 
Loop 2 
COMP-BLK Unit 4 
6 CL-F-LA Loo 2 CV-F-LA Unit 3 
7 CL-STK Loop 2 CV-STK Unit 3 
8 Q6 HI PART-BLK Unit 4 
Table 10.1 
Example Faults for Branches of Fault Tree of Figure 10.24 
10.3.3 DISCUSSION OF TREE 
Whilst the overall structure of the fault tree produced by the MKl methodology was 
correct, the detail of the tree contained some inaccuracies. These arose as a result of the 
sequential application of the control loop operators. Two main problems were 
encountered. These related to: 
both control loops manipulating the same stream. 
both control loops sharing common components. 
Each of these is described below. 
10.3.3.1 MANIPULATED STREAM 
Figures 10.25 and 10.26 give the fault tree sections for the control loop overload 
branches for control loop 1 and 2, respectively. 
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High 
Composition 
Unitl2 
OR 
Control Loop 
1 E(DUMMY) Overload 1 Loop 1 
OR 
D(DUMMY 
2 CL-F-LA Loop 1 Loop 1 
AD 
_ 
L -STK 3 
7 
XB10 HI 
L oop 1 
OR 
- 
E(DUMMY) 
F 
C(DUMMY) 
4 
7 
Control Loop 
5 Loop 2 Loop 2 Overload 2 
- 
OR 
F 
CL-F-LA 6 
7 
D(DUMMY) 
Loop 2 Loop 2 
AD 
1 
CL-STK 7 
7 
8 Q6 HI Loop 2 
Figure 10.24 
Overall Fault Tree Structure for Pipeline Mixer System 
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F(DUMMY) 
ÖR 
Q4 NONE 
COMP-BLK G3 NONE LK-LP- EN 
Unit 4 ýR Unit 4 
I 
Q3 NONE 
G2 NONE COMP-BLK LK-LP-EN CL-F-NA 
Unit 3 Unit 3 I Unit 3 R 
I 
OR 
Q2 NONE 
S15 NONE SIG-CB CV-F-SH 
COMP-BLK Gi NONE LK-LP-EN 1 Unit 3 Unit 3 
Unit 2 ÖR Unit 2 OR 
Q1 NONE 
SIG-CB S13 NONE (diamond) CNT-F-LO 
Unit 14 Unit 14 
OR 
SIG-CB SEN-F-LO 
Unit 11 Unit 11 
Figure 10.25 
Control Loop Overload Branch for Loop 1 
F(DUMMY) 
OR 
I 
Q4 NONE 
COMP-BLK G3 NONE LK-LP- EN 
Unit 4 JR Unit 4 
1 
Q3 NONE 
G2 NONE COMP-BLK LK-LP-EN CL-F-NA 
I Unit 3 Unit 3 Unit 3 
OR Ö 
R 
Q2 NONE 
S15 NONE SIG-CB CV-F-SH 
COMP-BLK G1 NONE LK-LP-EN 
ý Unit 3 Unit 3 
Unit 2 ýR Unit 2 
OR 
01 NONE 
SIG-CB S14 NONE CNT-F-LO 
(diamond) 
Unit 14 1 Unit 14 
OR 
SIG-CB SEN-F-LO 
Unit 11 Unit 8 
Figure 10.26 
Control Loop Overload Branch for Loop 2 
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It has already been stated that control loop overload is caused by either none or reverse flow of the manipulated stream. For the current system, since both control loops are 
manipulating the same stream, then the only differences in these branches are going to lie in the control loop components, giving rise to the control loop failing such that there 
is no aperture for flow. 
Since the application of the operator for control loop 1 states that control loop overload 
is sufficient to give rise to the top event, then it is necessary to eliminate the common 
events in Branches 1 and 5 (in Figure 10.24) from Branch 5. Hence, Branch 5 will only 
contain failures specific to control loop 2. This is illustrated in Figure 10.27 below: 
10.3.3.2 COMMON COMPONENTS 
It is necessary to apply the operator for Loop 1 prior to the operator for Loop 
2, since 
the former can correct for faults in the latter. Hence, spontaneous failure of Loop 
2, i. e. 
CL-F-LA Loop 2 is correctly ANDed with latent failure of Loop 1, i. e. CL-STK 
Loop 1. 
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However, since both control loops share common components, then the two branches 
mentioned above will have contradictory failures for the same component, e. g. the CL-F-LA branch will contain CV-F-LA Unit 3, whereas the CL-STK branch will 
contain CV-STK Unit 3. The fault tree sections for these two branches are given in Figures 10.28 and 10.29, respectively. 
CL-STK 
Loop 1 
OR 
S15 NCHA CV-STK 
I Unit3 
OR 
1 
CNT-STK S13 NCHA 
-7 
CNT-MAN 
Unit 14 I Unit 14 
OR 
SEN-STK 
Unit 11 
Figure 10.28 
Fault Tree Section for CL-STK Loop 1 
CL-F-LA 
Loop 2 
OR 
S15 LO CV-F-LA 
I Unit3 
OR 
CNT-F-LO S14 LO SIG-PB 
Unit 14 1 Unit 14 
OR 
SEN-F-LO SIG-PB 
Unit 8 Unit 8 
Figure 10.29 
Fault Tree Section for CL-F-LA Loop 2 
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To overcome this problem a fault tree rationalisation step was added. This was based 
upon the following criteria. 
Since the operator for Loop 1 is applied first, then this dictates what failure modes that the common component(s) can have. Subsequently any failures contradictory to this, 
appearing in any control loop operators below this would be removed from the tree. Hence, in the tree of Figure 10.29 the failure CV-F-LA Unit 3 in the CL-F-LA Loop 2 branch would be deleted, since the branch CL-STK Loop 1 imposes the condition that 
the valve failure state for this unit is CV-STK Unit 3. The modified branch for CL-F-LA 
Loop 2 is given in Figure 10.30. 
CL-F-LA 
Loop 2 
OR 
S15 LO 
OR 
S14 LO 
OR 
SEN-F-LO SIG-PB 
Unit 8 Unit 8 
Figure 10.30 
Modified Fault Tree Section for CL-F-LA Loop 2 
10.3.4 MUTUALLY EXCLUSIVE EVENTS 
The criteria used for determining mutually exclusive events has been described in 
Chapter 9. The main principle used is to examine the variable deviations. In the current 
system the start event for CL-STK Loop 1 is S 15 NCHA, whereas the start events for 
CL-F-LA Loop 2 and CL-F-NA Loop 2 are S 15 LO and S 15 NONE, respectively. 
Hence, the criteria described in Chapter 9 will prevent the ANDing together of events 
from the CL-STK Loop 1 branch with those from the CL-F-LA Loop 2 and CL-F-NA 
Loop 2 branches. 
However, this is not entirely accurate as only some of the events between the branches 
are mutually exclusive. Hence, it is necessary to modify the sub-trees of Figures 10.30 
and 10.28 as illustrated in Figures 10.31 and 10.32, respectively. 
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CL-F-LA 
Loop 2 
AND 
S15 LO S13 NCHA 
OR 
S14 LO 
OR 
SEN-F-LO SIG-PB 
Unit 8 Unit 8 
Figure 10.31 
Modified Sub-tree for CL-F-LA Loop 2 
F(DUMMY) 
I 
OR 
Q4 NONE 
OR 
G3 NONE 
OR 
I 
Q3 NONE 
CL-F-NA 
Unit 3 
1 
AND 
S15 NONE S13 NCHA 
OR 
S14 NONE 
OR 
SEN-F-LO 
Unit 8 
Figure 10.32 
Modified Sub-tree for Control Loop Overload Loop 2 
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103.5 CONCLUSION 
This example has outlined the problems presented by the sequential application of the 
control loop operators. The solution to these problems has also been outlined. In 
particular the following topics have been addressed: 
problems associated with shared components between the control loops. 
problems associated with shared manipulated stream. 
problem of mutually exclusive events. 
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10.4 BUTANE VAPORISER SYSTEM 
The flow diagram for this system is given in Figure 10.33. The plant section under study 
is used at times of high demand to produce a butane-air mixture for supplementing the 
supply of natural gas in the British Gas distribution system. 
The pump (P1) is used to deliver the liquid butane from storage to the vaporiser (VP1), 
where it is converted to the vapour by two independently controlled natural gas fired 
burners. The vaporised butane is then mixed with natural gas by flow ratio control. 
Dependent upon demand, the pressure control valve (V1) is adjusted to regulate the 
delivery pressure of the liquid butane between 70 and 110 psig. Since the pump is 
capable of delivering 300 psig and the vaporiser coils are rated at 250 psig, overpressure 
protection is provided by the slam shut facility on the pressure control valve (Vi), the 
slam shut valve (V2) and the pressure relief valves (VV1 and VV2). There is a further 
slam shut valve (V3) which activates on detection of liquid butane downstream of the 
vaporiser. This condition is represented by the presence of low temperature at the 
vaporiser outlet. All the slam shut valves are of the air-to-open type and activate by the 
rapid venting action of the three-way valves. 
The hazardous event of interest is high pressure liquid butane venting through VV2; the 
venting of high pressure butane vapour was not considered. Therefore the top event of 
the fault tree was specified as 'low temperature at the outlet of the vaporiser', 
representing the passage of liquid butane through the coils. 
10.4.1 SYSTEM DECOMPOSITION 
The decomposed configuration diagram is given in Figure 10.34. In general there is a 
one-to-one correspondence between the units in this and the system flow diagram of 
Figure 10.33. The differences are described below: 
a) since the plant downstream of the butane vaporiser does not contain any failure 
modes relevant to the current top event, it has been omitted from the decomposed 
configuration. 
b) the pressure switches PSW1 and PSW2 are represented as two units, a switch and a 
sensor (Units 5 and 22,7 and 16, respectively). 
c) the dummy head/tail and set-point units are used, as described in 
Chapter 3. 
d) the divider (Unit 6) is needed to represent the splitting of the process streams. 
e) the pressure relief valve VV1 behaves in a similar manner to a 
Closed Valve Trip 
System as described in Chapter 7. In order to treat this as a special sub-system, the 
ancillary units to a trip valve have also been included, i. e. the sensor 
(Unit 11), trip 
switch (Unit 14) and set-point (unit 15). 
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10.4.2 INPUT TO MASTER 
The input required by the MASTER program to fully specify the control loops and trip 
systems in the above configuration, is given below: 
Control Loops 
Number: 1 
Sensed Variable: P 
Variable Sensed in Unit: 4 
Control Valve Unit Number: 3 
Other Units in Control System are: 23 25 26 
Variable P Regulated in Connections: 3 45678 
Variable Q Regulated in Connections: 12 345678 
Loop is Not of Feedforward Type 
Open Valve Trip Systems 
Number: 1 
Trip Valve Unit Number: 3 
Other Units in Trip System are: 23 22 24 5 
Number: 2 
Trip Valve Unit Number: 8 
Other Units in Trip System are: 7 16 17 18 19 
Closed Valve Trip Systems 
Number: 1 
Trip Valve Unit Number: 12 
Other Units in Trip System are: 11 14 15 
Connections Having Flow When Valve Opens: 10 11 12 
The significant points to note from the above information is that the valve (unit 3) is 
specified as being part of both the control loop and the trip system. 
Also both the pressure P and the flow Q are specified as being regulated by the control 
loop. 
10.43 PROBLEMS PRESENTED TO FAULTFINDER MK 1 
Two main problems were encountered: 
a) the control loop contains an inter-relationship between the absolute pressure (P) and 
the flow (Q) variables. The FAULTFINDER MK 1 methodology treated these two as 
separate variables. 
b) the valve (Unit 3) is common to both the trip system and the control loop. 
The second problem and its solution have already been discussed in Chapter 7. Hence, 
only the first problem will be considered here. 
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10.4.4 SOLUTION TO PROBLEM 
Since the control loop is regulating the flow in stream 8, the template of Figure 10.35 
will be imposed. 
Deviation of Control Loop 
Regulated 
Variable 
OR 
E(DUMMY) Control Loop Overload C(DUMMY) 
OR 
CL-F-LA D(DUMMY) 
AND 
CL-STK Deviation of Sensed 
Variable 
Figure 10.35 
Control Loop Operator for Butane Vaporiser System 
It has already been described for the Lapp-Powers system how this template will be 
filled in. The basic points of note in the current context are that the C(DUMMY) branch 
will be developed to find the start points of the other branches. The contents of this 
branch will then be compared with the sensed variable branch, and the tree structure 
rationalised accordingly. 
The problem arose in this rationalisation step, since the C(DUMMY) branch was 
developed in terms of G and Q variables and the sensed variable deviation branch in 
terms of the P variable. The consistency checks were incomplete since they were based 
on the modelling conventions of keeping the G/Q and P paths separate. However, in this 
instance a requirement has arisen where it is necessary to compare events from these 
two separate branches. 
The consistency checks were therefore updated to reflect this overlap between the 
domains of the three variables, so that the fault tree synthesis algorithm could 
automatically rationalise events between the C(DUMMY) and the sensed variable 
branches. 
The complete fault tree for this system is given in Figure 10.36. 
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UNDRTEMP Unit 9 
1 
T9 LO 
I OR 
09 HI T8 LO DTROW1 Unit 9 
OR Ti LO AND 
G9 HI PROTECTN HEATFAIL HEATFAIL 
Trip 2 Unit 21 Unit 20 
AND 
TL-FN-F PROTECTN 
Trip 2 Trip 3 
OR AND 
II 
TV- T-SH VV- -OP TSW-STK SE -P-HI Q8 HI TL-FN-F 
Unit 8 Unit 17 Unit 16 Unit 19 I Trip 3 
OR 
I OR 
E(DUMMY) 
Loop 1 
1 012 NONE TV-FT-OP SET-P-HI 
OR Unit 12 Unit 15 
CL-F-HA D(DUMMY) 
Loop l Loop 1 
AND AND 
CL -F-HA TL-FN-I Trip 1 CL-I TK TL-FN- Trip 1 P3 HI 
OR OR OR 
I 
OR OR 
CV-F-HA CNT-F-HI SEN-F-LO CV- TK CNT-S K SEN-S K P1 I PUMP-SUR 
Unit 3 Unit 25 Unit 4 Unit 3 Unit 25 Unit 4 Unit 2 
CV-F-HA VV-F1-OP TSW-STK SET--P-HI CV-STK VV-FY-OP TSW-STK SET-P-HI 
Unit 3 Unit 23 Unit 22 Unit 24 Unit 3 Unit 23 Unit 22 Unit 24 
Figure 10.36 
Complete Fault Tree for Butane Vaporiser System 
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10.4.5 DISCUSSION OF THE FAULT TREE 
The fault tree indicates that there are three potential causes of liquid butane passing 
through the vaporiser: 
- Ti LO -a cold source could cause this if it were beyond the capacity of the vaporiser 
to compensate. However, no such source was found and so T1 LO is flagged as a 
diamond event. 
- G9 HI -a large leakage downstream could be sufficient to cause a surge through the 
vaporiser. Again it is flagged as a diamond event as the downstream plant is not being 
considered. 
- P1 HI -a genuine high pressure upstream causing an increased flow through the 
system. Since the three trip loops and the control loop can protect against this, this event 
is ANDed with failures in the protective devices. 
One further point is worthy of note. Although the pressure relief valve has been 
modelled as a Closed Valve Trip System, with its associated components, e. g. sensor, 
trip switch etc., the fault tree does not contain any failures related to these components. 
This is because the user has the capability to prune irrelevant/insignificant events from 
the tree, once it has been synthesised. Faults related to these components were pruned, 
since these components do not really exist in the system; they were introduced to model 
the relief system as a trip system. 
10.4.6 CONCLUSION 
This example has addressed the following points: 
- handling combined control/trip loops 
- modelling pressure relief systems as closed valve trip systems 
- rationalisation of events between pressure variable P, and the flow variable 
G/Q 
branches. 
A detailed solution for this example is presented by Mullhi, Ang, Lees and Andrews 
[Ref 10-1], where the tree generated by FAULTFINDER is compared with that 
generated manually by workers at British Gas. 
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10.5 BRITISH GAS BURNER CONTROL SEQUENCES 
A number of examples were provided by British Gas to validate the code. This section 
presents the fault tree for one of these systems - the manual system. It has been included 
since it demonstrates the use of the sequential operations algorithm of FAULTFINDER. 
10.5.1 MANUAL SYSTEM 
The flow diagram for the manually operated system is given in Figure 10.37. 
TO TORCH 
Figure 10.37 
Flow Diagram for Manual Burner System 
The burner is to be ignited by means of a hand held torch in a series of steps. MV, TV, 
and ISV are all manually operated valves; GOV is a governor included in the inlet line 
to the torch and the burner to prevent high flow, which would cause a loss of flame. The 
operating procedure is as follows: 
a) when the burner is shutdown, all valves will be closed. 
b) open the oven doors and leave for the required purge period. 
c) open the main isolation valve (ISV). 
d) open the torch valve (TV) and immediately light the torch. 
e) insert the torch into the oven in correct location. 
f) open the main valve (MV). 
g) check that the main flame has lit correctly. 
h) close the torch valve (TV) and remove the torch. 
i) close the oven doors. 
j) to shutdown, close the main and isolation valves. 
The undesired event is the release of unburnt gas from the system during the ignition, 
subsequent operation, or shutdown of the system. 
The decomposition diagram for this system is given in Figure 10.38. 
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DUMMY 
HEAD 
ISOLATION 2 GOVERNOR 3 DIVIDER 4 MAIN 5 BURNER 6 DUMMY 
VALVE 34 VALVE 56 TAIL 7 
7 TORCH 8 DUMMY 
VALVE 81 TAIL 9 
Figure 10.38 
Decomposition Diagram for Manual Burner System 
The following four sequence steps were identified. 
a) open the isolation valve (ISV). 
b) open the torch valve (TV) and then light the torch. 
c) open the main valve (MV) and ignite the burner by inserting the torch at the correct 
location. Remove the torch and close TV. 
d) to shutdown, close ISV and MV. 
It is necessary to specify the unit models to be used. The basic configuration is specified 
as normal. This is given in the following table: 
TOPOLOGY 
Unit Number Model Number 
1 6 
2 3 
3 76 
4 15 
5 3 
6 75 
7 7 
8 3 
9 7 
Table 10.2 
Topology Information for Manual Burner System 
However, in addition to this, it is necessary to specify the new models to 
be used at each 
step in the sequence. The units affected by these configurational changes are given 
in 
the following table: 
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Sequence Step Unit Number Model Number 
1 2 9 
2 8 77 
3 5 9 
6 78 
8 79 
4 2 3 
8 3 
5 3 
6 75 
Table 10.3 
Configurational Changes for the Manual Burner System 
The hazardous top events were specified as: 
a) Q6 SOME for Steps 1 and 4, representing gas leakage from the main burner. 
b) Either Q6 SOME or Q8 SOME for Steps 2 and 3, representing gas leakage from the 
main burner or torch valve. 
A condensed form of this tree is presented below: 
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Presented below are the sub-trees for each step in the sequence: 
SEQ-F-AT 
Step 1 
OR 
HV-D-OP HV-F-OP 
Unit 5 Unit 5 
Figure 10.40 
Fault Tree Section for SEQ-F-AT Step 1 
SEQ-F-AT 
Step 2 
OR 
Q6 SOME Q8 SOME 
OR OR 
TOR-NLIT 
HV-D-OP HV-F-OP Unit 8 
Unit 5 Unit 5 
Figure 10.41 
Fault Tree Section for SEQ-F-AT Step 2 
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SEQ-F-AT 
Step 3 
OR 
06 SOME 
OR 
F 
INSUF-PU P-FL-STA G5 HI P-X-LIT T-N-INS 
Unit 6 Unit 61 Unit 6 Unit 6 
OR 
GOV-F-FO 
Unit 3 
Q8 SOME 
AND 
TOR-N LIT 
Unit 8 
Figure 10.42 
Fault Tree Section for SEQ-F-AT Step 3 
TV-L-OP 
Unit 8 
SEQ-F-AT 
Step 4 
AND 
A(DUMMY) 
Unit 5 
OR 
HV-D-OP HV-F-OP 
Unit 5 Unit 5 
Q4 SOME 
OR 
HV-D-OP HV-F-OP 
Unit2 Unit2 
Figure 10.43 
Fault Tree Section for SEQ-F-AT Step 4 
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10.5.2 PROBLEMS PRESENTED 
Two main problems were encountered in modelling this system using the MK1 
methodology. Each of these is described below: 
a) Incorrect deletion of a Duplicated Event under an AND gate. This is exemplified by 
the following example: 
o --ºýý o Figure 10.44 
Schematic Representation of Hand Valve (Closed) Model 
The list of event statements and decision tables required to model some flow through 
this unit are given below: 
F HV-F-OP: A(DUMMY) 
O HV-D-OP: A(DUMMY) 
V Q1IN SOME: GIIN SOME 
V G2OUT SOME: Q2OUT SOME 
V GUN SOME I A(DUMMY) T Q2OUT SOME 
V Q2OUT SOME I A(DUMMY) T GUN SOME 
These would yield the following section of tree for the event SOME flow to propagate 
through this unit (considering the upstream causes only): 
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The second occurrence of Q2OUT SOME needs to be removed from the tree. However, it is insufficient to remove just Q2OUT SOME; it is also necessary to remove the other branch(es) from the AND gate above this event. In the MK1 methodology this was not done and thus yielded incorrect cutsets. 
b) the top event needs to be carefully modelled, when the hazard of interest is the SOME state. This is illustrated by the following modified section of plant from the 
above system: 
BURNER PIPE DUMMY 
TAIL 
Figure 10.46 
Modified Section of Plant from Manual Burner System 
If the event of interest is SOME FLOW in the pipe at the outlet of the burner then the 
sub-tree for this will be: 
SOME FLOW IN PIPE 
OR 
SOME FLOW INTO BURNER SOME FLOW THROUGH DUMMY TAIL 
Figure 10.47 
Sub-tree for SOME Flow Comprising an OR Gate 
Since SOME FLOW at the Dummy Tail is regarded by the methodology to be a 
normal(certain) event, then the right hand event will be deleted as certain. Since one 
branch under an OR gate is bound to occur then the left hand branch will also be deleted 
as certain. 
Consequently what is required is an AND gate to commence the synthesis thus: 
SOME FLOW IN PIPE 
AND 
SOME FLOW INTO BURNER SOME FLOW THROUGH DUMMY TAIL 
Figure 10.48 
Sub-tree for SOME Flow Comprising an AND Gate 
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10.5.3 CONCLUSION 
This example has addressed the following points: 
- the application of the sequential operations algorithm for FAULTFINDER 
- the deletion of events under an AND gate 
- the need to model SOME deviation with care. 
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10.6 PUMPS IN PARALLEL PROVIDING REDUNDANCY 
10.6.1 INTRODUCTION 
The flow and decomposition diagrams for this system are given in Figures 10.49 and 10.50, respectively. 
Figure 10.49 
Schematic Representation of Pump Bank 
Each pump is capable of providing 50% of the required throughput. The general 
problems presented by this sort of system, and the solution of these, have already been 
outlined in Chapter 5. This section presents the input required from the user along with 
the fault tree produced by the system. 
Firstly, the input required by the MASTER program will be discussed. The most 
important thing to note is how the three legs of the system have been represented by the 
use of the two-legged divider and header models, as described in Chapter 5. 
Having achieved this there is no problem in specifying the topology and configuration 
information to the MASTER program. As illustrated in Chapter 5, however, there is a 
need to specify the throughput that each leg is able to provide. The MASTER program 
will automatically detect that there are two dividers and two headers in this system. For 
each of these it will prompt for the required information as follows (the actual user input 
is given in italics): 
For each divider/header enter flow capacity of each leg. 
You may input: 0,50,100. 
Header unit number: 9 
Leg: 8 
100 
Leg: 18 
50 
Header unit number: 8 
Leg: 7 
50 
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Leg: 14 
50 
Divider unit number: 3 
Leg: 3 
100 
Leg: 15 
50 
Divider unit number: 4 
Leg: 4 
50 
Leg: 11 
50 
Since each leg is able to provide 50% of the required throughput, it should be noted that: 
a) for the outer divider/header the leg leading to the inner divider/header has been 
specified as having 100% capacity, whereas the other leg has been specified as having 
50% capacity. 
b) for the inner divider/header each leg has been specified as having 50% capacity. 
Having done this the system will generate the fault tree structure of Figure 10.51. 
Low Flow 
at 9 
dR 
External Internal 
dR dR 
LowI Flow 
at 2 
Bloc ge Leakage 
i dR 2/3 
OR OR OR 
II 
Q7NONE Q7 LO Q14NONE 014 LO Q18NONE Q18LO 
OR 
r- 1 
Q7NONE Q7 LO 
OR 
Q14NONE 014 LO 
OR 
Q18NONE Q18LO 
Figure 10.51 
General Form of Tree for Pump Bank System 
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10.6.2 DISCUSSION OF THE TREE 
The fault tree has two main branches; the faults are split according to whether they are internal to the three legs of the system or external to them. It is necessary to do this 
since the three legs can provide redundancy, and so the combination of faults between the legs is important. 
The internal branch is further split down between the leakage-type and blockage-type faults. As described in Chapter 5, the distinction between these faults is that, if a leakage 
occurs in any one leg, then that alone may be capable of producing low flow at the 
outlet, as the system may not be able to compensate for the loss of fluid. Hence, the leakage branches for the three legs are all linked by OR gates. 
On the other hand, the blockage branch is connected by an r/n gate. The r/n gate is 
actually a 2/3 gate since each leg is capable of providing 50% of the required throughput. 
Figure 10.52 gives the sub-tree for the external branch. Figures 10.53 and 10.54 contain 
the sub-trees for the leakage and blockage branches, respectively, for one leg of the 
above system. The sub-trees for the other legs would be similar. 
External 
OR 
LK-LP-EN G1 LO PART-BLK 
Unit 21 Unit 2 
OR 
Q1 LO 
(diamond) 
Figure 10.52 
Sub-tree for External Branch 
LEAKAGE BRANCH for LEG 18 
1 
OR 
G18 LO G18 NONE 
ÖR 
Uri 
LK-LP-EN G16 LO LK-LP-EN G16 NONE 
Unit 17 I Unit 17 
I 
On Uri 
LK-LP-EN LK-LP-EN 
Unit 15 Unit 15 
Figure 10.53 
Sub-tree for Leg 18 of Leakage Branch 
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BLOCKAGE BRANCH for LEG 18 
1 
OR 
G18 LO G18 NONE ÖR ÖR 
PART-BLK G17 LO 
Unit 17 1 
OR 
A(DUMMY) G16 LO 
Unit 
114 
OR 
CAVITATN AIR-LOCK IMPLR-F PART-B 
Unit 16 Unit 16 Unit 16 Unit 16 
G17 NONE HV-D-SH HV-F-SH COMP-BLK 
I Unit 17 Unit 17 Unit 17 
COMP-BLK SHUTDOWN G16 NONE 
Unit 16 Unit 16 1 
OR 
HV-D-SH HV-F-SH COMP-BLK 
Unit 15 Unit 15 Unit 15 
Figure 10.54 
Sub-tree for Leg 18 of Blockage Branch 
10.6.3 CONCLUSION 
This example has illustrated the special decomposition technique used to model parallel 
systems using the standard two-legged divider and header models. The resultant fault 
tree for such a system has also been presented. 
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10.7 PRESSURE REDUCTION INSTALLATION 
10.7.1 INTRODUCTION 
Figure 10.55 gives the flow diagram for a pressure reduction installation. It comprises 
two streams in parallel; one stream normally operating and the other providing 100% 
standby in the event of failure. In this study only one stream was considered - the normally operating one. 
It can be seen that each stream contains three valves, a slam shut valve (SS), a pressure 
control valve (PCV) and a flow control valve (FCV). 
In normal operation the FCV is driven by a volumetric controller (VC) which receives a 
signal from the station flow meter. The FCV maintains a constant flow. VC is an 
electrical-pneumatic controller. VC output is a high pressure for a high flow. 
PCL and PCH control unacceptably low and high pressure respectively. PCL and PCH 
are reverse-acting controllers with pneumatic input and output. There is a signal selector 
for the FCV. The selector takes the highest signal from VC and PCL and the lowest 
signal from PCH and the signal selected from VC and PCL. The signal selector is a 
pneumatic selector relay. 
The pressure control valve PCV reduces the pressure and is controlled by PC, a direct 
acting pneumatic controller. PCO is also a direct-acting pneumatic controller; however, 
it is an override controller. PCO is set at a value above PC such that if the FCV fails 
open then PCO will shut down PCV accordingly, since PCH is ineffective in this case. 
The slam shut valve will close if the pressure is unacceptably high at PZ. 
The decomposition diagram for this system is given in Figure 10.56. 
The following is a summary of the input required by the MASTER program. The 
topology and configuration information is omitted. Only the information relating to the 
sub-systems is given: 
CONTROL LOOPS 
Number: 1 
Sensed Variable: P 
Variable Sensed in Unit: 10 
Control Valve Unit Number: 5 
Other Units in Control System are: 6 
Variable P regulated in Connections: 
Loop is Not of the Feedforward Type 
Number: 2 
Sensed Variable: P 
Variable Sensed in Unit: 9 
Control Valve Unit Number: 7 
Other Units in Control System are: 2 
Variable P regulated in Connections: 
Loop is Not of the Feedforward Type 
151622 
5 67 89 10 11 12 
8 17 18 19 20 21 
789 10 11 12 
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Number: 3 
Sensed Variable: P 
Variable Sensed in Unit: 8 
Control Valve Unit Number: 7 
Other Units in Control System are: 29 
Variable P regulated in Connections: 7 
Loop is Not of the Feedforward Type 
Number: 4 
Sensed Variable: P 
Variable Sensed in Unit: 6 
Control Valve Unit Number: 5 
Other Units in Control System are: 10 
Variable P regulated in Connections: 5 
Loop is Not of the Feedforward Type 
1718192021 
89 10 11 12 
15 16 22 
6789101112 
Number: 5 
Sensed Variable: P 
Variable Sensed in Unit: 2 
Control Valve Unit Number: 7 
Other Units in Control System are: 89 17 18 19 20 21 
Variable P Regulated in Connections: 789 10 11 12 
Loop is of the Feedforward Type 
OPEN VALVE TRIP SYSTEMS 
Number: 1 
Trip Valve Unit Number: 4 
Other Units in Trip System are: 11 14 
The points to note from the above decomposition are: 
a) in accordance with the definition of a control loop, each sensor emitting a corrective 
signal to a control valve has been treated as a control loop in its own right. Hence, five 
control loops have been identified. 
b) all the control loops have been specified as being able to regulate the pressure in this 
stream, since one control loop can compensate for faults in another. Hence, the order in 
which the control loops are specified does not matter, c. f. Pipeline Mixer System of 
Section 10.3. 
c) control loop number 5, although it actually senses the flow variable has been 
specified as acting on the pressure variable. There is a bug in the program which 
prevented the use of the flow variable. There was insufficient time on this project to fix 
this problem. This approach was adequate in the current context since the causes/effects 
of the two variables were synonymous. 
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The top event of interest was specified as being a High Pressure at the outlet of the 
system. It has already been highlighted in Chapter 6 that, since more than one control loop can regulate a variable at one location and neither control loop is dominant, then 
the sequential application of the control loop operators is not correct. The solution to 
this problem has also presented in Chapters 6 and 9. The actual implementation is based 
on applying each control loop operator in turn and then rationalising the final structure 
of the tree to the required format. 
In order to be able to do this, the system needs to know if there is a group of 
self-compensating loops, i. e. those which can correct for failures in one another. This is 
achieved by the fault tree synthesis program prompting for groups of self-compensating 
loops, if more than one loop exists in the system. For the current system Loops 1-5 were 
specified as being self-compensating. 
The tree produced for this system was rather large, primarily due to the large number of 
common components in the different loops. Hence, only the top level of the overall tree 
structure is presented here in Figure 10.57. 
10.7.2 DISCUSSION OF THE TREE 
It can be seen from Figure 10.57, that the fault tree is dominated by failures in the 
control loop components, as exemplified by the CL-STK and CL-F-HA branches. The 
use of the A(DUMMY) Unit 0 event has been explained in Chapter 9. 
The tree is large because the system has been decomposed as five control loops, and 
there are a large number of shared components. This arises because the sensor signals 
are compared before being passed to the control valve. 
Hence, although the decomposition of this system, as described above in accordance 
with the rules of Chapter 6, yielded the correct cutsets, the resultant fault tree was rather 
opaque. There could be a case for treating this sort of system, where the signals are not 
independently fed to the control valve but are compared, as a special case and to 
decompose the control loops around the control valves as opposed to the sensors. 
In the MK2 methodology, decomposition based on the sensors was supported as it was 
of general applicability. However, there is clearly a need to carry out further work to 
identify any similar special cases. 
In actual fact the same problem was encountered by workers at British Gas, in the 
manual analysis of this system using the digraph technique. Two analysts independently 
studied this system. One applied the control loop operator five times, as did 
FAULTFINDER, whereas the other applied it twice for the two control valves. Both 
techniques produced the same cutsets, but obviously the latter yielded a smaller and 
more transparent tree structure. 
10.7.3 CONCLUSION 
This example has demonstrated how the system can handle multiple control 
loops, 
where each control loop is capable of correcting faults in another control 
loop. 
Page 10/55 
Page 11/1 
11.0 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR 
FUTURE WORK 
There is an on-going programme of research into fault tree synthesis at Loughborough 
University. The previous work had resulted in the creation of FAULTFINDER MK I, a 
suite of programs for computer-aided fault tree synthesis. However, this work also 
revealed certain problems. 
The work described in this thesis has thus been involved in fundamental studies to 
improve the FAULTFINDER MK1 package. The approach taken has been to identify 
problems partly by review of the code facilities and partly by running case studies and 
then addressing the problems thus identified. 
The output of this work has been FAULTFINDER MK2, a suite of programs written 
entirely in FORTRAN 77 and implemented at British Gas. Supporting user 
documentation has also been written and provided with the package. 
One of the main thrusts has been to elucidate rules for fault tree synthesis, with 
emphasis on synthesising the tree. Rules have also been developed for other aspects, i. e. 
modelling and system decomposition. 
Overall work has been undertaken in the following areas: 
- model generation 
- system decomposition 
- fault tree synthesis 
- fault tree analysis 
- case studies 
- developing the computer program 
Each of these is reviewed below: 
Model Generation: in the MK1 methodology the user had to specify a large number of 
event statements. Since this is a tedious approach, it is clearly advantageous to facilitate 
this task. Rules were developed which enabled the model generation algorithm to 
determine much of this information automatically. This was achieved by developing a 
more intelligent procedure for analysing propagation equations and by establishing a 
library of basic faults to handle fault initiation. 
System Decomposition and Fault Tree Synthesis: the methodology has been 
considerably enhanced by facilitating the treatment of special sub-systems 
in the 
configuration. The following main advances have been made: 
a) the need to explicitly specify divider header combinations has been eliminated. 
The 
package automatically identifies loops in the information flow structure and so can set 
up appropriate boundary condition checks in the fault tree synthesis algorithm. 
Rules 
have been defined for handling an arbitrary number of legs which may or may not have 
flow using a standard divider and header pair of models. 
b) rules have been defined to assist the user in the decomposition of control 
loops and 
trip systems. A decomposition technique has been defined for modelling pressure relief 
systems as closed valve trip systems. The fault tree synthesis algorithm 
has been 
enhanced to handle complex control loops and combined control and trip systems. 
Rules 
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have been defined to ascertain the conditions that control and trip loops can protect against. The consistency checks have been updated, particularly in the case of combined flow and pressure regulation. The problems inherent in shared components between different loops has been addressed. 
c) the problem of partial utility failures has been addressed. 
Fault Tree Analysis: FAULTFINDER has been interfaced to FTAP and PREP. The 
problem of logically consistent trees which nevertheless yield incorrect cutsets due to 
the mechanistic application of standard fault tree analysis packages has been addressed by writing a modified input file to FTAP and carrying out post-analysis processing of 
the cutsets thus generated. 
Case Studies: the application of the FAULTFINDER MK2 methodology has been 
illustrated using a large number of examples, which have been taken from three main 
sources: 
a) from the literature, e. g. heat exchanger system of Lapp and Powers, composition 
regulation system of Taylor, hydrocarbon/oxygen reactor of Lihou and propane pipeline 
system of Lawley. 
b) from British Gas studies, e. g. butane vaporiser system, burner control sequences and 
the pressure reduction installation. 
c) a large number of contrived examples were set up to fully evaluate specific aspects of 
the methodology. 
Developing the Computer Program: the MK1 system had been developed in a 
mixture of Basic and FORTRAN and resided on two different hardware environments. 
The MK2 system has been rationalised by conversion to FORTRAN 77 and 
implementation on a single machine (MicroVax II). It is easily portable to other 
environments. 
The work described in this thesis has demonstrated that FAULTFINDER MK2 is 
capable of modelling realistic examples from the process industries. The main strengths 
of the package are: 
- flexible component-based decomposition procedure which allows the easy description 
of the plant flow diagram to the system and facilitates the generation of failure models. 
Rules have been defined to assist the user in the decomposition of the plant flow 
diagram. 
- the methodology can handle a wide range of systems consisting of quite complex 
control and trip loops. 
- an extensive failure model library now exists, reducing the need to generate models 
for 
new studies. 
- the system interfaces to standard fault tree analysis programs 
FTAP and PREP. 
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It is however not intended that FAULTFINDER should replace the fault tree expert; it 
should rather be viewed as a tool to assist the work of an experienced engineer in 
evaluating a number of design options. To this end FAULTFINDER should not be 
regarded as a "blind" package. 
Although the primary role of FAULTFINDER will be to assist in the design phase, 
some time was also spent during this project evaluating its applicability to alarm diagnosis. It was intended that the cutsets from FAULTFINDER could be used to derive 
rules enabling the diagnosis of faults. Two main problems were encountered in 
achieving this: 
- alarm combination trees could entail mutually exclusive branches, making their 
analysis difficult by standard fault tree analysis packages. 
- fault trees by their very nature contain only failures. In diagnosing faults it is necessary 
to explicitly state the normal working states of plant items as well as failed states. 
This topic is addressed in greater detail by Trenchard [Ref 11-1]. 
Although FAULTFINDER MK2 now offers a flexible tool for the interactive generation 
of fault trees, due to the limitation of time on this project there are inevitably further 
areas of work which should be undertaken to further enhance the package. These can be 
broken down into three main categories: fundamental studies on improving the 
underlying methodology, improved features in the package, and improvements to the 
code. Each of these is discussed below: 
Improved Methodology 
The emphasis to date in developing the FAULTFINDER methodology has been on 
producing logically consistent trees. Fault tree analysis has therefore tended to be 
overlooked. Some problems inherent in this have been discovered through the presence 
of mutually exclusive events in the fault tree. This is clearly an area which requires 
greater study and evaluation. 
The rules for decomposing control loops and the application of control loop operators 
need further evaluation. The flow regulation system, although producing the correct 
cutsets, generated a rather opaque fault tree. 
Improved Features 
The following features of the system should be further enhanced: 
- enhancement of the fault library for generating event statements 
(see Section 4.6.2). 
- conflict resolution in generating event statements 
(see Section 4.6.4). 
- enhancement of the algorithm for the detection of 
loops in the information flow 
structure (see Section 5.10.3). 
- automatic detection/specification of control loops 
(see Sections 6.6.1.3,6.6.1.5 and 6.7) 
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Improved Code 
The following improvements should be made to the code itself: 
- the man-machine interface is very basic and should be improved. The ultimate aim 
should be to integrate FAULTFINDER with standard CAD packages. 
- the code has not been developed using any formal design methodologies. It is thus becoming rather unwieldy and would benefit from a re-write to a formal standard. 
- the use of a conventional programming language, FORTRAN, has meant that much of 
the methodology of fault tree synthesis is embedded in the code and so is somewhat 
difficult to understand and upgrade. The use of knowledge based systems technology 
should be considered to enable a better control of the development and refinement of the 
rules relating to fault tree synthesis. 
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APPENDIX A 
A. 1 INTRODUCTION 
The suite of FAULTFINDER programs have been written in FORTRAN 77 and implemented on a DEC MicroVax running VMS. However, the code should be 
portable to other systems with only minimal modifications. The main programs and the flow of information between these is shown in Figure A. 1 below: 
Figure A. 1 
Suite of FAULTFINDER Programs 
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The key to the above programs is: 
MODGEN => Model Generation Program 
EVTGEN => Event Generation Program 
MASTER => Configuration Input Program 
FAULT => Fault Tree Synthesis Program 
DRAW/PLOT => Fault Tree Drawing Programs 
FTAP/PREP => Public Domain Fault Tree Analysis Programs 
A. 2 MAIN STEPS IN USING FAULTFINDER 
The following section summarises the main steps involved in the synthesis of fault trees 
using FAULTFINDER. 
a) decompose the plant representation to identify the unit and top event models to be 
used. Identify the special sub-systems in the configuration. 
b) ensure that the unit and top event models exist in the respective libraries. If any 
models do not exist then the MODGEN/EVTGEN programs should be run. The user input to these can either be interactive or can come from a suitably created data file. 
If these programs are run using interactive input, then a record is maintained of the input in a suitable data file for future reference. 
A data file for a new model may be created using the template of an existing model. 
c) run the MASTER program to input the plant configuration data. This input can either 
be interactive or can come from a data file. 
If the program is run using interactive input, then a record is maintained of the input in a 
suitable data file for future reference. 
A data file for a new configuration may be created using the template of an existing 
system. 
d) run FAULT to synthesise the fault tree. The input to this program must be the output 
of the MASTER program. The output from this program is suitable to obtain either a 
pictorial representation of the fault tree or to carry out fault tree analysis. 
e) run the fault tree drawing programs. These programs take their input from the data 
files created by the fault tree synthesis program and send their output to either a line 
printer, or a flat bed plotter. 
f) run PREP/FTAP. The input to these programs is from data files created by the fault 
tree synthesis program. The output from these programs is also written to data files and 
comprises the listing of the minimal cutsets for the system. 
Further details of the nature of user input required by these programs can be found in 
the main body of the thesis. 
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APPENDIX B 
B. 1 INTRODUCTION 
This section presents an overview of the Lapp-Powers Heat Exchanger system and gives 
the complete decomposition information required by FAULTFINDER to synthesise the 
fault tree. 
B. 2 LAPP-POWERS SYSTEM FLOW DIAGRAM 
The starting point for any analysis by FAULTFINDER is the system flow diagram. This 
is given in Figure B. 1. The main points to note are that the system comprises two 
streams which interact in the heat exchanger. The hot nitric acid stream passes through 
the tubes of the heat exchanger and is cooled by the flow of coolant water through the 
shell-side of the exchanger. 
The temperature at the outlet of the heat exchanger is monitored and regulated by 
manipulating the flow of coolant via a feedback control loop. 
There is also a feedforward trip system. This is activated only if there is no flow of 
coolant. Under such conditions the flow of nitric acid is cut off. This is necessary since 
the control loop cannot compensate for deviations in the nitric acid stream if there is no 
flow of coolant. 
Figure B. 1 
Flow Diagram for Lapp-Powers System 
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B. 3 DECOMPOSITION DIAGRAM FOR LAPP-POWERS SYSTEM 
The decomposition diagram corresponding to the flow diagram given in Figure B. 1, is 
given in Figure B. 2. A discussion of the decomposition diagram is presented in Chapter 
3.2. 
B. 4 CONFIGURATION INPUT TO FAULTFINDER 
When a new configuration is being input, it would normally be done interactively; the 
system prompts the user for input. The input would then be stored in a data file. This file 
is suitable for carrying out minor modifications to the configuration using a suitable 
screen editor. The complete input file required by FAULTFINDER to specify the 
configuration is given below. 
NUMBER OF UNITS : 17 
NUMBER OF CONNECTIONS: 19 
NUMBER OF DIVIDER-HEADER COMBINATIONS: 0 
NUMBER OF CONTROL LOOPS: 1 
NUMBER OF TRIPS WITH OPEN VALVE: 1 
NUMBER OF TRIPS WITH CLOSED VALVE: 0 
TOPOLOGY - LIBRARY NUMBERS OF UNITS 
UNIT NUMBER MODEL NUMBER 
1 6 
2 45 
3 28 
4 13 
5 12 
6 7 
7 6 
8 1 
9 10 
10 4 
11 7 
12 18 
13 8 
14 68 
15 8 
16 70 
17 71 
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CONFIGURATION - CONNECTIONS LINKING UNITS TOGETHER 
CONNECTION UPSTREAM DOWNSTREAM 
NUMBER UNIT PORT UNIT PORT 
1 1 1 2 1 
2 2 2 3 1 
3 3 2 4 1 
4 4 2 5 1 
5 
6 
5 
7 
2 
1 
6 
8 
1 
1 
7 8 2 9 1 
8 9 2 10 1 
9 10 2 3 3 
10 3 4 11 1 
11 5 3 12 1 
12 12 2 10 3 
13 13 1 12 3 
14 9 3 14 1 
15 14 2 2 3 
16 15 1 14 3 
17 16 1 12 4 
18 16 2 14 4 
19 17 1 8 3 
CONTROL LOOPS 
NUMBER: 1 
SENSED VARIABLE: T 
VARIABLE SENSED IN UNIT: 5 
CONTROL VALVE UNIT NUMBER: 10 
OTHER UNITS IN CONTROL SYSTEM ARE: 12 13 16 
VARIABLE T REGULATED IN CONNECTIONS: 345 
FLOW MANIPULATED IN CONNECTIONS :6789 10 
LOOP IS NOT OF THE FEEDFORWARD TYPE 
OPEN VALVE TRIP SYSTEMS 
NUMBER: 1 
TRIP VALVE UNIT NUMBER: 2 
OTHER UNITS IN THE TRIP SYSTEM ARE: 9 14 15 16 
The following notes accompany the above data input requirements: 
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a) the first section simply summarises some top-level information about the system. All 
systems comprise units and interconnections between these. In most systems these will interact to form sub-systems which require special treatment during fault tree synthesis. The FAULTFINDER MK1 methodology identifies four categories of sub-system: divider-header combinations, control loops, open valve trip systems and closed valve trip systems. Each of these is explained in Section 3.2 of Chapter 3. It will suffice here to note that the current system is flagged as having one control loop and one open valve trip system. 
b) in the topology section it is necessary to identify the model library reference number 
of the failure model relating to each unit in the configuration. It is necessary that failure 
models exist in the library for all the units in the configuration. 
c) in the configuration section it is necessary to identify how all the units are connected 
together. This is done by reference to the connections between the units. The terms 
upstream and downstream refer to the normal direction of flow. 
d) for each sub-system it is necessary to specify additional information which is needed 
by the fault tree synthesis algorithm. 
B. 5 MODEL FOR HEAT EXCHANGER 
A schematic representation of this unit is given in Figure B. 3. This model has been 
selected from the above configuration to illustrate the modelling conventions of 
FAULTFINDER. This model is discussed in Section 3.3 of Chapter 3. 
2 
Figure B. 3 
Schematic Representation of Heat Exchanger Model 
Given below is the list of propagation equations and event statements used to specify the 
failure model for the heat exchanger. 
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Number Propagation Equations 
1 Gl IN=F l IN2OUT 
2 R1 IN=F R2OUT 
3 U1 IN=F 2OUT 
4 Y1 IN=F Y2OUT 
5 2OUT=F G 1ING2OUT 
6 T2OUT=F G 1IN -G3IN T 1INT3IN 
7 X2OUT=F X1 IN 
8 P2OUT=F P1 IN 
9 G3IN=F 3IN 4OUT 
10 R3IN=F R4OUT 
11 U3IN=F 4OUT G1 IN 
12 Y3IN=F Y4OUT 
13 4OUT=F G3ING4OUT 
14 T4OUT=F G1 IN -G3IN T1 INT3IN 
15 X4OUT=F X3IN 
16 7 - P4OUT=F P3IN 
Table B. 1 
List of Propagation Equations for Heat Exchanger Model of Figure B. 3 
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Number Event Statements 
1 F EXT-HEAT: T2OUT HI, T4OUT HI ,U1 IN HI 
2 F EXT-COLD: T2OUT LO, T4OUT LO U3IN LO 
3 F FOULING: T2OUT HI T4OUT LO U1IN HI U3IN LO 
4 V G1IN LO: D DUMMY 
5 V G3IN LO: E DUMMY 
6 V GUN NONE: D DUMMY 
7 V G3IN NONE: E UMMY 
8 V GUN REV: D DUMMY 
9 V G3IN REV: E DUMMY 
10 ID DUMMY : T4OUT LO, U3IN LO 
1 IE DUMMY : T2OUT HI ,U 1IN HI 
12 F LK-LP-EN: G3IN HI, G3IN SOME, Q4OUT LO, Q4OUT NONE, 
Q4OUT REV, R3IN HI, R3IN SOME, R3IN NOP, P4OUT NONE, 
P4OUT REV T2OUT HI T4OUT HI ,U 1IN 
HI 
13 F INT-LK: G l IN HI, G 1IN SOME, Q2OUT LO, Q2OUT NONE, 
Q2OUT REV, RIIN HI, R1IN SOME, RIIN NOP, P2OUT LO, 
P2OUT NONE, P2OUT REV, G3IN LO, G3IN NONE, G3IN REV, 
Q4OUT HI, Q4OUT SOME, R3IN LO, R3IN NONE, R3IN REV, 
P4OUT HI, P4OUT SOME, P4OUT NOR, X4OUT HI, Y3IN HI, 
T2OUT LO, T4OUT HI 
14 F PART-BLK: GIIN LO, Q2OUT LO, RIIN LO, P2OUT LO, T2OUT LO, 
T4OUT LO U 3IN LO 
15 F COMP-BLK: GIIN NONE, Q2OUT NONE, RIIN NONE, RIIN NOP, 
P2OUT NONE, P2OUT NOR, T4OUT LO, U3IN LO 
16 S NORMAL: U 1IN LO U3IN HI 
Table B. 2 
List of Event Statements for Heat Exchanger Model of Figure B. 
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APPENDIX C 
This appendix contains the list of fault names, along with their meaning, which have been used in this thesis. 
A(DUMMY) Intermediate event to structure the fault tree AIR-LOCK Air lock in a pump 
AN-BROKE Alarm annunciator broken 
B(DUMMY) Intermediate event to structure the fault tree CAVITATN Pump cavitating 
C(DUMMY) Intermediate event to structure the fault tree 
CL-ACT Normal control loop action branch 
CL-F-HA Control loop has failed giving high aperture CL-F-LA Control loop has failed giving a low aperture CL-F-NA Control loop has failed giving no aperture 
CL-O-LD Control loop overload 
CL-STK Control loop stuck 
CNT-F-HI Controller failed emitting high signal 
CNT-F-LO Controller failed emitting low signal 
CNT-MAN Controller is in a manual setting 
CNT-STK Controller is stuck 
COMP-BLK Complete blockage in pipe 
CV-F-HA Control valve failed giving a high aperture 
CV-F-LA Control valve failed giving a low aperture 
CV-F-NA Control valve failed giving no aperture 
CV-F-SH Control valve failed shut 
CV-STK Control valve stuck 
D(DUMMY) Intermediate event to structure the fault tree 
DTROWn Intermediate event arising from decision table 
DUMMY Intermediate event to structure the fault tree 
E(DUMMY) Intermediate event to structure the fault tree 
EXT-COLD External cold source 
EXT-HEAT External hot source 
F(DUMMY) Intermediate event to structure the fault tree 
FOULING Fouling in heat exchanger 
GOV-F-FO Governor failed fully open 
HEAT-FAIL Heater failed 
HV-D-OP Hand valve driven open 
HV-D-SH Hand valve driven shut 
HV-F-OP Hand valve fails open 
HV-F-SH Hand valve fails shut 
HV-FT-SH Hand valve fails to shut 
IAR-LOSS Loss of inert air supply 
IMPLR-F Pump impeller failed 
INSUF-PU Insufficient purge 
INT-LK Internal leakage 
LK-HP-EN Leak from a high pressure environment 
LK-LP-EN Leak to a low pressure environment 
OP-FAIL Failure of operator to act 
OVRTEMP Over temperature 
PART-BLK Partial blockage in pipe 
P-F-STA Poor flame stability 
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POW-LOSS Loss of power supply 
PROTECTN Start of trip loop functional failure 
PUMP-FAIL Pump failure 
PUMP-SUR Surge in pump 
P-X-LIT Poor cross lighting 
SEN-F-HI Sensor failed high 
SEN-F-LO Sensor failed low 
SEN-F-NO Sensor failed none 
SEN-STK Sensor stuck 
SET-P-HI Setpoint failed high 
SET-P-LO Setpoint failed low 
SEQ-ABRT Sequence aborts 
SEQ-F-AF Sequence fails after step n 
SEQ-F-AT Sequence fails at step n 
SHUTDOWN The unit has been shutdown 
SIG-CB Signal line is completely blocked 
SIG-PB Signal line is partially blocked 
SV-FT-OP Solenoid valve fails to open 
TL-FN-F Trip loop functional failure 
TL-OP-F Trip loop operational failure 
T-N-INS Torch not inserted 
TOR-NLIT Torch not lit 
TSW-DIS Trip switch disarmed 
TSW-STK Trip switch stuck 
TV-FT-OP Trip valve fails to open 
TV-FT-SH Trip valve fails to shut 
TV-L-OP Torch valve left open 
UTL-FAIL Utility failure 
UTL-OK Utility OK 
UTL-SOME Some utility exists 
VV-FT-OP Vent valve fails to open 
